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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to provide some insight into the
current interests and objectives of the United States in the
Southwest Pacific and to examine whether the present policies of
the United States are adequate to meet the changing situation in
the region.
In the past the United States has kept a low profile in the
region, leaving regional affairs to the various Island states ana
general security matters to what was considered the firm anchors
of Australia and New Zealand. The United States has relaxed in
the knowledge that relationships among South Pacific Forum
countries were harmonious and that the Islands were anti-
communist and Western-orientated.
The United States has played an active role in the Southwest
Pacific in that sector of the region where it has territories,
these being the islands of Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust.
Territories of the Pacific Islands. However, in the rest of the
Southwest Pacific, the policy of the United States has been to
let Australia and New Zealand manage the region, since the
interests and objectives of these two allies were seen as being
very much in tune with those of the United States.
The contention of this thesis is that, in light of the
current disputes between the United States and several states in
the Southwest Pacific, especially with New Zealand and the Island
states, and the opportunities this has presented the Soviets to
gain a foothold In the region, that It la time for the United
Statea to adopt new policy directiona in the area.
The reaearch conducted in thia theaia will examine whether or
not current United Statea policy atill aervea United Statea
Intereata and object!vea in the Southweat Pacific. And that if
It doea not, what new directiona United Statea policy ahould take
In the Southweat Pacific. To accomplish thia, thia theaia will
reaearch the current political, military, and economic
environment In the Southweat Pacific and the United Statea
Intereata and objectives in thia area, and poaaible future trends
in policy. From thia baaia, policy optiona will be recommended
that will hopefully lead to more effective protection of United
Statea interests, both on the regional and global levels.
8
II- IHI AREA DEFINED
An overview of the various states of the region and the
physical, political, economic, and social environment in which
they exist provides the current setting in which United States
national security policy must operate. An understanding of the
region is essential to the formulation of realistic policies for
the United States.
The area with which this thesis is concerned is given the
name of the Southwest Pacific , although someone examining the
region from Thailand would probably term it the Southeast
Pacific. Host literature concerning the region also refers it as
the South Pacific and Oceania. The states with which this thesis
is primarily concerned include Australia, New Zealand, and those
Islands states and territories that stretch from approximately 10
degrees north to 50 degrees south of the equator as upper and
lower limits and from 140 degrees west longitude to 130 east
longitude.
A. AUSTRALIA
Australia is the sixth largest country in the world and the
smallest of the world's seven continents. Australia has a land
area of 2,967,909 square miles—an area almost the size of the
forty-eight contiguous states of the United States. Cl:32]
The population, 15.5 million in 1985, is comparatively small but
growing. It is largely urban, concentrated in the better watered
areas that fringe the continent, especially the eastern littoral.
Figure 1 Map of the Southwest Pacific
Source: [1:874]
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Successive recent Australian governments have carried out a
program of massive growth and diversification. An ambitious
immigration effort has doubled the population, and mixed large
numbers of continental Europeans into a society whose ancestors
had come largely from the British Isles. Australia has abolished
the "White Australia" policy and has admitted significant numbers
of Asian immigrants. Furthermore , steps have been taken to
expand the industrial and educational basis of Australian
society. [2:3473
These steps have resulted in a current day Australia that is
a highly industrialized and independent nation deeply involved in
International affairs. Nonetheless, the country's economy is
still dependent firstly on agriculture and then on raw materials,
ranging from iron ore and coal to nickel, uranium, diamonds,
natural gas, and more. The new independent Island states in the
South Pacific have looked to Australia for leadership as the most
advanced and affluent power in its geopolitical sphere. [1:303
The notable feature of Australian society is the consensus on
political values, including the principle of popular control of
government. The political value system introduced to Australia
by the early settlers was rooted principally in the liberal
thoughts of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Moreover, the procedures for settling social and political
conflicts were also patterned after the English model. These
include the belief that government derives its just powers from
popular consent, that government exists for the protection of
certain inalienable individual rights, and that public officials
should be subject to the close scrutiny of the community through
11
Figure 2 Map of Australia and New Zealand
Source: [1:8733
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frequent elections. The tenets of values held by Australians are
familiar to Americans and others sharing broadly in the liberal
Western political tradition. C3:214]
Australia's political relations within the Southwest Pacific
are complicated by ambiguities due to the inherent difficulties
of Australia's position as a rich, high-cost, hedonistic and
largely empty "European" outpost off the coast of Asia, by the
demands of the Australian Labour Party's (ALP) left wing, and by
the determination any government must demonstrate to play a
definable role in the region and not simply tag along behind
larger friends or groups of friends. [4:123
Australia shares with New Zealand the benefits of being a
long way from the major concentrations of military power, and
from the focal points of superpower competition. Neither live
side by side with nations that have standing forces able to
present a major threat to them. Furthermore, it is self-evident
that any defense emergency directly threatening Australia (or New
Zealand) would be maritime in nature, at least initially. [5:7]
B. NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand lies approximately 1,500 miles southeast of
Australia. It consists of two main islands. North Island with an
area of 44,200 sq. miles and South Island with an area of 58,170
sq. miles, plus Stewart Island to the south, with an area of 625
sq. miles and some smaller islands. North and South Islands are
separated by Cook Strait, which is about 19 miles wide at the
narrowest point. [1:462]
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New Zealand's development during the poat-World War II period
has been much less spectacular than that of Australia. New
Zealand has achieved a high standard of living built on efficient
production of livestock, meat, and dairy products. The British
entry into the European Community deprived New Zealand of much of
it secure export market, forcing a painful shift to Japan and
other alternative customers (one of which is the Soviet Union)
.
Unlike Australia, New Zealand does not have a widely varied
mineral resource base or a highly industrial structure. [2:3473
The processes of economic development that has occurred, has
dictated a steadily increasing concentration of population, still
relying on farm products and industrial output, in the major
cities, especially within the North Island. [6:6233
The majority of the population is of European origin, with a
total population in 1985 of 3.2 million. For nearly a century
and a half—from the Treaty of Waitangi signed between the Maoris
(the native people of New Zealand) and the European settlers in
1940--the European influence has heavily predominated. Recently
however, there has been a pronounced reassertion of Maori rights
and a renaissance in Maori culture, even though the Maoris
represent less than 10* of the total population. [7:83
In New Zealand the parliamentary model has been severely
modified to where New Zealand can rightfully claim to be called
"democracy's testtube." New Zealand once had provincial
parliaments and an upper house in the national parliament. Both
have been abolished and instead New Zealand formed 95
constituencies of equal population. Elections are held every
three years, with over 90 percent of eligible voters casting
14
their votes. These structual changes have resulted in a very
sensitive and dynamic political process. Many in New Zealand are
becoming more active, perhaps sensing that the country's
political direction is susceptible to "the confusion of the
1
multitude."
In the view of the New Zealand Government, and the population
at large. New Zealand has played and will continue to play a very
important role in maintaining the stability of the Southwest
Pacific and regard New Zealand very much as a Pacific power.
C9:ml] However, this role and interest in maintaining stability
in the South Pacific may be in jeopardy due to the current New
Zealand Government ban on nuclear-armed and propelled ship visits
in order to get away from and protest, "things nuclear."
According to the New Zealand Government, the country's location,
far removed from potential adversaries, renders a "nuclear
defense" unnecessary and unwanted. [10:23
C. AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND LINK
Australia and New Zealand share a special relationship, but
the ties which bind the two are not based on sentiment but on
essentially practical considerations. They are a mixture of a
"Irfhen America's Founding Fathers debated the institutional
future of the nation, some warned of the dangers of too much
democracy. The argument favored a representative government, a
republic to "guard against the confusion of a multitude."
Madison and other federalist suggested a aeries of governmental
checks and balances to temper the self-serving factions and the
vicissitudes of populism. What emerged included a House of
Representatives, responsible to local constituencies, and a
Senate responsible for larger regional and national interests,
and an Executive charged with safeguarding national security
Interests, among other responsibilities. [8:4-5]
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common heritage in the British Empire and Commonwealth,
geographic proximity, a tradition of allowing movement of people
between the two countries with a minimun of restriction, a close
military association embodied in the word Anzac and a highly
preferential trading relationship. While each country has
developed a distinctive national spirit, people speak with
similar accents and share similar cultures. [11:23
The successful negotiation of the Agreement for Closer
Economic Relations (CER) in 1982 has laid the foundations for a
common market between the two countries which will be of
significant importance to both, but particularly in strengthening
New Zealand. Australia is a vital middle power in the world
comparable in many ways to Canada; New Zealand is a small country
with many of the characteristics of Denmark. Under CER, New
Zealand's future economic security and development will be
inextricably bound up with Australia, although their political
relations—in some ways very reminiscent of the relations between
Canada and the United States—will continue to be those of two
independent neighbors of markedly different size. [2:3483
As pointed out above, a military pact exists between the two
countries, the Anzac Pact. This agreement came into force in
1944 and is a cornerstone of the Australia-New Zealand nexus. It
was negotiated amid the stresses of war and it came about because
the governments of the time agreed that if an Anzac voice were to
be asserted about the conduct of the war and post-war
developments there would be a better chance of persuading the
great powers to take Australia's and New Zealand's views into
account. Although there have been several differences of opinion
16
between the Australian and New Zealand Governments (such as over
New Zealand's nuclear-free zone stance), the relations between
the two have been fashioned since the war by the development of
close consultation and more often than not unity of view on the
major international issues of the day. [11:5-63
Australia and New Zealand both see the Southwest Pacific and
Southeast Asia as areas of primary strategic interest, as
Australian Minister of Defence Kim Brezley pointed out when he
stated
:
It is fundamental to the security interests of both Australia
and New Zealand that the broad alignment between ourselves and
the countries of ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum prove to be
durable in the long-term. We concentrate our cooperative
activity with regional partners in these areas because it is
there that our interests are most directly involved, that
we are best placed to develop our influence, and that we
can make a practical contribution to wider Western security
interests. [5:163
The Polynesian South Pacific has been traditionally a New
Zealand area of concern and Australia has focused more on
Melanesia. Both countries have given the South Pacific more
concentrated attention since the mid-1970' s. Prompted by Tonga's
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in
April 1976 and reports that the Soviets had offered Tonga aid in
exchange for right to build an international airport and 3et up a
permanent fishing base, strategic planners were spurred to take a
new look at the security ramifications of decolonization in the
South Pacific. [12:4723
D. ANZUS
For Australia and New Zealand, their experience during World
War II changed their prewar stereotypes forever. The shock of
17
realizing that Britain could no longer protect them against
external attack resulted in a rapid and fundamental reorientation
in their thinking. The United States, which before the war had
been regarded as distant, somewhat unfamiliar, and of secondary
importance, now became clearly the powerful bulwark on which
their military security rested. [2:3473
The ANZUS alliance entered into force on April 29, 1952. It
was originally sought by Australia and New Zealand to prevent
repetition of Japanese aggression. The Alliance has evolved
subsequently into a component part of the interlocking anti-
communist system of alliances linking the Western states.
Collectively, these alliances aim to deter aggression and to
provide for cooperation should deterrence fail. [10:1] For
example, there are no direct political or legal linkages between
2
ANZUS and the Five Power Defense Arrangement. However, any
potential aggressor in Southeast Asia must take into account that
ANZUS alliance interests would be threatened by an attack
engaging Australian and New Zealand forces there. [13:43
The ANZUS Treaty is a broadly worded document (see Appendix
B) and has come to be regarded by all three states aa the basis
for a very wide-ranging program of security cooperation which
includes intelligence exchanges, regular joint exercises,
logistics and defense technology agreements, joint planning and
2The Five Power Defense Arrangement of 1971, between
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and
Singapore, made Malaysia and Singapore responsible for their own
defense and required consultation in the event of external
aggression. It also provides for the stationing of Australian,
New Zealand, and United Kingdom forces in Malaysia and Singapore.
18
regular consultative arrangements at the highest civilian and
military levels. [14:783
The ANZUS link has enhanced the influence and ability of
Australia and New Zealand to preserve regional stability beyond
what they could achieve in isolation. C15:l] Australia and New
Zealand have a clear interest in doing what they can to see that
the region is not open to exploitation by countries who do not
share their values or basic commitment to individual freedom and
democracy. C16:23 Both Australia and New Zealand have programs
designed to support the security capabilities of friendly
countries in the region. New Zealand has its military assistance
program, and Australia its Defence Cooperation program. [5:17]
In retrospect, the Tonga incident in 1976 proved significant
as a catalyst that sparked an overdue reappraisal of security in
the Southwest Pacific by the ANZUS partners. At ANZUS meetings
in 1976 and 1977 the two nations undertook to persuade the United
States to accept their contention that Soviet activity in the
Southwest Pacific was sufficiently threatening to ANZUS interests
to warrant more attention to security matters. [12:4723
Having had it brought to their notice that the strategic
setting in the Southwest Pacific was changing, the ANZUS allies
determined to take active steps to protect their own security
interests. In August 1976 and 1977, the ANZUS states agreed that
it was totally unnecessary for them to take a direct military
response to the situation. Instead, they resolved to increase
economic assistance to the South Pacific and upgrade support for
regional institutions. Provision of military aid and development
of regional defense cooperation were to form only a minor part of
19
this. Because Australia and New Zealand had the closest
bilateral ties to the South Pacific area, it was agreed that they
should properly take the leading role in implementing the new
policy. By increasing economic assistance to the Southwest
Pacific the ANZUS states hoped to ensure that none of the new
states would seek aid from any adversary of ANZUS or from sources
deemed likely to promote radical ideologies. Additionally, by
encouraging regionalism it was hoped that peer pressure and the
influence of ANZUS nations themselves would constrain individual
decisionmakers in the South Pacific from pursuing any
"adventurist" policies. [12:4733
E. THE ISLANDS
The Pacific Ocean occupies a third of the earth's surface.
Within it are located many thousands of islands, more than in all
the rest of the world's seas combined. [17:6513 Sparsely
scattered over one-sixth of the earth's surface, the 10,000
islands (sometimes called "Oceania") in the central and south
Pacific Ocean include nine independent countries, two freely
associated states, and a larger number of dependencies of the
United States, France, and New Zealand.
The islands of the insular Pacific are unequally distributed
within the vast expanse of ocean, and large portions of it are
indeed quite empty. Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan, the
first European known to transit the Pacific, discovered this
basic fact of geography the hard way. He sighted only a few
uninhabited reefs on his journey across the Pacific from South
America to the Philippines before he sighted Guam in 1521. Had
20
Figure 3 The Pacific Islands
21
he missed Guam, he most likely would have thought that the ocean
was without human inhabitants. [12:6]
The South Pacific Island countries are characterized by their
small size (the whole island region has a population of only five
million, with most living in Papua New Guinea), limited land
3
resources and an economic dependence on larger states. Like all
developing countries the people of the South Pacific region wish
to achieve the living standards of those in the West, but for
most of the Pacific developing countries, the main problem is
that the resources from which their political, social and
economic needs have to be met are inadequate to maintain the
levels of income to which they aspire, or even those to which
they have become accustomed. [18:203
"3
A number of broad classifications of Pacific Islands exist.
The islands may be divided into continental islands, high
islands, low islands and atolls. The continental islands are
located on the broken edges of the continental blocks. Erosion
has resulted in plains, deltas and swamps. The coastal pattern is
one of small coastal plains alternating with low river terraces,
high marine terraces, coastal hills and steep mountain slopes
plunging straight into the sea. Papua New Guinea is the best
example of a continental island. The high islands of the central
Pacific are composed almost entirely of volcanic materials and
are basically the peaks of the largest volcanoes in the world.
Characteristic landforms of this islands are striking peak and
valley forms and narrow beaches, with fringing coral reefs
completing the pattern. Low islands are of two types: some are
volcanic islands which have been eroded, while others are raised
atolls. Caves and sinkholes occur widely, with small pockets of
soil occurring within the limestone rocks. Surface water is
extremely uncommon. The final island form is the atolls, which
are roughly circular reefs of coral limestone, partly covered by
sea water on which there are small islands made up of
accumulations of limestone debris, and within which there occurs
a lagoon of calm water. Atoll islets are commonly less than 9
feet above the high-tide level and vary in size from about less
than 1 mile by 1 mile to over 37 miles long. Sources of fresh
water are rain and a freshwater lens which is found floating on
salt groundwater beneath the islets. [17:651-52].
22
TABLE I










































































Ethnically and culturally the islands of the Pacific fall
into three subregions:
Micronesia--Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam,
Nauru, and Kiribati;
Melanesia--Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia,
Vanuatu, and part of Fiji; and
Polynesia—part of Fiji, French Polynesia, Tuvalu, Tonga,
Western Samoa, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna,
and the Pitcairn Dependency. [19:1]
Polynesian societies are basically patrilineal and
genealogically ranked, with elaborate hierarchical systems of
rank and class, best developed on the Hawaiian, Tongan and
Society Islands. Micronesian societies are mainly matrilineal,
with the exception of Yap and Kiribati. Melanesia is culturally
the most diverse area of all. Hereditary ranking occurs in Fiji,
but in many areas, especially in Papua New Guinea, status is
achieved rather than inherited. Most groups are patrilineal, but
matrilineal societies occur in New Guinea, Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu. [17:6533
The Polynesians, broadly speaking, tend to take a less
assertive role in regional affairs and generally their economies
are in more serious trouble; the others have larger populations
and wider resource bases and are apt to take wider interest in
regional affairs. The Melanesians also tend to argue for a
merger of the South Pacific Forum with other regional groups such
as the South Pacific Economic Commission in Fiji. This is
resisted by the smaller predominantly Polynesian states who fear
that their interests would be overlooked in one large regional
grouping. [20:112]
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Population growth rates vary from 1.1 percent in Western
Samoa, through 2.7 percent in Papua New Guinea, to 3.2 percent in
Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. Life expectancy is generally
between 50-60 years. Most Pacific Islanders live in rural areas,
with a high of 91 percent rural dwellers in the Solomon Islands
and a low of 63 percent in Fiji. 2.7 million people, an
estimated 89 percent of the population, reside in rural areas in
Papua New Guinea. t21:735]
For most of the Southwest Pacific Island states, official
development assistance (ODA)., comprising ODA loans and grants,
constitutes a significant component of total external financing.
ODA accounts for more than 90 per cent of external inflows into
the following Island countries (in descending order of reliance):
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Niue, Samoa, and the Cook
Islands. Nearly complete dependence on ODA for these countries
reflects their inability to mobilize external resources on non-
concessional terms. For a second group of Island states, ODA
accounts for 66 per cent to less than 90 per cent of their
external financing; these being: Kiribati and Papua New Guinea.
In the remainder of the Island states, ODA plays a relatively
less important role, although it is still important to the
functioning of their economies. [22:195]
Unfavorable balance of payments position and low foreign
exchange levels are common regional problems. Foreign direct
investments are important in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. There
has been a stable, even increased, flow of foreign direct
investments to economies of the region, which have relied on and
encouraged such investment as a long-term strategy. [22:1043
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The bottom line for all these countries is that the inflow of
funds from external sources is critical in keeping the economies
(and the political and social systems) afloat.
The general employment situation is similar to many
developing countries, with widespread unemployment in urban
centers, especially among youth. The largest proportion of the
workforce is engaged in agriculture and fisheries. While this
proportion has been declining for some time in relation to the
non-agricultural and services sectors, it remains the major part
of the cash economy. The level of employment in subsistence
agriculture is very high. Government priorities in most nations
are aimed at finding suitable employment opportunities. There is
little likelihood that significant industrial development will
emerge to provide alternative employment for traditional farmers
and fisherman. A reflection of this is considerable emigration
of the young to developed, industrialized countries. [21:735]
The economic performance of several Southwest Pacific Island
states economies have improved considerably since 1983. This
economic growth has been propelled largely by a higher level of
export-related activities. Higher demand and external prices for
most commodities of significant importance to the island
subregion--including coconut produce, palm oil, rubber, cocoa,
copper and gold--resulted in an appreciable improvement in trade
earnings. It is important to note that much of this improvement
was a reflection of the recovery in the economies of industrial
countries, mainly the United States. Additionally, the effect of
increased external demand varied greatly among the countries of
the subregion, depending on both the commodities they exported
26
and the conditions in the markets of their traditional trading
partners. [22:38]
In the Southwest Pacific, there are no communist parties and
Marxism is not an attractive philosophy in Island states where
Christianity is deeply entrenched. In contrast to the experience
of post-colonial societies in Africa and Asia, force has not been
used in the Southwest Pacific countries to remove a government
and there have been no military coups and there are no one party
states. [23:713 Furthermore, the Islanders share the United
States' respect for democracy and human rights and have modeled
many of their institutions on those of Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States. [19:13
Regarding the Pacific Island states, there is a growing
opinion emerging among some members of the political elites of
these states. Some feel that if it is in the national interest
of these states to 'normalize' relations with the Soviet Union,
then they will do so. They argue that the U.S., Australia, and
New Zealand, should not be overly concerned that these states
cannot successfully cope with the Soviets, since they are just as
capable of handling the Soviets as the U.S. and the Anzac
combination. If other Western countries can profit from
commerical and cultural transactions with the Soviets, and handle
the pressures of the 'Bear', then it is chauvinistic of Western
states to think that the Island states could not also handle
relations with the Soviet Union.
27
F. SOUTH PACIFIC INSTITUTIONS
In striving for a regional approach to the political,
economic, and security problems facing the various states in the
region, the concerned states have founded several institutions to
cope with these issues. The original and still functioning
institution for the area, the South Pacific Commission, comprises
the five metropolitan powers of Australia, New Zealand, France,
the United Kingdom, and the U.S., and the independent Island
countries of Fiji, Nauru, New Guinea, Solomons, Tuvalu, and
Western Samoa. Formed in the post-World War II era of gradual
decolonialization, the Commission has undergone several
transitions from (1) an advisory body for the metropolitan
powers, to (2) a body placing stronger emphasis on technical aid,
and finally towards becoming (3) an education and training
organization for the Island countries. Although the developed
nations that founded the Commission intended for it to
increasingly involve the indigenous peoples of the region,
discontent over their inability to take part directly in
decisions affecting the region lead the Island leaders to form
their own coalition in the early 1970s. [24:12483
It was New Zealand in 1971, at the suggestion of Fiji, that
took the lead in founding the South Pacific Forum to allow the
heads of the governments of the Island countries, Australia and
New Zealand to discuss political questions openly. [25:163 This
coalition has as its administrative arm the South Pacific Bureau
for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) . The Forum and SPEC were forged
by the Pacific mini-states more or less as a challenge to the
Commission's reluctance to address pressing political issues in
28
Figure 4 Area Served by the South Pacific Commission
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auch natters aa diatant water fiahing righta. [24:12483 Only
two developed countries, Australia and New Zealand, are part of
4
the Forum's restrictive membership.
In spite of their apparent rivalry, the two institutions
instead serve complementary functions and facilitate flexibility
and choice in multilateral cooperation in the South Pacific. The
Commission, because of its emphasis in the generally nonpolitical
area of training and research, can explore new and experimental
ideas. The Forum, on the other hand, is able to deal more
directly with sensitive political issues through its ministerial
meetings while SPEC promotes cooperation on economic development
and trade. Together, the Commission and the Forum represent a
two-tiered approach that allows both research and policy-oriented
activities to move forward. [24:1248] These two institutions
have been among the most successful in the Pacific in terms of
active involvement of a group of developing and develop nations.
G. NUCLEAR TESTING
Since the end of World War II, the region has been used for
the development of nuclear weapons. The U.S. began testing in
1946 over Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands and it exploded
its first hydrogen bomb on Enewetok Atoll in 1952. Over the next
six years, some 66 tests were carried out at Bikini and Enewetok.
Thereafter the United States moved its tests to Johnson Island,
The member states of the SPF are Australia, Cook Islands,
Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. The
Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau have
obaerver status in the Forum.
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south of Hawaii. Britain also conducted an extensive program of
atmospheric tests in the Southwest Pacific. It exploded some 12
nuclear bombs on Australian territory and then moved its tests to
Christmas Island where it exploded its first thermonuclear device
in 1957. As a consequence of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the
United States and Britain ceased testing in the Southwest Pacific
in 1963. France remain the only state which continues nuclear
tests in the region. [14:803
Given this background, the nations of the Southwest Pacific
have sought to stop the use of their area as a testing ground for
nuclear weapons development. And during the meeting of the South
Pacific Forum in Raratonga from 4-6 August 1985, the nations of
the Forum unanimously endorsed the draft Treaty on a South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone on the 6th of that month. The Treaty
and its protocols are intended to lead to the acceptance by the
international community, including the nuclear weapon states, of
a zone in the South Pacific in which all the territories are free
of nuclear weapons and that there is no testing of nuclear
explosive devices and no dumping of nuclear wastes. [26:2] The
action of the South Pacific Forum states makes their region the




III. UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
A. BASIC TENETS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Specific United States interests and objectives in the
Southwest Pacific are subject to the same basic tenets that
underly all United States policies. The foundations that guide
America's approach to the rest of the world are found in the
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States. The
fundamental purpose of the United States, as laid down in the
Preamble, is " . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the
fundamental purpose of the United States is to assure the
integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon
the dignity and worth of the individual. [27:90]
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our
determination to maintain the essential elements of individual
freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights;
our determination to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to
fight if necessary to defend our way of life. [27:903
Our approach toward the rest of the world is based on the
reality that our own security and prosperity require constructive
engagement in the world beyond our own frontiers. We are locked
in a global competition with forces whose objectives and methods
are diametrically opposed to the values on which our society is
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based. The fundamental values as I conceive them that guide U.S.
foreign policy are:
1. As a pluralistic and diverse society, we have a strong bias
toward pluralist democracy as a unifying system of
government in other nations.
--Democratic systems have proven to be a strong defense
against communist penetration and subversion. People who
live within a democratic system with individual freedom and
guarantees of justice are not susceptible to the
blandishments of Marxism-Leninism.
2. As beneficiaries of change, we are convinced that change
cannot be resisted. We are confident that, when it is
accommodated in an open, competitive system, change is a
positive process. We are not wedded to the status quo.
3. As a "have" and "satisfied" nation, we are committed to the
rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are
opposed to the use of violence and subversion as
instruments of political change. C28:2]
American motives in the conduct of international relations
are quite simple. The United States wants to assist in
maintaining a world of independent nations, a world in which
problems are solved not by force but by negotiation. We have
secondary motives, like international well being and reinforcing
peace. [29:83 But, it is also essential for United States
foreign policy formulators to understand that an American foreign
policy which is not grounded in our own democratic values will
not be supported by the American people and therefore, could not
be sustained. C28:2]
B. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE SW PACIFIC
Within a single generation the United States has fought three
wars in the Pacific. As a result, Americans have been called
upon to reexamine our national interests and policies in this
region more frequently than in any other part of the world. And
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each of these reassessments has led to the same Inescapable
conclusion-that the United States is a Pacific nation whose
security and economic prosperity are inextricably linked to the
stability and growth of this vast area. [30:33
Another aspect of U.S. policy following World War Two
concerning the Southwest Pacific, was that given American
preoccupation with the dangers in Northeast and Southeast Asia
the lack of interest in the Southwestern Pacific affairs was
unavoidable. In any case, the region had been put on the
backburner for the U.S. virtually from the conclusion of the
ANZUS alliance in 1951. [31:187]
The United States has a strong interest in the maintenance of
a stable equilibrium of power in East Asia and the Western
Pacific. Economic factors such as natural resources, markets,
energy, trade, and investment closely tie together the United
States and the burgeoning countries of Asia. Not only do we have
a major interest in such economic, political, and strategic
matters, but our interests also include issues involving deeply
held American values, as listed above. The three keys to a sound
U.S. policy in the region are a free and open world economy, a
solid deterrent posture, and effective diplomacy. Or to put it
another way, the watchwords of our policy are realism, strength,
and negotiation:
1) Realism: The acknowledgement that economic growth lies at
the heart of progress in the Pacific. Economic growth, in
turn, is the key to both military and political strength.
2) Strength: Economic development and diplomacy cannot




3) Negotiation: Sound economies and a strong military
commitment cannot by themselves provide stability and
confidence. They must be accompanied by an active and
creative diplomacy and a willingness to negotiate. [32:3-43
In the Southwest Pacific, the focus of United States policy
is our relationship with Australia and New Zealand, as ordinarily
defined by ANZUS. ANZUS is not simply an isolated alliance for
the defense of one portion of the globe, but part of a broader
network of relations that together help hold in check a communist
threat. The ANZUS countries share traditions of democratic
freedom and a willingness to bear the cost of preserving these
values. The United States recognizes that managing a democratic
alliance requires mutual counsel as well as mutual obligations.
It is for this reason that the United States takes ANZUS country
views seriously into account in formulating American arms control
provisions, which is a world wide concern. [32:33 But for its
part, the U.S. considers ready access to Australian and New
Zealand ports critical to its defense role in the Pacific.
Australia, by virtue of its size, geographic proximity--to
the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific- -and
because of its military and political alignment, makes an
important regional contribution to mutual U.S. -ANZUS strategic
interests. Additionally, Australia plays an important role in
the overall deterrence posture of the United States, due to it
being host for a number of U.S. defense communication facilities.
Three of these directly support the U.S. strategic posture: the
Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, which relays
communications with SLBM submarines; the Defense Space Research
facility at Pine Gap, a signals intelligence unit that is
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involved in the interception of Soviet and Chinese military and
radar transmissions; and the defense space communications
facility, at Nurrungar, which is part of the United States'
satellite early warning system. In total, these three facilities
provide the U.S. with communications, including command and
control of ballistic missile submarines, early warning, targeting
information and signals intelligence. [14:77]
United States interests in the Pacific Islands are largely
derivative of those in East Asia generally, and more specifically
in Australia/New Zealand, and generally are of a lesser magnitude
than in other regions. However, with the decolonization cycle
nearing its conclusion, and with the increasing importance of
marine resources, new interests are emerging. [21:7353
The Southwest Pacific Islands assume an importance to the U.S.
belying their small size because their location lies athwart our
lines of communication with Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast
Asia. Additionally, the State of Hawaii, the territories of Guam
and American Samoa, and our close relationship with the states
emerging from the United States administered Trust Territory also
give us a stake in the region's future. [19:2]
The extent of American interest in the region in the past has
been more limited than that of either of its ANZUS partners.
Outside the defense installations in the Micronesian entities and
the security of its other regional territories, the United States
has almost no direct military interest in the area. Indeed
America's requirements of the Island states are essentially
negative, no adventurous relations with potentially hostile
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third parties and no action which would impair American military
access to its ANZUS allies. [31:1863
The only "vital" national interests are that of preservation
of open lines of communication within the region, and the denial
of the region to hostile military forces. Most of the remaining
security, political and economic interests and objectives however
do relate to and serve those vital interests, and therefore fall
into the "important" category. Economically, the most critical
of our direct national interests is that of access to the
region's marine resources which links directly to the welfare of
not only the US fishing industry, but also to the economies of
Hawaii and American Samoa. [33:35]
Major U.S. interests are: 1) to support friendly governments
that pursue moderate foreign policies supportive of U.S. basic
interests not only in the region, but also in the United Nations
and in Third World councils; 2) to preserve the reservoir of
goodwill toward the U.S. which exists throughout the region, but
which has suffered erosion from lack of any real U.S. presence in
the region since the end of World War II; and 3) to preserve U.S.
access to fish and seabed resources in the region's exclusive
economic zones. [21:736]
United States relations with the Pacific Islands are
generally friendly, due to the fact that both share to a
remarkable degree a belief in democratic government and devotion
to individual liberties. Furthermore, it is in the interest of
the U.S. to assist Island governments in their efforts to promote
economic growth [34:1723; however, due to the proliferation of
mini-states in the region it was impractical for the United
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TABLE II
UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE SW PACIFIC
STRATEGIC/SECURITY
1. region's relationship to our lines of communication with
the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, Asia, and
Australia/New Zealand.
2. US territorial/national possessions in the region--i.e.
Hawaii, Guam, and missile test range.
3. global perception of the Pacific as a region of exclusive
Western influence.
POLITICAL
1. Maintenance of stable, friendly governments that pursue
moderate foreign policies supportive not only of US basic
regional interests and objectives, but also in a global
context in the UN and in Third World councils.
2. Regional acceptance of the US as a supportive regional
partner power, and of US Pacific territories as regional
partners in their own right.
3. Maintenance of the region's showcase record in the area of
human rights and preservation of democratic institutions.
4. Promotion of regional cooperation and cohesion as elements
essential to the region's development and stability.
ECONOMIC
1. Non-discriminatory access by US fisherman, and by third
country fishing fleets that supply Hawaiian and US
territorial processing plants, to the region's exclusive
economic zones.
2. US access, as well as other friendly nation, to seabed
resources in the region's economic zones.
3. Within the region, a level of sustained economic growth
sufficient to induce continuing regional stability, and to
pre-empt the possibility of fiscally desperate Island
states undertaking initiatives with the Soviets, or other
Soviet alinged states, which could introduce to the area
great power rivalry and destabilizing political influences.
[33:33-34]
US DEFENSE RELATIONS
The major features of the American defense posture in the
Pacific are:
1. AN2US for the military response to any global and major
regional threats in this part of the world.
2. Strategic denial to limit the emergence of a major threat
in the Islands region.
3. Reliance on Australia and New Zealand to manage lesser
order threats in the area and to maintain its existing
stability. [31:1863
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States to establish diplomatic missions in each capital and
maintenance of relationships through traditional bilateral means.
This, together with limited AID resources, and the region's
tendency to address issues through regional institutions, led to
a U.S. policy focus on links with key regional states (Fiji and
1
Papua New Guinea) and support for strengthened regional cohesion
through cooperation with regional institutions, i.e., a policy of
regionalism rather than bilateralism. [33:293
The United States has long been more active to the north of
the equator than to the south, by the nature of its relationship
with Guam and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
<TTPI). Contrary to the case in other parts of the region, the
movement toward political transition in the TTPI and the attempt
to address islanders' desires for greater self-rule had generated
2
considerable analysis of related security matters. This analysis
was affected by the territory's proximity to Guam and by
The United States presently has two resident embassies in the
area--Port Moresby and Suva. The Reagan Administration is
seeking to expand these contacts by opening satellite missions in
Apia (Western Samoa) and Honiara. These missions would provide
the U.S. with an improved capacity to routinely pass its own
defense and civilian concerns on to the Governments of the region
and to respond to their interests. [31:187]
2
•'•The over-all policy goals of the United States with regard to
the Compact of Free Association between the U.S. and the FSM and
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, are based on a review of
United States policy by the Senior Interagency Group on Foreign
Policy and were approved by the President on September 21, 1981.
An important policy goal of the United States is to see political
stability in the freely associated states. The Compact seeks to
help accomplish this goal of political stability through
provision of annual grant assistance. [34:1743
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developments outside Oceania itself. Important in this regard
was the growing strategic importance of the bases at Guam in
light of its use during the Vietnam Conflict and its use as a
forward base for Polaris submarines. [12:4743 Furthermore, the
strategic importance of the TTPI has increased even more in the
mid-1980's by the turmoil in the Philippines. The need to secure
a fall-back position to the facilities at Clark and Subic,
especially in light of the Soviet position in Vietnam, has became
a prime concern of U.S. strategic planners.
C. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
The Agency for International Development's (AID) South
Pacific Regional Program assists 10 Island nations: Fiji, Papua
New Guinea, Solomons, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western
Samoa, Cook Islands, and Niue. During FY1S86, 56 million was
budgeted for this assistance. The objectives of the program are
3
to assist national development and support regionalism.
Principal problems by sector which the A.I.D. program
addresses include: increased production, diversification, and
marketing of cash crops, livestock, and marine life; agriculture
research and extension; appropriate non-formal education in
specific skills for specific groups; managerial level training
and university extension; potable water supply and sanitation;
increased private sector opportunities in agribusiness, trade and
joint ventures; and alternative and renewable energy sources.
A.I.D. assistance consists of both "grass roots" community
projects and regional programs which benefit all of the Island
countries. A.I.D. 's program strategy is increasing developmental
skills at lower levels of society and has allowed several Island
governments to make better use of both bilateral and multilateral
programs conducted by other countries. [21:7363
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Figure 6 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
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The basic A.I.D. strategy is to provide modest, non-bilateral and
indirect assistance from a regional development office located in
Fiji. For the most part, this assistance is provided through
4
intermediaries to the independent Island countries. In addition,
a modest bilateral assistance program for Fiji is under
consideration for fiscal year 1986. About 450 Peace Corps
volunteers, many of whom focus on rural development, are serving
in the region. United States contributions to international
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank also benefit the
region. [19:2]
There are fairly regular but not constant visits by U.S.
personnel to the three regional states which maintain uniformed
forces, Fiji (2,600), Papua New Guinea (3,250), and Tonga (250),
and less frequent contact with other Island states.
Additionally, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomons, and Tonga
participate in small international military education and
training programs. [19:2] Vanuatu (300) and the Solomon Islands
(50) maintain paramilitary forces, while the remainder have only
small constabulary forces. [14:79] There are also efficiency
programs such as the Hawaii-based Western Command's Pacific
Armies Management Seminars (PAMS) in which Island states
participate. [31:186]
Intermediaries used are United States and indigenous private
and voluntary organizations which implement about 70?< of the
current program, South Pacific regional institutions, and the
Peace Corps. Included are out-of -school , non-formal education
and vocational training in needed skills, principally for small
farmers and fisherman, and unemployed youth, and assistance to
regional institutions in agricultural development, satellite
communications, water and sanitation, and training. [34:189-91]
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In summary, the United States and other major donors,
Australia and New Zealand, share a common interest in seeing that
the small, newly independent Island states maintain stable
environments through political and economic growth.
D. SUMMARY
In the past the bridging role of Australia and New Zealand
has served U.S. interests and objectives in the region in the
management of regional security and Western hegemony.
Furthermore, the United States has benefited from Australia's
strategic objectives of: maintaining the mantle of the ANZUS
treaty over the South Pacific; keeping the lines of
communications to North America and Japan secure; and keeping the
Soviet diplomatic and military presence in the region to a
minimum. [14:793 This partnership has served in meeting the
major strategic concern of the United States in the Southwest
Pacific: the denial of its use for military purposes by any
hostile outside power. Furthermore, in pursuit of this goal, the
U.S. has attempted to maintain good relations with the region by
dealing with its concern.
The key to maintaining the relative stability that the region
enjoys today, and into the future, as far as U.S. policy is
concerned lies in four related efforts of roughly equal
importance: (1) the maintenance of a strong and capable U.S.
presence, one backed not only by credible forces but also by a
demonstrated U.S. will to stand by its commitments; (2) the
United States' encouragement of increased efforts by friends and
allies in support of common interests in proportion to their
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ability to bear those burdens; <3> skillful diplomacy, to manage
relations and to build ties with the very diverse countries in
the region that share fundamental interests with the United
States; and (4) the effort to encourage continued economic
development, and to the extent that the United States can, the
political development of countries in the region. A final
consideration is that the United States does not rank these
objectives in any order of importance; they are all equally
important and mutually supportive of each other. [35:29-303
As noted before, the focus of United States policy in the
Southwest Pacific has been focused on ANZUS and our partners in
the alliance, with Australia and New Zealand playing the major
role in the area. However, with the potential break-up of ANZUS,
the need for a change in U.S. policy concerning the Pacific must
be looked at since the current difficulty with New Zealand has
revealed what appears to be a basic disagreement over what the
ANZUS alliance commitment means (which will be further expanded
upon in this paper) , the United States must be prepared to assume
a larger role in the region as it concerns the security and
economic programs that affect the Island states, since the ties
of cooperation between New Zealand and the United States may be
less effective in the future. Additionally, it will be in the
interest of the United States to be in a position to state our
views on such issues as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, and
other issues, directly to the various states in the region,
rather then being filtered through a government that has
fundamental differences with the United States over this issue
and perhaps others in the future.
45
IV. OTHER STATES WITH INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
Besides the United States, Australia and New Zealand, there
are several other states who have interests in the Southwest
Pacific. Their activities and interests play a role in the
makeup of the political, economic, and social environment of the
region; therefore, an understanding of what the interests and
activities of these other states are is important to the
formulation of Americian policies.
A. FRANCE
If the world at large had forgotten that France still had
territories in the Pacific, the troubles in New Caledonia and the
Greenpeace incident in New Zealand have brought that fact back
into the limelight, for at least the present time. For United
States policymakers, the French presence has been an important
factor in issues effecting U.S. interests and objectives in the
region.
The French presence in the region is manifested mainly in the
overseas territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
France does not consider the region vital to French national
security interests nor related to its global strategy except
indirectly through its nuclear testing facility in French
Polynesia. Aside from that program, the strategic significance
of its island territories arises from France's economic stake in
New Caledonia and support for French language and culture in all
three of its dependencies. [12:4893
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The French military presence in the South Pacific is divided
between New Caledonia and French Polynesia. French forces are
deployed in the Pacific to protect French territories from
external aggression, act as a backup to internal security forces
should the need arise, provide auxiliary logistics and disaster
relief assistance to local governments, and maintain and protect
the nuclear Pacific Test Center, which is located in French
Polynesia. [12:4893
Both New Caledonia and the nuclear Pacific Test Center have
fueled resentment in the region against France, for France is
seen as a colonial power that is exploiting its territories for
its own interests and disregarding the rights and needs of both
the people who live in French possessions and the people of the
region at large.
The issue in New Caledonia is that the native Melanesians are
demanding their independence; however, French settlers want to
retain ties with France. The fear in the region is that an
Algerian-style conflict could erupt between the indigenous
Melanesians and the French settlers. And from this conflict it
is feared that meddling, unfriendly foreign powers would have an
excuse to intrude and that the region would become unstable
beyond New Caledonia. Already Melanesians from the Independence
Front <FI) have traveled to Libya seeking funds, support and
arms. Furthermore, in 1984 it was reported that 18 young
militants from the Kanak Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS) , a
break away party from the FI, went to Libya to receive six weeks
of so-called security-guard training. Prime Minister Hawke has
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remarked that any involvement of a Libyan terrorist force in New
Caledonia 'would be disastrous" for the South Pacific. [36:100]
The rigid French stand on conducting nuclear tests in the
region has also resulted in hard feelings against the French
presence in the area. Furthermore, the French nuclear tests have
directly impacted on the United States, which will be further
examined in the sections on the New Zealand nuclear-free zone
issue and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
Since its nuclear program began in 1966, France has carried
out over 113 test in the Pacific, 45 of them atmospheric and over
70 underground. [36:993 France stopped atmospheric testing in
the mid-1970' s after strong protests from the states in the
region. The culmination of this pressure to stop testing came in
May 1973, when Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji filed legal
briefs with the International Court of Justice contesting the
legality and morality of the tests. The Court ruled that the
French Government should avoid nuclear tests that resulted in the
deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territories of other
states. The French Government responded by not recognizing the
decision of the Court; however, it finally did bow to
international pressure and stopped above-ground testing in 1975.
[37:210-113
The French move to conducting only underground nuclear
testing has not made the issue any less explosive. During a
series of French test in September 1985, the governments of
Australia and New Zealand condemned as untimely and "provocative"
the visit of French President Mitterrand to hi3 country's nuclear
test site at Mururoa Atoll.
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Colin McDonald, head of Australia's European, American and
North Asian Desk, met with the French ambassador to Australia,
Bernard Follin and stated that:
The ambassador was told to convey to the president that the
Australian Government and people considered the meeting (of
French diplomatic and military representatives at Mururoa
Atoll) to be "highly provocative and contemptuous" of countries
of the South Pacific, including Australia. He was also told to
inform Mr. Mitterrand that the government felt the meeting was
apparently designed to "highlight the determination of France
to continue nuclear testing in the face of universal and total
condemnation of South Pacific governments." £38: ml]
Prime Minister Lange stated that the visit of Mitterrand to
French testing site was for the purpose of making a statement
about future French intentions. Mr. Lange said, "This (visit)
could be aimed at promoting an even more vigorous and reckless
campaign to encounter the growing opposition to nuclear testing
in the Pacific. If this is so, it will serve to harden the
attitudes of those in the region." C39:m23
The Pacific Island states joined in protesting the
continuance of French testing. For example, Fiji's Prime
Minister Ratu Sir Kanisese Mara cautioned France against using
President's Mitterrand's visit to Mururoa Atoll as a show of
defiance against the people of the South Pacific. Ratu Sir
Kamisese said he hoped that the visit would cause France to take
heed of the very strong opposition of the South Pacific nations
to the nuclear tests. C40:ml3
The Australian ambassador to the United Nations, Richard
Woolcott, sums up the feelings of the leaders and people of the
region concerning French testing, when he stated that, "This
practice is an affront to the region and a willful defiance of
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the aspirations of the people of the region to live in a nuclear
free zone." [41:23
The final chapter of the ramifications of the French nuclear
tests has not been written. France will continue the tests to
insure that it possesses a respectable nuclear strike force,
which is based on the French belief that France needs nuclear
armament, not in order to indulge in dreams of vain greatness,
but because her national security and very existence is at stake.
[37:210] And the continuance of these tests will further
inflame the passions of the people of the Southwest Pacific.
B. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The PRC has actively cultivated regional governments and
leaders for the past several years, including state visits by
Island leaders to Bejing, modest assistance programs, and through
the dispatch of trade delegations, dance troupes, and high-level
officials to the area. In order of priority, Chinese
interests/objectives appear to be pre-emption of a Soviet
presence and influence in the region, cultivation of support from
Island states within the Third World context, and replacement of
Taiwanese influence. [33:243
China has been successful in developing quite close and
friendly relations with both Australia and New Zealand, and even
some of the Island states in the Southwest Pacific. It is
generally seen as less threatening than the Soviet Union and has
been able to establish resident missions in several countries,
including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Western Samoa. [23:723
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China has good and expanding relations, both political and
economic, with Australia and New Zealand. Its main objectives
towards these two countries include encouragement of the ANZUS
policy of keeping the Soviet diplomatic and military presence in
the South Pacific to a minimum, and the development of economic
relations that assist China's modernization program. [14:78]
C. JAPAN
Japan has significant economic interests in the Southwest
Pacific. Japan is a major trading partner of Australia and New
Zealand. In the islands area, Japan has a major stake in
fishing. Japan has invested in fish freezing plants and
canneries which service Japanese fishing fleets, and tends to
focus her relationships in areas where there are significant
fisheries: Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons, Kiribati,
1
Western Samoa, and Tonga. Tokyo has negotiated bilateral
fisheries agreements with most of these states and provides some
aid, mostly in the form of concessional loans. [33:233 Japan's
future economic growth will result in increased trade,
investment, and aid links with most of the region.
At various times it has been suggested by Japan, followed up
by studies, that parts of the Southwest Pacific should be used to
store or dump nuclear waste (Japan, while not a nuclear-armed
state, has a large commitment to nuclear energy as a power
"Tor example, in the Solomon Islands, Japan has a strong
presence. The fish freezing depot is a joint venture between
Japan's Taiyo Fisheries and the Solomon Islands Government. A
new fish cannery will extend this plant at a cost of $11 million.
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source) . While there are no current programs for dumping
radioactive waste in the region, the suggestions alone have been
strongly opposed by South Pacific states, and in deferrence to
their views, Japan has not made any concrete actions in this
direction. £14:803
The increase in Japan's defense capabilities has resulted in
concern in some of the Island states. Prime Minister Nakasone,
during a tour of the Southwest Pacific in January 1985, assured
Fiji's Prime Minister that Japan was still bound by its own peace
constitution and non-nuclear policy. The Japanese prime minister
further assured Island leaders that Japan would never dump low-
level radioactive waste in the Pacific without the consent of the
countries concerned. C42:m43
D. GREAT BRITAIN
Great Britain, once the major colonial power and dominant
political influence in the region, divested itself of its last
significant political responsibilities in the area with the
independence of Vanuatu (the former New Hebrides) in 1980. It
still has responsibility for Pitcairn Island. However, Britain
is likely to continue to have some political influence in the
region, due to the fact that the majority of the independent
states in the region are members of the Commonwealth. [33:223
E. THE SOVIET UNION
Soviet economic interests in the region are slight. Moscow
has attempted to improve its access by seeking fishing agreements
with Australia, New Zealand and several Island states, and has
currently negotiated agreements with New Zealand and Kiribati. A
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substantial number of Soviet and allied fishing vessels have
access to New Zealand port facilities and have fishing rights in
New Zealand waters. The remaining regional economic interest of
note is merchant shipping. The Soviet merchant marine is
becoming more active in the region largely by undercutting
Western competitors by substantial margins. [14:78]
The current most outward sign of a Soviet presence in the
region is its fishing fleet. The USSR has the largest fishing
fleet in the world and the declaration by many countries of 200-
mile fishing zones has encouraged an increase in its distant
fishing operations. Fish provides 15 per cent of the animal
protein in the Soviet diet and the consumption of fish has more
than doubled in the USSR in the last 20 years. The Soviet Union
has been particularly concerned to establish a base for its
fishing fleet in the Southwest Pacific, which operates at a
some distance of 6,000 nautical miles from its headquarters at
Vladivostok. [23:73]
The Soviets have had a limited military presence in the area
for several years. The ocean area north of Kiribati serves as
the impact area for re-entry vehicles during Soviet tests of
their ICBMs. Additionally, since 1980, there has been an notable
increase in the region of Soviet naval activity. Although, this
activity still amounts to just several ships a year, it still
represents a the beginning of a different sort of Soviet presence
in the area.
Politically, the Soviet Union currently does not have a major
presence in the region. It does have embassies in Australia and
New Zealand; however, due largely to the vigorous actions of
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Australia and New Zealand, not a single diplomatic mission has
been opened in the Island states. The USSR, however, does have
non-resident accreditation in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Western
Samoa. [14:783
The decolonization process in the Southwest Pacific and the
coming to power of socialist governments in Australia and New
Zealand have attracted Soviet attention. Additionally, current
Issues between the United States and several of the states in the
region (which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections)
have drawn the attention of Moscow, since these issues may
present the Soviet Union with opportunities to crack what has in
the past been a solid front to Soviet efforts to increase its
influence in the region.
Because of Moscow's increased attention to the region, and
given the nature of the global competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union, I believe it is necessary to examine
more closely the Soviet Union's interest in the area and what it
could hope to achieve by taking a greater role in the region.
1 • Historical Interest in the Region
Russian activities in the Pacific in the first half of
the nineteenth century were concentrated in the North Pacific and
were transacted not only in Asiatic Russia but also across the
way in Alaska. Insofar as having anything to do with Polynesia,
they chiefly focused on the Hawaiian Islands, in which at various
times the Russians considered founding a settlement. But because
land communications between European Russia and the Pacific
littoral were long and difficult--the journey ordinarily took two
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years--it seemed reasonable to establish a link by sea to Alaska,
using Capes Horn and Good Hope, and in doing this the Russians
arrived at the islands of the South Pacific. Apparently however,
the Russians found the voyage from the Baltic via Cape Horn to
Alaska and Asiatic Russia hardly a profitable substitute for the
overland route, for after 1826, no more Russian visits to the
South Pacific were made. As remarked, the only part of Polynesia
they ever coveted was Hawaii in the north, because it bore a
rational relation to their holdings on either side of the North
Pacific Ocean at the time.
The above review of past Russian interest in the Pacific
is not to establish a basis to formulate a grand Russian-Soviet
design on the islands of the Pacific or even a future attempt to
grab Hawaii. Instead it is intended to show that the Russians
have shown an interest in the Pacific in the past which arose
from other Russian possessions in the world at that time and that
the Soviets, as both communist and inheritors of Russian history,
will venture into the Pacific again if it suits Soviets
interests, which will be further examined below.
2. Soviet Views on the Region
In Soviets perceptions Australia and New Zealand are tied
directly into the Western alliance system and the Islands of the
Southwest Pacific are Western inclined and generally suspicious
of Soviet intentions. With the decline of British power in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets saw the U.S. being
compelled, in its search for reliable allies in the immense
region spreading east of Suez, to "turn" increasingly away from
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England and toward Japan and Australia. The Nixon Doctrine gave
added movement towards formation of a future Pacific regional
military organization. This projected PATO bloc (the Pacific
Ocean Treaty Organization) would have included the countries of
SEATO and ANZUS, already linked to the United States through
various agreements. The Soviet Union has found and still finds
the idea of any American attempt to build an Asian security
system very distasteful, because it has itself encountered
nothing but negative responses from Asia and Pacific states when
it has tried to launch similar projects. [43:145]
In Soviet thinking the Indian Ocean is increasingly
viewed as an extension of the Pacific, with Southeast Asia and
Australia as the hinge. Hence the Soviets viewed with alarm the
involvement of ANZUS in the Indian Ocean and the possibility that
ASEAN might throw in its lot militarily with a "Pacific
Community" that would coordinate the various American bilateral
and multilateral military relationships in the Pacific area. The
visit of Australian Prime Minister Fraser to Beijing in 1982 was,
in Moscow's view, an attempt to involve China. [44:22]
Unlike NATO, ANZUS does not directly threaten the
national security of the Soviet Union with military attack. But
the roles of North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar suggest that
it is in the Soviet Union's interests to see them removed form
Australia through political pressure. Moreover, Moscow would
like to see the U.S. prevented from using port and air facilities
in the region for its naval warships and military aircraft.
Soviet propaganda seeks to influence the denial of such
facilities to the U.S. by frequently pointing out that it is only
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the presence of U.S. military forces in Australia and New Zealand
that would make them Soviet nuclear targets. [23:703 The
Australians have been specifically warned by the Soviet Union of
the danger of becoming an American "nuclear hostage" because of
their willing cooperation in American designs:
In the event of a nuclear war, Australia would no doubt be
one of the targets of the Soviet nuclear attack, special
advisor for national security questions in the Soviet party
Central Committee Stanislav Menshikov stated on Australian
Television. Menshikov said that not only U.S. bases would be
destroyed in the political attack but also facilities not
connected with them, such as ports in which U.S. nuclear war
ships are docking. The Soviet Union, however, has no interest
in threatening Australia nor should Australia in any way feel
endangered by Moscow. C45:E13
The Australian elections in 1983 stimulated Soviet
interest, and Moscow noted hopefully Labour's less pro-American
position However, the Soviets soon concluded that things had not
really changed, and the usual polemics were resumed in connection
with ANZUS meetings, focusing on Australia's continuing military
cooperation with the United States and implications for
Australia's role in the American Pacific strategy. [46:113
The Soviet Union is a substantial trade partner of both
Australia and New Zealand. Trade turnover has more than doubled
in the last seven years and is now worth about US $1.2 billion
annually. However, from a Soviet perspective, trade with
Australia and New Zealand has always been heavily in favor of
these countries and it show no sign of moving to a more even
balance. In 1982 the ratio was 35:1 against the Soviets. [23:733
Soviet concern also extends into the Pacific Islands,
focusing on the new relationships being developed between the
United States and these countries. Soviet media has played up
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demonstrations on Kwajelein, as well as the second conference of
the Pacific Trade Union Forum, held in Noumea in September 1982,
where demilitarization of the region was discussed. For their
part the Soviets seek to ridicule claims that they seek positions
of military strength in the Pacific Islands. [44:23] Moscow has
also called for the full independence of the Trust Territories
and New Caledonia and nuclear-free status for the entire Pacific
Islands region [46:113.:
The U.S. policy of annexing the strategic U.N. trust
territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia) and converting it
into an American strategic military staging areas has been
censured by the U.N. Decolonization Committee . . . . It is
strategic military considerations that have determined the
American Administration's approach to the problem of the
exercise of their rights by the people of Micronesia and
prompted the U.S. general policy of sabotaging the fulfillment
of the UN declaration on granting independence to colonial
countries and peoples and U.S. attempts to arrogate step by
step territories which never belonged to Washington .... The
USSR strongly condemns this policy. It supports the sovereign
right of the people of the region to a peaceful and free
development. [47:A5-6]
And:
The U.S. policy aimed at absorbing and transforming it into
a military bridgehead in the western Pacific crudely
contravenes . . . granting independence to colonial countries
and peoples .... The course toward the militarization of
Micronesia, its utilization as a proving ground for missile
equipment, and the plans to site nuclear weapons there create a
direct threat to the entire region and conflict with the desire
of Pacific states to create a nuclear-free zone in the South
Pacific. The (U.N.) Decolonization Committee must fulfill its
duty by backing the people of Micronesia in their struggle
against militarist nuclear neocolonialism. [48:E4]
On the economic side, Soviet trade with the Pacific
Islands is so small that it is not recorded in official Soviet
trade statistics. What trade there is, in such commodities as
copra, coffee, and tea, is either done through third countries or




Views on ANZUS Difficulties
The Soviet Union would like to see the ANZUS alliance
system disrupted in its favor and the close relationship that has
developed between Australia, New Zealand and the United States
with the ASEAN countries and with the nations of the Southwest
Pacific destroyed; therefore, the Soviet Government cannot
conceal its delight at this turn of events, which offers an
unprecedented threat to the cohesion of ANZUS, and thus to
American conventional and nuclear capacities in the Southwest
Pacific. C4:83
Although the Soviets feel it is still to early to talk
about the way events in Wellington will develop, there is no
doubt in the Soviet's mind that the Labour Party's victory in the
New Zealand elections and it's anti-nuclear stance has dealt a
heavy blow to Washington's strategy in the Pacific area. C49:E2]
Consequently, the Soviet media has played up the importance of
the Labour Party's stance, pushing the idea that, "The Labour
Party position also testifies that the number of New Zealanders
opposing the presence of U.S. nuclear vessels has increased
considerably and that such a tendency is logical and natural, due
to growing understanding of the indisputable fact that the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in New Zealand territorial
waters is fraught with catastrophic consequences. For in that
case New Zealand becomes the Pentagon's nuclear hostage. What is
nore, it cannot be ruled out that this country may find itself
involved in the realization of U.S. strategists' adventurous
designs to turn the Pacific Ocean region into a nuclear missile
bridgehead directed against the Soviet Union." C50:E3]
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Moscow also points out that with the American Pacific
Fleet adopting Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles, Oceania may well
turn into a giant American nuclear base and for this reason
Island nations of the Pacific are resisting Washington's
militarism in an effort to restrict its military expansion in the
region. Furthermore, despite strong pressure from Washington,
New Zealand has done the same and that its position has been
appreciated throughout the world. In fact, the Soviets point
out, that New Zealand's resolve helped to speed up the drafting
of the treaty declaring the southern Pacific free of nuclear
weapons. C5i:El]
Furthermore, the Soviets point to the wider ramifications
of New Zealnd's nuclear-free policy:
At the same time, speaking more broadly, the anti -nuclear
mood in New Zealand is not an isolated phenomenon .... It is
such an antinuclear chain reaction which is feared most of all
in Washington. Mainichi (a major Japanese paper) wrote in this
connection that Wellington's position is strengthening the
anti-nuclear mood in Japan. The United States is afraid that
New Zealand's example may undermine its supremacy in the
Pacific Ocean which it regards as its own backyard, Mainichi
points out; and not only in the Pacific Ocean. The United
States is attempting to also turn many other regions of our
planet into its nuclear fiefdom." C50:E33
4 . Views on Nuclear-Free Zone
In the Soviet view, the Cook Islands Forum decisions will
undoubtedly provoke widespread international response, since they
reflect the desire of the peoples of all continents for peace and
peaceful cooperation and for the removal of the threat of nuclear
catastrophe. C52:E23
:
The leaders of the thirteen states incorporated into the
South Pacific Forum . . . have unanimously passed a decision
declaring that region to be a nuclear free-zone. This time
again the decision (The Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 concerning
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Latin America being the first) adopted on the Cook Islands has
net with hostile reception from the USA and the other Western
powers . . . . In this day and age, the creation of nuclear-
free zones has become one of the essential trends in the
struggle for curbing "the nuclear jinn". The "Avarua Treaty"
is fresh proof of that .... The importance of creative
nuclear-free zones is obvious to all those who seriously set
the aim of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a
stabilization of the international situation. There is no
doubt that the signal, which has come from the Cook Islands,
will attract much attention all over the world. C52:E13
The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South
Pacific also fits into Soviet domestic and global interests.
Fears that might be aroused in the Soviet citizen by his leaders'
view of the world are assuaged by official assurances about the
"invincible might" of the USSR, as well as by pointing out the
growing power of the peace movement in the West. Whatever the
imperialists might be scheming, the "peace-loving masses" of
ordinary citizens in the capitalist countries stand, Moscow
points out, as an additional barrier against unleashing of a
nuclear war. [53:311]
5« Soviet Power and Policy
The Soviet Navy is used in peacetime for purposes of
demonstrating the economic and military might of our state
beyond its borders.
Naval Collections (Soviet naval journal)
1971 [54:333
The most important single change in the strategic
situation in the Asian-Pacific region since the end of the
Vietnam War has been the build-up of the USSR's military
strength. From the Soviet point of view, what has been the
purpose of this build-up? In part, it represents an attempt to
balance the long-standing and relatively large defense effort of
the U.S. in the Pacific region, the USSR's changed perception of
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China, and apprehension over the build-up of Japan's Self -"Defense
Force. However, in more general terms, the Soviet military
build-up can be viewed as an attempt to address diplomatic
failure in the region over the past 30 years. On balance, Asian
resistance to Soviet penetration by non-military means has been
striking, and the Soviet response to the growing military and
economic development of the region has been to build ever more
impressive land, sea and air forces. [55:8]
In applying Admiral Gorshkov's precepts of seapower,
which stress political pressure and force projection, the Soviet
Union has created a centrally controlled maritime force of
merchant ships, intelligence gatherers, oceanographic vessels
(that can provide a research data base for submarines) , and a
vast fishing fleet that probes for footholds for power
projection. The merchant marine, the world's largest, is
designed to integrate with the Soviet Navy, and regularly carries
naval officers and equipment. With ships ranging from passenger
liners to small break bulk carriers, useful for discreet arms
shipments and able to unload on the beach, the possibilities for
deception operations as well as instant coordination at the
outbreak of hostilities are obvious. [56:13-43
Soviet foreign policy may be seen as the pursuit of a
number of interrelated objectives in the face of complex
constraints and pressures, both internal and external to the
USSR. These objectives range from self-preservation and security
to a number of others whose relative priority may depend on the
expected price to be paid for their attainment. A related
aspect of Soviet foreign policy is a habitual inclination to
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exploit political crises and power vacuums in Third World areas
insofar as these can be exploited without incurring undue costs
or risks. [57:3393
By words, policies, and actions the Soviet Union has long
demonstrated its firm commitment to involvement in the Third
World. Major foreign policy declarations unfailingly link the
destiny of the Soviet Union and the Socialist world community
with that of the Third World. This central idea has its root in
Lenin; over a half century ago he perceived the natural linkage
of interests between the then colonial-imperial areas of the
world and the Soviet Union; the idea has been nurtured and
applied as practical policy. An undergirding principle in Soviet
policy toward the Third World has been this belief that a
symbiotic relationship exists between the Soviet Union and the
emerging nations of the former colonial areas. [58:118]
Since 1954, Soviet economic aid, technical assistance,
and trade with the Third World have been important instruments of
Soviet Third World policy. Moscow seems well aware of the Third
World's need and desire for developmental assistance. The Soviet
Union also seems cognizant of the increasingly important role of
Soviet economic aid in Third World development, though in the
past it has always given such aid on a highly selective and
concentrated basis and may continue to do so. Consequently the
Soviet leadership views economic aid and trade as important
instruments of Soviet foreign policy: these instruments are
capable of creating goodwill and enhancing Soviet prestige,
influence, and power in the Third World. A well -coordinated and
well-executed economic program is viewed by the Soviets as being
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just as an effective method of Soviet penetration in the Third
World as political infiltration. [59:68]
In line with these beliefs, the Soviet Union will
continue to pursue its fishing interests in the region. It will
seek to use its scientific and technical knowledge to entice
Island states into joint fishing ventures. Recent Soviet
overtures indicate that this is one of the few areas where the
USSR feels that it has a potential lever with which it can
influence the small Island states of the region. £23:75]
But for practical, if not ideological, reasons, it is
impossible for the Soviet leadership to abandon the tenet of
Marxism-Leninism that proclaims that recent history must be
understood in terms of a struggle between two systems: one
epitomized and led by the United States, the other by the Soviet
Union. This struggle does not have to assume violent forms, and
in the nuclear age, it must not, if at all possible, lead to an
all-out war. But to discard the old formula entirely, and to
halt the attempts at destabilizing the capitalist world and
expanding the Soviet sphere of domination and influence, would,
in the Kremlin's view, pose a grave danger to the cohesion of the
Soviet system itself. Over and above any considerations of
national security, it is those touching on the preservation of
the present form of Communist rule in Russia that require Moscow
to persist in conceiving of international politics as an arena of
constant struggle, with Communism and its allies advancing and
capitalism in retreat. [53:311]
With the country's mounting social and economic problems,
with the ideology itself having become discredited or irrelevant
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in the minds of the great mass of the Soviet people, the regime
strives to demonstrate its viability and dynamism through foreign
expansion. It tries, and not without success, to inculcate the
lesson that for all of its internal shortcomings and excesses, it
has been under Communism that Russia has steadily advanced in
power and worldwide influence, while the democracies, for all
their alleged freedoms and riches, have been in disorderly re-
treat, insofar as their international role is concerned. [53:312]
The Southwest Pacific has in the past not been an area of
primary strategic interest for the Soviet Union and it appears
unlikely to become so in the foreseeable future. Most Soviet
strategic interest in the Pacific has been focused on areas to
the north and east of the Oceania and the closest Soviet bases to
the area are located some 1875 miles west of the Palau in Vietnam
and over 3,000 miles northwest of the Northern Marianas in
Vladivostok. The Soviet Union however, is a global power, and
therefore no area of the world is completely void of strategic
interest to it. It must be assumed that the Soviet Union has
subsidiary strategic interests in the South pacific that relate
to the sea/air-lanes of communication running through it and to
the United States military presence in Guam and Hawaii. There is
also speculation that the Soviets might also be interested in the
Southwest Pacific as a place where strategic submarines could be
deployed to escape detection, as well as an area to conduct ASW
operations to hunt American submarines. Additionally, it can be
speculated that over the long term the Soviet Union might be
interested in developing mid-range bases in the Southwest Pacific
to support operations in Antarctica. [12:490-13
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It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a
detailed assessment of Soviet interests, objectives and
priorities in the Southwest Pacific or of the exact resources it
is prepared to devote to achieving these aims. Nevertheless, the
Soviet Union does have interests in the region which it pursues,
however indifferently, through a variety of avenues. While the
outcome of Soviet approaches generally reveal a low level of
sympathy amongst the Islands, and little to none in Australia and
New Zealand, the persistent efforts of Moscow to gain an entry
into the region clearly indicate that the Soviet Union does
intend to achieve some improvement in its access to the region if
at all possible. £60:4-5] Thus, probings for opportunity (such
as the fishing issue between the Islands and the United States,
which will be covered in a subsequent chapter) are likely to
continue at least on an occasional basis, with an increase in
resources devoted to probings if large cracks appear to be
developing in the stability of the region.
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V. TOWARDS A NUCLEARZFREE NEW ZEALAND
In his speeches, Mr. Lange, as well as others, has pointed
out that over the last several years New Zealanders have felt an
increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress in
bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal
overall. This concern has been heightened by the growing
realization that, despite its physical isolation, New Zealand
would not escape the consequences of a nuclear conflict. Anti-
nuclear sentiment has also been fanned by French intransigence in
persisting with its nuclear testing program in the Southwest
Pacific, in defiance of the expressed views of countries in the
region. [61:1010]
The New Zealand ambassador to the United States, Bryce
Harland, in a speech given in March 1985, emphasized the
importance of these issues in the actions that New Zealand has
taken
:
Why then has New Zealand done what no other country in the
world has done and actually closed its ports to nuclear armed
ships? The reasons are not simple. Many factors are involved,
at various levels, but the two that are most effective can
easily be identified. The first is nuclear testing. The South
Pacific is the only part of the world where a nuclear power is
still carrying out tests outside its own metropolitan territory
. . . . The U.S. and the United Kingdom stopped testing in the
Central Pacific 20 years ago, but France has gone on carrying
out tests in the South Pacific. This testing has aroused
public concern in all the countries in the area .... The
second reason follows from the first. Since the mid-70s, no
significant progress has been made in arms control negotiations
If we cannot get the great powers to stop (the arms
race) themselves, people in New Zealand say, we can at least
show them that we will have nothing to do with nuclear
weapons." [62:123
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Against this background, the Labour Government acted to
implement what it saw as the only practical measure of nuclear
arms control that it viewed as available to it: the absolute
exclusion of nuclear weapons and power from New Zealand. To
ensure that the exclusion of nuclear weapons is complete, the
Labour Government decided, upon entering office in July 1984,
that access to New Zealand's ports would be granted only to those
vessels which it could satisfy itself were neither nuclear-
powered nor nuclear armed. Given the neither-conf irm-nor-deny
stance of the nuclear powers (for practical purposes the United
States and Great Britain) , this meant that the New Zealand
Government itself has to decide, based on its own assessment, on
the weaponry carried by a vessel. C61 : 10113
The nuclear exclusion issue had come to the forefront once
before in the early 1970s when the Labour Party had been in
power, and has been a part of the Labour Party's platform for
almost twenty years. The United States, in the early 1970's,
while taking issue with the stance did not react strongly. The
Labour Government lasted only three years and was replaced with a
National Party Government that moved quickly to strengthen
defense ties with the United States. However, when the Labour
Party came into power in July 1984, it moved quickly to put into
effect its nuclear-free zone. policy, and more importantly,
stated its intention to make its nuclear-free policy into the law
of the land. This placed the issue into an entirely different
context for the United States. For a nation which had been
considered such a stauch ally since World War II to refute the
basic foundation upon which U.S. (Western) defense was built,
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nuclear deterrence, called for a strong United States response,
otherwise the U.S. could possibly face a wave of allied nations
moving to detach themselves from the concept of nuclear
deterrence
.
In order for the United States to deal effectively with this
current issue of dispute with New Zealand, and the current and
future shock waves that a breakup of the ANZUS alliance would
send throughout the region and the Western global security
network, American national security decision makers, must
understand the internal dynamics of the issue in New Zealand.
And in dealing with New Zealand's nuclear stance, it is important
to remember that there are three sets of debate: in New Zealand
internally, between New Zealand and the United States bilaterally
and between the United States, New Zealand and Australia
trilaterally . The security of the Pacific Island states will be
effected by the outcome of the debate.
A. INTERNAL FACTORS
Both the major political parties in New Zealand accept the
ANZUS alliance as a vital part of the country's foreign policy;
but they differ in emphasis and interpretations. The National
Party, in power from 1975 to 1984, is in favor of continuing the
status quo. The Labour Party's position reveals unmistakable
traces of ambivalence. It wants to retain ANZUS, but in
1
renegotiated form. The two minor parties are more specific in
In 1983, Labour's new leader David Lange shocked party
faithfuls by proposing that nuclear armed and/or powered ships
could be given transit rights in a South Pacific NWFZ. This
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their ANZUS policies. Social Credit would withdraw from the
alliance and institute a policy of armed neutrality. The New
Zealand Party's official policy is to conduct a national debate
and hold a referendum before making a final decision on the
issue. On the basis of these choices presented to the voters in
July 1984, one can conclude that one fifth of the people, in
voting for the two minor parties, indicated some support for
withdrawal from ANZUS. The four-fifths majority however supports
a retention of the alliance. [63:173
Prime Minister David Lange came from a party whose national
conference wished to see New Zealand out of the ANZUS treaty, and
American nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships excluded from New
Zealand ports. [4:7] Ever since the 1950s resolutions have come
forward at Labour Party conferences that New Zealand should
withdraw from ANZUS (or from all military pacts or alliances with
nuclear weapons states. For many years such resolutions were
invariably rejected. However, on five occasions recently, in
1977, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983, the party conference passed
resolutions favoring withdrawal from military alliances. [64:162]
Within the Labour Party itself, demands to withdraw entirely
2
from the alliance are confined to left-wing groups. The demand
departed significantly from the party's 1981 manifesto which
expressed opposition to visits by nuclear powered or nuclear
armed craft. [63:18]
2A recent Massey University study showed that the anti -nuclear
and anti-American Left Wing of the Labour Party, while
vociferous, is a minority in Labour and a very small group indeed
within the larger community. Its influence is exaggerated
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to ban nuclear ahip visits by contrast is very much the center
ground of the Labour Party. Consequently, if a Labour Government
was to retreat from this position, the Party would also most
certainly be split in both its organizational and parliamentary
sectors. The Government is caught in a similar trap regarding a
law banning all nuclear ship visits to New Zealand, rather than
simply adopt a policy to this effect. If the Labour Government
does not bring in an anti-nuclear law, then Social Credit almost
certainly would introduce a similar bill, thus presenting Labour
with an acute political dilemma. Opposing a Social Credit bill
which merely expressed Labour policy would again risk splitting
the Labour Party. C63:213
The Labour Government of New Zealand is a prisoner of certain
political realities. The 1975 NWFZ (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone)
initiative at the U.N. celebrated a year in which there had been
no atmosphere nuclear test in the South Pacific. Nevertheless,
the South Pacific remains the only region where (underground)
nuclear testing is conducted outside the main national territory
of a nuclear power: France conducted four nuclear tests at
Mururoa in the first six months of 1984 and also two tests alone
in Oct. 1985) The French series of nuclear testing at Mururoa
serves to underline the fact that on its own New Zealand cannot
hope to achieve significant impact on arms control and
because many of its adherents are skillful in the use of
publicity. Assiduous in the delivery of press releases, always
available to talk to reporters and proficient in the organization
of protest marches, they have had an effect which is out of
proportion to their actual numbers in the community. C65:m33
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disarmament issues. Making New Zealand nuclear-free would be a
purely symbolic gesture, born of frustrations at its inability to
do anything else. £63:20]
1 • Anti -nuclear and Peace Movement
Those in government who are pushing for a nuclear free
New Zealand draw support from several anti-nuclear movements in
New Zealand and also from several outside organizations.
Furthermore, as some of the statements below show, these groups
help to keep pressure on Prime Minister Lange and other
government officials to push forward with their non-nuclear
stance.
There has been a rapid growth in nonparty groups
concerned with nuclear issues in New Zealand. Many local
authorities, including the Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch
city councils, have declared their districts to be NWFZs; there
are now 30 such zones covering 900,000 people or 30 percent of
the population. Church, student, medical, and trade unions have
given increased attention to the issue. [64:1643 The coordinating
body for the 300 peace groups in a country of 3.3 million people
is called Peace Movement Aotearoa. Aotearoa, or Long White
Cloud, is the Maori name for New Zealand. Among the objectives
of Peace Movement Aotearoa are government support for peace
studies in the school curriculum and a permanent Commission for
Peace and Disarmament to be established by 1986. [7:83
Perhaps the largest organizations within New Zealand that
can and does put direct pressure on the Labour Government are the
Labor unions. The Federation of Labor's president, Jim Knox,
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reaffirmed the federation's strong support for the government's
policy and condemned any outright interference in it. Mr. Knox
said the federation has had the same policy on the nuclear issue
since 1963, and he hopes the Government recognizes that fact and
does not change its tack. C66:m2]
While on the subject of Labor Unions, it is important to
bring up a connection between the Federation of Labor and
Socialist Unity Party (SUP), because this ties into the influence
of outside organizations in the non-nuclear movement.
The SUP boasts extensive trade union connections. For
example, SUP leader Ken Douglas is secretary-treasurer of New
Zealand's 450, OOO-member Federation of Labor (FOL) and is
generally considered one of the trade union movement's best
tacticians. In addition, SUP National President Bill Andersen
serves as a member of the NOL's national executive and as
president of the Auckland Trades Council, the largest in the
country. [67:2233 It should be further noted that in 1985 23
round trip tickets to Moscow were provided to union leaders free
of charge by the Soviet Union.
Most New Zealanders view the SUP as the country's leading
communist party, probably because of its higher public profile.
The Socialist Unity Party (membership of 100) was organized in
1966, the result of the CPNZ's break with Moscow. It has
retained its Soviet ties and is the only communist party in New
Zealand recognized by Moscow. In May 1984, the SUP sent a
delegation to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Central
Committee to study organizational and party activities. The
SUP's pro-Moscow line has, in recent years, included endorsement
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of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and support for Soviet
proposals on disarmament. [67:2233
The Auckland-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has
sent a petition to David Lange asking him not to give into
overseas pressure on New Zealand's nuclear weapons stance.
Spokeswoman Marie Wedgeworth said the petition was hurriedly
organized after Mr. Lange was quoted as saying that if the United
States' Senate curbed New Zealand trade too severely, the nuclear
weapons stance may have to be reviewed. C68:ml]
New Zealand peace activists have warned the Labour
Government of "all-out protest" if the government backed down on
its ban on nuclear warships. Speaking for the peace movement
Aotearoa, Owen Wilkes said that plans to have senior ministers
make the final decision on a warship's nuclear capacity suggests
the United States can get back into New Zealand ports. Allowing
any nuclear-capable ship to visit would be "an unacceptable
softening" of the Labour Government's strong anti-nuclear policy,
he said. He also warned that a visit "by a nuclear-capable
vessel of any nation will be met with concerted and determined
opposition . . . this means any vessel possessing missile
launchers, aircraft or torpedo tubes equipped for delivering
nuclear weapons." "The Government is completely unable to judge
whether a nuclear-capable warship is or is not carrying nuclear
weapons beneath its decks," he said. He said protestors would
come out in force with big demonstrations and a revival of harbor
blockades by peace squadron vessels if nuclear-capable warship
tried to visit New Zealand. "We have set an example for the
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world with our anti-nuclear policy, its a very precious thing and
something to be safeguarded at any cost," he said. C69:m2-3]
A December 2, 1985 editorial in the Wellington 'Evening
E2§£' brings up an interesting point regarding the Soviet Union
in the peace movement in New Zealand:
The dilemas for defence which this slow, strange withdrawal
from the West has posed, will not trouble the peace movement
which as a broad spectrum organisation seems able to maintain a
consensus only by limiting any criticism of Soviet action.
While it would be paranoid to regard the whole peace movement
as supporters of the Soviet Union, the silence which greeted
the eight Soviet missile tests in the Pacific area over the
past year is deafening. 3 This silence poses more questions
about the limits of our peace movement's agenda, and should
increase the warning signals about the costs and implications
of New Zealand cutting adrift from the West. C70:m5J
There is a vague but persistent anti -American strain that
pervades three distinct but overlapping lobbies representing the
Polynesians, the peace movement and the women's movement. Each
of these lobbies has the ear of the government not least because
their votes were crucial to the election of the Labour Government
in 1984. And if for no other reason than to safeguard themselves
from any defections from their ranks, the government was under
pressure to deliver some form of "political payment", this being
the banning of 'anything nuclear' from New Zealand. This ban
satisfied the political requirements of the three groups, even
through each has its own internal agenda. [7:8]
The reason why the American Government is the focus of so
much attention from peace campaigners in New Zealand is that
•^The Soviet Union carried out test firings of missiles in
the Pacific from 22-31 May 1985 inside a zone which had a radius
of 110 nm, and had the following co-ordinates at its center:
latitude 22 27 N, longitude 174 40 E. [71:9613
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the U.S. is perceived as the major bellicose power in the world
today. Many New Zealanders have come to regard the U.S.
administration as belligerent toward Moscow, arrogant toward
allies and unworthy of the role of world leadership. [63:24]
2. Opposition
Although those who oppose the anti-nuclear platform of
the Labour Party initially did not react strongly to Labour's
policies, they are now mobilizing the overturn the gains the
anti-movement has made; conservative principles have been
challenged, first by the woman's forums, then by the extent of a
social change signalled in some clauses of the Homosexual Law
Reform Bill. C65:m3]
In September 1985 Acting Opposition Leader Mr. Jim Bolger
said the Government's anti-nuclear, and the resulting conflict
with the United States, was proposed to satisfy the electorate at
home, particularly left-wing elements, at the expense of New
Zealand's international standing. Mr. Bolger stated that, "I am
fearful that the Labour Government does not intend to look at New
Zealand's wider concerns and only intends to look at the narrower
concerns of an electorate back in New Zealand that they want to
massage." C72:m23 Furthermore, Mr. Doug Graham, Opposition
spokesman on disarmament, (on 19 Sept 85) has pointed out that,
"It ( the Government's nuclear-free zone policy) will lead to the
end of ANZUS, which 70 percent of all New Zealanders want for
conventional purpose and it will lead to instability in the
Pacific region." Opposition defense spokesman Mr. Doug Kidd has
reiterated that the National Party, if returned to power, would
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recommit New Zealand to full commitment to the Western alliance
and ANZUS, if it could be revived. [73:m51
3. P£2£©§§i2Q2i View
There is another factor in the internal debate in New
Zealand that must be discussed, this being the role of
professional military men who are directly responsible for the
4
defense of their country. In the internal debate that has arisen
since the Labour Party's nuclear-free zone policy has been
implemented, the Labour Government appears to be extremely
sensitive to any part being played in the debate by defense
professionals. Mr. Lange has prohibited the Department of
Defence from playing any public part in the discussion of the
issue. Additionally, Lange scorned as "geriatric generals"
former defense chiefs who, in October 1985, criticized his anti-
nuclear policies. The seventeen former defense chiefs attacked
the Labour Government's anti-nuclear policies, and said that the
ban on U.S. ships could cause "a grave breakdown" in relations
with the U.S. Mr. Lange said the group were "geriatric generals"
who had "shot themselves in the foot, or the mouth," by speaking
out when they had. [75: ml]
It seems to me that the reason that Mr. Lange and his
Government is so sensitive to preventing any defense professional
T<ew Zealand also: 1) has statutory responsibility for the
defense of Cook Island, Niue and Tokalau; 2) has maintained one
of its only two infantry battalions in Singapore; and 3)
maintains close defense relations with Tonga and Fiji, and has
sought to assist all of its smaller neighbors to maintain
stability in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. [74:383
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from playing an active part in the anti-nuclear debate, is that
defense professionals will point out how important defense ties
are with the United States for the conventional defense of New
Zealand. Mr. Lange and his Government were well aware of the
importance of the alliance linkage before he implemented his
Party's anti-nuclear platform.
After the election of the Labour Government in July 1984,
Lange, as the incoming Prime Minister, was presented with a brief
by the New Zealand Department of Defence that covered the
country's entire defense capabilities. Mr. Lange was briefed
that the list of military specializations in which N.Z. has no
capacity at all is long. It has no air defense for airfields and
ground forces, heavy artillery, satellite communications systems,
over-the-horizon radar; there is no effective interceptor /fighter
capacity in the air, nor surface-to-surface guided missiles for
any of the three services; there are no main battle tanks; the
Navy lacks submarines, an oil tanker to extend the range of its
ships, or vessels able to provide logistic support for operations
in the Pacific or Antarctic; and the Air Force has no aerial
refuelling capability for its aircraft. Although some of these
problems areas were to be addressed by future defense plans, Mr.
Lange was told that, "Some of these systems, however, are beyond
our resources and unneccessary for New Zealand because in the
high-intensity conflict in which they would be required the
capability would be supplied by one of our other partners. This
assumption makes it possible for New Zealand to assess
realistically its equipment requirements against our actual
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strategic circumstances and the likely conditions in which our
forces might be engaged." [74:38]
New Zealand, the brief further stated, does not have an
indigenous defense industry capable of providing modern high
technology defense equipment. "New Zealand's armed forces are,
therefore, almost totally dependent on overseas suppliers for
5
defense equipment which uses advanced technology." Furthermore,
Lange was told that New Zealand's independent defense
intelligence collection facilities are limited; that the
Directorate of Defense Intelligence was almost totally dependent
upon information supplied by the intelligence agencies of allied
countries, including Australia and the United States. [74:38-9]
The brief wrapped it all up for Mr. Lange, and his Party
with a conclusion that stated:
The ANZU5 connection gives a dimension and depth to mutuai
defense exchanges between the services of the three nations
which goes beyond that provided by other co-operative bilateral
or multinational arrangements. It fosters a high degree of
understanding and confidence which it would be difficult if not
impossible to achieve by other means. This in turn encourages
the sense of purpose and commitment of our defense forces.
Bilateral defense arrangements with Australia (the ANZAC
connection) are sound. But, while Australia attaches so much
weight to ANZUS, it is clear that that alliance must be the
foundation for the ANZAC link. The trilateral structure of
ANZUS by contrast, permits New Zealand's voice, in relation to
defense, readily to be identified as a needed, independent and
sovereign influence. It overcomes isolation. [74:39]
^"o provide the arrangements for technical exchange. New
Zealand has signed a number of agreements. Although not directly
connected to ANZUS, the agreements fall within the general
umbrella of mutual cooperation and understanding provided by the
ANZUS Treaty. The most important scientific agreements and co-
operative program to which New Zealand belongs is the Technical
Co-operation Program (TTCP) which has a number of sub-groups
covering such subjects as undersea warfare, electronic warfare,
communications, aeronauticstechnology and materials. [74:39]
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"*• k®9i§A§!=l2Q Introduced
The anti-nuclear Bill was introduced into Parliament on
10 December 1985 and was referred to a Select Committee which
will invite public comment, schedule hearings and examine
witnesses. It could be April or May 1986 before the Select
Committee reports back to Parliament. [76:1340] Mr. Lange said
the legislation could be passed through all its stages before
June 1986 under the new parliamentary timetable. [77:m33
In introducing the New Zealand nuclear-free zone,
disarmament and arms control bill. Prime Minister Lange said it
gives "the sanction of laws to the exclusion of nuclear weapons
from New Zealand, and hence to New Zealand's disengagement from
any nuclear strategy for the defence of New Zealand." C78:m3]
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B. THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND
The debate between the United States and New Zealand
basically boils down to the policy of the United States of
"neither confirming nor denying" the existence of nuclear weapons
on board its military vessels. The current non-nuclear policy of
New Zealand and the proposed nuclear-free zone legislation,
directly challenges this American policy. Additionally, the
issue of visits by nuclear-powered vessels also causes a strain
in the alliance relationship. Finally, the question of just what
the objective of the ANZUS allaince is and how that objective is
to be achieved, enters into the dispute.
1 . New Zealand^s Position
Upon coming into office in July 1984, the Labour
Government implemented its nuclear-free zone policy, stating that
it would not allow either nuclear-powered vessels or nuclear
armed vessels into its ports. The United States at first decided
not to press the issue too hard and sought to find some
compromise in the situation. In pursuit of this end, the United
States put off any proposed ship visits until March 1985, when an
ANZUS exercise (Sea Eagle) would take place. However, at the
beginning of 1985, there was still no compromise solution to the
issue at hand and the United States presented its request for the
USS Buchanan, a conventionally powered destroyer. This brought
the issue to a head.
On January 31, 1985, Mr. Lange said the nuclear capable
vessel (the Buchanan) nominated to call at a New Zealand port by
the United States could not be confirmed as not carrying nuclear
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weapons. Therefore he stated that, "No nuclear capable ship will
be allowed into New Zealand unless there is confirmation that it
is not nuclear armed .... We are not prepared to accept any
area of doubt or ambiguity." "Unless we are assured it is not
carrying nuclear arms and we have no way of verifying that, then
Q.E.D.--no come." C79:m23 And since the Buchanan could not be
confirmed as not having nuclear weapons on board, Mr. Lange
refused entry to New Zealand ports by the vessels.
The New Zealand Government had planned to use their
external intelligence sources to establish whether or not the
ships that the United States wanted to send on port calls were
nuclear-armed or not. Mr. Lange felt that New Zealand's Defence
Department and External Intelligence Bureau were of considerable
quality and expertise and that given American resolve not to say
whether its warships are nuclear-armed, he was relying on these
organizations to provide an assessment of whether or not military
vessels can be assured, assessed and confirmed to be not nuclear
armed. [80:m-6] However, in the case of the Buchanan (and
potential future ones) Mr. Lange was forced to admit in late
January 1985 that New Zealand's intelligence agencies had failed
to confirm whether the ship was carrying nuclear weapons or not.
Only U.S. officials "are the ones who can answer the question of
whether the ship had nuclear arms aboard," he said. C8l:m-3]
Mr. Lange has however, consistently stated that although
having nuclear weapons in New Zealand was not negotiable that
".
. . there is a need to respect the United States position that
it will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weaponry
abroad its vessels--we are not going to confront that." [72:m23
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Furthermore, he has stated that New Zealand's nuclear-free policy
not be misunderstood. "This policy is not anti-ANZUS, not anti-
American, it is not neutralist, but we are not going to have
nuclear weapons in New Zealand," Mr. Lange has stated, adding
that ANZUS "can certainly continue" despite the ban. C81:m-3]
In September 1985, in an effort to find a solution to the
U.S. -New Zealand inpasse. Deputy Prime Minister Palmer traveled
to the United States, with the proposal that New Zealand should
make its own assessment as to whether an American warship was
1
carrying nuclear weapons. New Zealand's proposals were said to
center on its not ruling out in advance visits by U.S. ships that
are "nuclear capable," but only those deemed by Wellington to be
carrying nuclear weapons. C82:m2] However, Mr. Palmer found the
Washington political climate "very difficult" and returned with
the issue still unresolved. Consequently, in late October 1985,
Prime Minister Lange urged the United States to overcome its
objections to his country's ban on nuclear warships. He said New
Zealand's proposal to make its own assessment as to whether or
not an American vessel was nuclear armed would allow American
warships to visit New Zealand without the United States
disclosing whether they carried nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
this arrangement would not compromise his country's anti-nuclear
stance. He said Japan and Scandinavian countries allowed
This self assessment was centered around New Zealand defense
and intelligence officials making an assessment of any navy ship
seeking to visit to decide if it was nuclear-armed. If the
finding was that the ship could be carrying nuclear weapons, it
would be banned. C83:m53
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American warships into their ports despite their opposition to
nuclear weapons and suggested that New Zealand could also
compromise with the United States on the matter. [84:Ml-23
Furthermore, Lange stated that the U.S. would be allowed to study
the full draft of New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation as part
of the government's attempt to heal the rift over the ANZUS row.
Lange believed because the United States wanted to study the
legislation, the door was still open to a solution and that his
government should continue to try to heal the rift with the U.S.
with constructive diplomacy. C85:ml-2]
The New Zealand Government hoped that the United States
would look carefully at the bill. Mr. Lange stated that, "I want
to stress that there have been considerable efforts made to
produce legislation which does not breach the neither confirm nor
deny policy. Our concern is not to legislate against port
visits. They are welcome to come here... that welcome is not
tendered however to nuclear weaponry or propulsion." C86:ml]
Under the legislation introduced to Parliment on December
10, 1985, the New Zealand Prime Minister would have the power to
allow entry of a vessel when he was satisfied it was not carrying
nuclear weapons without first being obliged to receive a report
from the chief of staff of the New Zealand Defence Forces, as the
orginal draft of the legislation proposed. [87:ml3
In the view of New Zealand, the ANZUS row between New
Zealand and the United States over nuclear warship visits is not
about whether Pacific security should be maintained but how it
should be maintained, Mr. Lange has stated. The dispute over
nuclear warship visits is essentially about the operational
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character of ANZUS. "That alliance (ANZUS) is not the same as
NATO. It has no standing forces, no plans, no HQ or command
structure. "New Zealand has always seen ANZUS as a non-nuclear
alliance. We neither ask nor expect to be defended by nuclear
weapons. We have, since its inception, made our contribution to
ANZUS in conventional ways," Mr. Lange said. The nuclear element
is eliminated from any future calculations about the defence of
New Zealand." C88:m43 The need to eliminate the nuclear element
is vital, because in the words of Mr. Palmer, "We want a nuclear-
free South Pacific and a nuclear-free New Zealand and we are
going to have it." C87:ml3
The Labour Government feels that there is simply no need
for nuclear weapons to be brought into New Zealand, because the
strategic environment does not call for nuclear weaponry and that
New Zealand does not form part of a nuclear strategy. [61:10113
Labour holds to the view that ANZUS is as much the reflection and
assertion of common interests as the framework of a formai
military alliance. ANZUS is not the southern hemisphere replica
of NATO. The contrast is absolute between Europe, a landmass
divided ideologically and physically into antagonistic blocs, and
the South Pacific, and that the two treaties reflect these
strategic circumstances: in terms of both their core provisions
and the form of defense cooperation evolved, they differ
fundamentally. £61:1013]
Regarding American and New Zealand interest in Pacific
security, Mr. Lange has stated that "I have consistently argued
that in itself is common grounds enough for an agreement."
"Whatever became of the military cooperation between the two
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countries, all democracies had a continuing interest in the
stability of the South Pacific "which must in the end assert
itself," he said. C89:m4]
2 • United States^. Position On Labour^s Pol icy
After deferring any ship visits for six months, in order
to address our differences, the U.S., in January 1985, nominated
the U.S.S. Buchanan, a conventionally powered destroyer, as a
ship to visit New Zealand as part of a joint ANZUS exercise. The
New Zealand Government refused the visit, based on its insistence
on a virtually explicit guarantee by the U.S. Government that the
ship was not nuclear armed. C10:2] After the refusal of the
visit, the United States moved to curtail defense ties between
the United States and New Zealand based on the belief that one
party to an alliance cannot insist on narrowing the scope of the
alliance unilaterally in one respect while retaining it as a
broad arrangement in other respects without some
consequences. [63:233
The basic United States Government position is that the
New Zealand ban on port access to potentially nuclear armed or
nuclear powered vessels goes to the core of the mutual
2
responsibilities of allies. America's ability to exercise with
New Zealand forces under ANZUS depends in large part on port
2A Memorandum of Understanding on Logistic Support was signed
by New Zealand and the U.S. in May 1982. In the Memorandum, the
U.S. undertook to ensure uninterrupted supply of a range of
American weapons systems and other logistic support to New
Zealand. In return. New Zealand agreed to provide such
assistance as the refit and maintenance of U.S. ships, aircraft
and equipment in New Zealand. [63:19]
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access. Opportunities for repair, refueling, and replenishment
of supplies, as well as for rest and shore leave, are critical
factors on long voyages. In a crisis situation, the U.S. may be
unable to fulfill ANZUS treaty obligations without unlimited port
access. [15:2] Furthermore, the United States points out that
it has only one navy-not one conventionally capable navy and one
nuclear-capable navy; not one navy to accommodate one country's
3
policy and another navy for the rest of the world. The United
States points out that in the words of the 1984 ANZUS Council
communique, "Access by allied aircraft and ships to the airfields
and ports of the ANZUS members was reaffirmed as essential to the
continuing effectiveness of the alliance." [10:23
Paul D.Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, underlined U.S. interests concerning
this issue when he stated that:
The United States attaches critical importance to the
opportunity to use Australian and New Zealand ports that
provide ready access to the South Pacific and Indian Oceans.
We view Australia's and New Zealand's willingness to allow us
use of their ports as part of their contribution to ANZUS. We
also value efforts to assure standardization or
interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, share
intelligence, exchange personnel, and consult on problems. The
maintenance of U.S. presence in the region, and the
demonstration of our ability to operate effectively with our
treaty partners, are tangible physical evidence of our treaty
commitments. All of the ANZUS nations share in this effort and
all benefit from it. [13:5]
^Admiral Robert Lang, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the
Pacific, said at a press conference in Wellington on April 27,
1983 that nuclear powered warships were particularly well suited
to Pacific vastness; banning their visits would be a blow to the
ANZUS alliance. [63:22]
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The other main U.S. counter-point to the New Zealand
position that the ANZUS alliance is not part of an overall world-
wide deterrence, is that the role of New Zealand and Australia in
the South Pacific does indeed fit into the world-wide deterrence
of the Western democracies. As Secretary of State George Schultz
has pointed out:
Deterring aggression is never an easy task. But for
democracies, there is a special difficulty. A democracy at
peace would much rather focus on the more immediate and
tangible social benefits to its people than on the potential
danger that exists beyond the horizon. Indeed, we sometimes
take for granted that security itself is a vital part of our
public welfare.
When even one partner shirks its responsibilities, the health
and unity of the entire alliance are placed in jeopardy. All
the allies face the same kind of domestic problems; all would
prefer to use their resources in other ways that offer more
immediate and tangible benefits to their peoples; and all would
rather avoid the political complications that may be brought on
by fulfilling alliance commitments. If one partner is
unwilling to make these sacrifices, others will wonder why they
should carry their share of the burden. The result may be the
gradual erosion of the popular commitment to the common cause.
And furthermore:
The goal of our alliances 35 years ago was to deter
aggression against the alliance partners and preserve the
peace, particularly against treats from the Soviet Union and
its proxies. The purpose of our alliances, therefore, remains
the same today: to deter aggression, and to preserve peace by
making it clear, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that allied
nations will resist, repel, and punish the aggressor.
And something else that was true 35 years ago is also true
today: it is not enough for allies to agree that when war
starts they will come to each other's aid. Words and
agreements alone will not deter war. Allies must work together
to ensure that we have the capability to fight and win a war,
and that our adversaries know it. That is real deterrent . [90:23
The United States also feels that Prime Minister Lange's
contention that the ANZUS alliance is not a nuclear one and that
there is simply no need for nuclear weapons to be brought into
New Zealand because the strategic environment does not call for
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nuclear weaponry and that New Zealand does not form part of a
nuclear strategy, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of
the Western system of deterrence. £61:10113 The United States
pointed this out when Secretary Schultz stated that:
The first and most basic responsibility is that each of us
has a share in maintaining the overall deterrent strength of
the alliance. For the United States, that means restoring our
own strength, in both conventional and nuclear arms. Our
allies, of course, have an equally grave responsibility to help
maintain the deterrent strength of the alliance. They must
make the necessary effort to ensure their own security-and
particularly in the area of conventional defense. Joint
military exercises and intelligence cooperation are also
essential. They need not possess their own nuclear deterrent;
but if they undermine ours as New Zealand has, they weaken
their own national security. Commitments cannot be met
selectively by one nation without eroding the security of all
and undermining popular support for the alliance .... The
arguments for isolationism or unilateralism should have been
dashed long, long ago. The global equilibrium would be that
much more precarious. Nor is it a serious option for our
allies: the aggression we see in many parts of the world has
shown that there is no defense in isolation. For any of us, to
retreat from this collective security system-in a world of new
dangers-would be foolish." C90:2-43
There is an additional U.S. concern on this idea that New
Zealand sees no place in its defense for nuclear weapons or
nuclear powered ships, or anything nuclear. The ANZUS treaty
provides for the treaty partners to consult together if there is
an armed attack on the territory or "armed forces, public vessels
or aircraft in the Pacific" (Article V) . It is possible then to
suggest that U.S. nuclear vessels and aircraft come under the
protective umbrella of ANZUS. If a category of craft not
specifically listed in ANZUS can be excluded by an unilateral New
Zealand interpretation, then of course all categories could be
taken off the list one by one. [63:193 Furthermore, if a U.S.
vessel came under attack in the South Pacific, would New Zealand
first check to see what its 'nuclear status' was before coming to
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the aid of the ship. Additionally, would a New Zealand vessel in
distress refuse help from a nuclear U.S. vessel?
Prime Minister Lange is always quick to point out that
New Zealand's decision to implement a nuclear-free zone was
arrived at through a democratic process and that the United
States should respect this process and not punish New Zealand for
making a democratic decision. However, the Prime Minister seems
to lose sight that the United States is also a democratic nation
and also has its own interests, as Secretary Wolfowitz has
pointed out:
We recognize that New Zealand's decision has been a product
of the democratic process. New Zealand is under no compulsion
to cooperate with us militarily if it feels that this does not
serve its interest. But the United States is also a democratic
nation with broad responsibilities. We must husband our
defense resources for use in areas where our help is wanted and
appreciated. Our people would tolerate nothing less. £10:3]
The United States has also pointed out that it feels that
New Zealand is off base concerning the nuclear arms race and
disarmament. Mr. Lange has pointed out the New Zealanders have
felt an increasing sense of frustration and concern that progress
in bringing the nuclear arms race under control has been minimal
and in recent years almost nonexistent. £61:1010] The United
States response to New Zealand's concern and subsequent action
is that instead of helping the arms control and disarmament
effort, that New Zealand's nuclear-free zone policy and proposed
law instead works against the process. The United 5tates has
pointed out that a principal Soviet aim throughout the postwar
period" has been to divide the alliance. Instead of pursuing arms
negotiations seriously in the quest for an equal and stable
strategic balance, the Soviets have often tried to develop and
SO
exploit differences among the allies, leaving us to negotiate
among ourselves while they sit back and wait for unilateral
concessions that they need not reciprocate. [90:3]
The response of the Reagan Administration to the actions
of New Zealand, has also been strongly backed by members of
Congress, who are on both sides of the aisle. Mr. Solarz (D-
N.Y.), Chairman of the Asia Pacific subcommitte of the House of
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, is a frequent critic
of the New Zealand stand against entry of ships carrying nuclear
weapons, and has said he is prepared to lead a delegation of U.S.
legislators to try to have the matter resolved. And that if there
was no resolution, that he would move in the Congress to have the
ANZUS alliance terminated. [91:m3]
The bipartisan support for the United States position
extends beyond Congress. In September 1985, the New Zealand
Opposition Leader Mr. McLay visited the United States and
discussed the current row between the his country and the U.S.
He said that during his visit he had met a group of people "who
would be best described as the Democratic Party foreign policy
establishment. They made it very clear to me that even though
many of them were sympathic to what the Labour Party is trying to
achieve, that even a Democratic president would have treated us
in the same way on this issue as a Republican administration."
[92:m4-5]
Concerning the American public at large Sir Wallace
Rowling, New Zealand's Ambassador to the United States, best
described American public opinion when he stated that, "At the
other end of the situation, public feeling is not relevant. In
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fact, it ia totally irrelevant. From the diacuaaiona ... I
don't know of any attempt anywhere in the U.S. to assess public
opinion . . . if there is such a thing as public opinion, on the
ANZUS question." £93:m4]
An additional aspect of the U.S.-N.Z. dispute has been
risen by Opposition Leader McLay . During his visit to the United
States in September 1985, Mr. McLay met with Secretary of Defense
4
Weinberger. Upon his return to N.Z., Mr. McLay said that the
one message that had got through to him in his discussions with
Mr. Weinberger and other Administration officials was that New
Zealand's best support in Washington had come from the Pentagon
and the State Department. "Every time someone has wanted to put a
countervailing duty on New Zealand products, or everytime a
congressman has wanted to pass a law that might restrict New
Zealand access to the American markets it's been the State
Department and the Pentagon that have gone to those people and
5
said 'don't do things that damage New Zealand's interests.'
4 In October 1985, Deputy PM Palmer deplored attempts by senior
Reagan administration officials to directly influence New
Zealand public opinion on the nuclear warship port access row.
Mr. Weinberger, during a special seven-nation satellite link
which included New Zealand, said in an interview the U.S. would
have to consider alternative security arrangements for the South
Pacific if New Zealand passed laws banning nuclear weapons. He
appealed to New Zealand to rethink its nuclear warship ban. Mr.
Palmer said that New Zealanders were being told the whole issue
would reach breaking point "unless the government buckles to the
American view on this matter." "That we will not do," he said.
He said that New Zealand also would not leave ANZUS and that it
was the United States that had declared the treaty inoperative
"on a unilateral basis." C94:ml3
The New Zealand farming community has been troubled for some
time that the American Administration's refusal to grant high
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Mr. McLay said the administration had been saying it did not want
trade sanctions, and he accepted that. "But they don't control
trade. The Congress does and it's there a protectionist law
could be passed. What we in New Zealand may not fully appreciate
at our distance is the very strong protectionist sentiment that
is developing in the United States Congress. "Now at that stage,
New Zealand, as an agricultural exporting nation has a lot to
worry about. Indeed, I was given that message very bluntly even
by very friendly congressmen." Furthermore, Mr. McLay stated
that, "As one person put it to me this morning . . . 'I'm not
spending any of my time in Congress now arguing New Zealand's
case.' That's simply because they can't say that New Zealand is
a safe, sane, solid ally of the United States," said Mr. McLay.
"With the best will in the world, that argument isn't available,"
he said. "And that, in the longterm, can be very damaging to our
interests." C92:m53
The response of the United States to the introduction of
the legislation in New Zealand, even with the modification to the
legislation whereby the Prime Minister will not be advised from
intelligence and defense officials on whether a ship is nuclear-
armed or not, was a flat refusal to look at the new changes.
Additionally, Mr. James Lilley, a senior State Department
offical, said that the United States saw no value in receiving an
envoy from New Zealand with the draft legislation. C89:m33 It
level access to the New Zealand Ambassador, Sir Wallace Rowling,
is a signal that their economic problems are of little interest
in a capital where once they were a matter of sympathetic
concern. [65:3m]
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was (and is) the position of the United Statea that the baaic
intent of the proposed legislation still violates the "neither
confirm nor deny" policy of the United States.
As the Labour Party moved to introduce the nuclear-free
zone legislation, the feeling in the State Department was that
turning the port-access issue into law would be a step backward
and away from the U.S. goal of restoring normal port access. The
other side of the United States "messages" was a blunt
reiteration that, if New Zealand put its nuclear-free legislation
into law--and that effectively blocked port access--then the U.S.
would have to "review its obligations under the ANZUS alliance."
C91:m2D The American position is that a process which called
upon New Zealand authorities to make their own assessments as to
whether U.S. ships are carrying nuclear weapons is not
acceptable. In the American view, it compromises the purpose of
their 'neither confirm nor deny' policy. C95:m3] Furthermore,
Secretary Schultz has stated that if the New Zealand Government
proceeded with statutory changes which would affect its ability
to participate in ANZUS, the treaty would have to be reexamined
by the United States. [96:165]
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C. AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON THE ISSUE
The Australian Labor Party <ALP) entered the polls in March
1983 with a platform that included foreign policy provisions
prompted by its left wing that seemed bound to prove embarrassing
if the Party came into office. The platform (chap. II. B7)
declared that Labor in office would:
Pursue an independent foreign policy and develop reliable
lines of communication with all great powers, thereby enabling
Australia to achieve a closer association with the non-aligned
movement and to engage in effective collective action for the
establishment of regional zones of peace and neutrality,
notably in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific. [4:1]
One of the first actions that the Australian Labour Party
undertook when it assumed control of the government in 1983, in
seeking to pursue this platform, was to initiate a review of the
contemporary relevance to Australia of the ANZUS treaty. And as
Mr. Kim Beazley, the Australian Minister for Defence has stated:
That review highlighted the fact that the treaty relationship
had facilitated for Australia the development of a framework
for valuable--and in some ways irreplaceable—cooperation on
defence matters, with benefits much wider than the scope of the
provisions of the treaty. I refer to such matters as regular
consultations on strategic matters; favoured customer standing
in equipment purchasing; supply/support arrangements; exchanges
on military doctrine, operational techniques, intelligence and
defence science; and co-operation through the Joint Defence
Facilities at North West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar . Indeed,
the breadth and depth of the cooperation on what one might term
a daily basis has become in many ways the central feature of a
relationship that was initially perceived largely in terms of
guarantees of assistance presented in the treaty.
As a result of this co-operation the Australian government
has secured an input into U.S. strategic policy. This and the
character of aspects of joint co-operation dovetail with a
strong sense of responsibility in the government on the need to
pursue vigorously the policies on arms control. This allows
Australia to address potential if distant threats to the
security of its people which are beyond the capacity of any
individual government to deal with.
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For most of its history, Australia's principal security
concern has been that world forces could turn against our
natural allies, and so make Australia's position unacceptably
insecure, especially because of the large land mass that would
need to be defended by a population so small in numbers. [5:12-
13]
The ALP left wing's hankering after a more non-aligned, more
independent, foreign policy ran up against the findings of the
ANZUS review, and the uncomfortable fact that the great majority
of Australians have no desire to be non-aligned, feel far more
comfortable with the American alliance than they would without
it, and have shown no desire to spend more on defense than they
can possibly avoid. [4:5]
Given this background, from the beginning of the U.S. -New
Zealand dispute, Australia has distanced itself from New
Zealand's ANZUS stand. Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Foreign
Minister Bill Hayden have constantly reiterated Australia's
sideline position in the ANZUS row, declined to condemn the
refusal by the United States to accept a personal New Zealand
briefing on its anti-nuclear legislation, and insisted that
Australia's relations with the U.S. remain unchanged. The
Australian Government has consistently stated that it regards
granting a reasonable level of port access as a responsibility
1
inherent in the status of an ally. And furthermore, that
Yet in the past incidents have occurred that have pointed
out that the issue has not been entirely worked out within the
Australian government and Australian society. In December 1983,
under Labor, the British carrier HMS Invincible-which would have
been sold to the Australian navy but for the Falkldnds war-was
refused access to Sydney's drydock facilities because the British
declined to reveal whether it carried nuclear weapons. Another
curious incident in January 1984 demonstrated even more the
ambiguities in Labor's position. The British aircraft carrier
96
Australia understands the reasons for the neither confirm nor
deny policy regarding carriage of nuclear weapons aboard warships
and accepted that policy. [16:23
Even though Australia has tried to maintain a sideline
position in the U.S.-N.Z. dispute, in January 1985, just prior to
the New Zealand decision not to permit the U.5.S. Buchanan to
make a port call after the 'Sea Eagle' exercise. Prime Minister
Hawke sent a strongly worded letter to New Zealand Prime Minister
Lange concerning Lange's government ban on nuclear-powered or
possibly nuclear-armed ships. In the letter Mr. Hawke firmly
backed the U.S. position on the issue. Mr. Hawke pointed out
that Australia could not accept as a permanent arrangement that
the alliance ANZUS had a different meaning and entailed different
obligations for different members. The prime minister also said
he told Mr. Lange that the Australian Government would "continue
to make clear that, whatever New Zealand's position or policies
might be, Australia . . . had its own well known and clearly
expressed position on visits by U.S. warships and the importance
of maintaining the 'neither confirm nor deny' principle." Mr.
Hawke said Australia would avoid any public statements which
would cast doubt on whether the U.S. was applying its policy of
Invincible came to Sydney on a goodwill visit and asked for dry
dock facilities to carry out repairs. (Former) Minister for
Defense Scholes refused to allow the ship in, on the grounds that
the ship's captain would not declare whether or not the vessel
was carrying nuclear weapons. Scholes saw a distinction between
berthing at a wharf, thus staying in the water, and entering a
dry dock which is "Australian territory" or "soil" on which,
under the Australian Labor Party's party platform, nuclear
weapons cannot be "stored". C4:10D
97
neither confirming or denying that warships were carrying nuclear
weapons and said that it was important that New Zealand, as an
alliance partner, should do the same. C97:ml3
2
Even Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, who has been the
sometimes querulous, "chip-on-the-shoulder , " suspicious ally,
over-affected perhaps by U.S. paternalism, resentful of its
dominance in the alliance and its hardnosed attitude an all
negotiations [4:5], when asked whether, given the nature of the
relationship between Australia and New Zealand, that there was
room for the Australian Government to change its policy to a
harder anti-nuclear stance, replied that:
We have already declared quite categorically our belief that
we should provide port facilities for American nuclear-powered
and nuclear-capable vessels, for that was a proposition
challenged at the last federal conference of the (Australian
Labor) Party. The challenge was beaten off quite comfortably .
. . . Overwhelmingly the party supports the government's view.
Overwhelmingly the community supports the government's view;
and that is, the Australian Government provides port facilities
for American vessels in transit- -nuclear-powered , nuclear
capable. C98:m-43
Even though the leader of the opposition, John Howard and his
"shadow" foreign minister, Michael MacKellar, have attempted to
find some fault with the Government's response to the nuclear
2What concerns many people about Hayden is whether his
periodic deference to the left, the occasional bone thrown to it
or cause pursued on its behalf, derives from his determination to
keep them around in the party jungle, or whether he is privately
dedicated to their general position and resiles from it only as a
temporary concession or discretion to enable him to fight another
day for more radical causes. On substantive issues of foreign
policy, he has found the party platform dangerously impractical,
and despite concern with the causes of the left he has come to
join his leader (Hawke) in promoting the essential policies of
their Liberal predecessors. [4:43
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issue overall they have been hard put to find points of substance
3
to criticize. It is now clear that an alliance with the United
States has a broad base of support in all the Australian
political parties and that close ties will continue no matter
which group forms the government in either Canberra or
Washington. [2:3503 Furthermore, the important thing -co keep
in mind with the current dialouge between Australia and New
Zealand on the nuciear issue, is that the Labour (Labor) Parties
are in power in both nations, and that the Australian Labor Party
is telling its New Zealand counterpart that it is going to far on
the issue and endangering the alliance relationship. One would
have expected this from a Liberal -Country Party Government. But
it is even more stunning that it is an Australian Labor
Government that is siding with the United States on the dispute.
Australia shares New Zealand's concern about the arms race;
moreover, if anything the Australian Labor Government has proved
itself to be (especially via Foreign Minister Bill Hayden) the
more active one in seeking a negotiated end to the arms race.
Tor example on August 10, 1985, speaking at the opening of
the New South Wales Liberal Party convention in Sydney, Mr.
Peacock said the nuclear-free treaty has thrown more obstacles in
the path of American attempts to maintain its strategic presence
in the region. Earlier, the opposition spokesman on defense, Mr.
Sinclair, said the nuclear-free treaty would put further stress
on Australia's relations with the United States. Mr. Sinclair
also claimed that the treaty would play straight into the hands
of the Soviet Union. C68:ml3 Additionally, in overall foreign
policy matters, and in some specific instances Hawke is, if
anything, to the right of Fraser . Above all it is a remainder
that whatever their domestic poiicies-and even here Hawke has,
for the most part, merely made Fraser's policies more palatable
by appealing successfully to the notion of consensus- -Austral lans
are conservatives in looking at the outside worid. [4:15]
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such as an upgrading of personnel working on this subject.
However, the Australia Government realizes that if it seeks to
go too far too fast on disarmament it will find itself clashing
with its main ally, the United States. [99:2003 The Australian
position is that:
The Australian government rejects the attractive but.
unrealistic idea that unilateral disarmament by Western
countries would somehow ensure our security. The objective of
all concerned governments must be to promote multilateral arms
control and disarmament proposals that are balanced, equitable,
and able to be verified. [5:11]
The Australian government is as concerned as the New Zealand
government over the threat of nuclear war. The Australian
government has elevated arms control and disarmament issues to
the first order of priority and has worked energetically and
openly through international forums on a broad range of
initiatives. In 1983 and 1984 Australia, with New Zealand,
jointly and successfully sponsored resolutions at the United
Nations General Assembly calling for a Comprehensive Test Ban
treaty to end all nuclear testing in all environments." [5:11]
Furthermore, it was Australia that originally put forward the
idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Yet, in the Australia
view, the content of the proposed nuclear-free zone legislation
in New Zealand goes well beyond that of the South Pacific Forum's
nuclear-free zone treaty, and reinforces the difference in stands
between the Lange and Hawke governments over nuclear ship visits
and whether the ANZUS allaince with the United States means such
visits must be allowed without question. [83:m5] Furthermore,
the Australian position, in agreement with that of the United
States, is that nuclear ships are now much more important in the
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total fleet structure of the U.S. Navy than used to be the case.
Denying entry to nuclear ships is therefore tantamount to
dismantling ANZUS. [63:26]
Even though the United States has suspended military
cooperation with New Zealand, Australia is still actively
seeking to ensure that the important aspects of her cooperation
with both the United states and New Zealand continue on a
bilateral basis." £5:14] A Joint Communique by New Zealand
Minister of Defence F.D. O'Flynn and the Australian Minister for
Defence K.C. Beazley on April 3,1985, reaffirmed the relevance
and importance of the ANZUS Treaty and that both governments
remained firmly committed members of the Western alliance. It
also stated that both governments would also together continue to
pursue the objective of a nuclear-free zone in the Southwest
Pacific. [16:1]
Yet there is trouble on the horizon for the defense ties
between Australia and New Zealand. For example, in February
1985, Prime Minister Hawke notified New Zealand that Australia
would not pass to New Zealand intelligence material originating
in the United States. [100:11] This action definitely deprives
New Zealand of valuable information. Furthermore, according to a
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Closer Defence Logistics
Cooperation entered into by both countries in 1983, both
Australia and New Zealand agreed to undertake cooperative
arrangements for logistic support and defence production and
supply. [5:16-7] Yet, if the defense ties between the U.S. and
New Zealand are cut off permanently and New Zealand turns to
other suppliers for defense supplies and systems, while Australia
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retains close ties to the United States, the ability o±" New
Zealand and Australia to coordinate logistic support and defense
production and supply would be placed in serious difficulty.
This is an issue that both nations will have to face in the
future, if the U.S.-N.Z. split becomes final.
D. SUMMARY
Instead of trying to summarize New Zealand's position on its
anti-nuclear stance, I believe the following comments by Derek
Davies, a reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review, who
conducted an interview with Prime Minister Lange in March 1985,
best sums up the situation:
Several people have asked me how I squared New Zealand Prime
Minister David Lange' s passionate defence of his country's non-
nuclear stance plus his known sincerity (he is a Methodist lay
preacher) with my impression . . . that his heart really wasn't
in it-that, like a lawyer, he was arguing a case he did not
entirely believe in because he needed the support of the unions
and his party's leftwing for his economic policies. The answer
is I can't--not if it means accusing him of conscious
hypocrisy. Oh the other hand, he is too intelligent not to see
the contradictions inherent in his pro-ANZUS, anti-nuclear
stance.
As I reported after my interview with his, he and his
government's policies are full of ironic contradictions. It
may be that he calculated that the chance of getting his
economic policies through was worth a tiff with the US, and has
been taken aback by the strength of Washington's reaction. He
may also have been taken aback by reservations expressed by
leaders of the Island states of the Pacific. Already worried
by the unrest in New Caledonia, Pacific Island leaders such as
the King of Tonga, Ratu Mara of Fiji, Tofilau Eti of Western
Samoa and Tom Davis of the Cook Islands, have expressed concern
over Wellington's ANZUS policy-a point being bashed home by the
leader of the opposition Jim McLay. [101:493
Additionally, the following editorial form a New Zealand
paper spells out Mr. Lange's domestic concerns:
What has happened to ANZUS was predictable from the start and
now the Government has the responsibility to tell the nation
what happens next. Only the historians will be able to decide
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if the voters knowningly gave their assent to the break-up of
ANZUS last year when they voted in large numbers for the
present Government. Certainly the port visit policy was in
Labour's manifesto and Sir Robert Muldoon warned what would
happen if the policy was put into effect. American officials
have told Mr. Palmer that they will review their security
commitment to New Zealand if the proposed anti -nuclear
legislation becomes law. Additionally, they told Mr. Palmer
that they would not replay the situation in January 1985 when
the USS Buchanan was not permitted to visit our ports. On that
occassion the Americans came very close to allowing one ally a
different set of rules than they have allowed others. Pressure
on the Government from those who want no part of the American
alliance forced the last-minute cancellation of the visit.
Since then sections of the Labour Party have called at their
conference for an end to ANZUS and a policy of neutrality
between the West and the Soviet Union.
Intense anti-nuclear feelings and burgeoning nationalism have
coalesced around a desire to be a nuclear-free country. It is
an attractive prospect but the electorate does not seem to have
thought through the consequences of a gesture the rest of the
West simply see as a small country opting out of a shared
burden while wanting to retain the benefits of a joint
alliance. Had these arguments been fought through in the past
election campaign and membership of ANZUS unequivocally
rejected at the polls then a neutral role would have had
democratic endorsement. But the argument was a muffled one.
Labour had assured the nervous that ANZUS would remain in place
and the electorate had got tired of nine years of National
Administration. C102:m43
Mr. Lange has painted himself into a corner. He has found no
support from Australia in pushing New Zealand's non-nuclear
position, as a matter of fact he has been repeatedly told that he
is backing the wrong horse. His attempts to change the proposed
non-nuclear legislation so as to leave an opening for the entry
of American ships and his contention that it does not conflict
with the United States' policy of 'neither confirming nor
denying' , has run into continued stiff opposition from the
United States, as it should. Clause 9: Subclause 2 of the
legislation presented to the New Zealand Parliament on December
10, 1985 still states that:
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The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry
into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if
the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be
carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the
internal waters of New Zealand.
This provision still directly calls into question the neither
'confirm nor deny' policy of the United States. Even if Mr.
Lange, or any future Prime Minister, were to simply assume that.
every ship that the United States asks for port visits for was
not armed with nuclear weapons in order to avoid a dispute with
the United States, the legislation, by its wording, is stating
that the ship in question does not have nuclear weapons. This is
not satisfactory to the United States.
Even if the United States was willing to live with this
proposed situation, American nuclear propelled warships would
still be prohibited from entry into the internal water of New
Zealand, (see Appendix A, clause 11). This prohibition by itself
renders a functional alliance relationship unworkable.
Opposition from within the Labour Party and also the various
domestic anti-nuclear groups, will not allow Mr. Lange to back
off too far from his current stance. If he tries to remove the
part3 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone that the United States
says will result in the termination of the ANZUS relationship,
the leftwing of the Labour Party will withdraw its support from
the Government, most likely resulting in a vote of no-confidence.
To forestall this situation, Mr. Lange seems to be stalling
for time. In October 1985 the government set up a committee to
study New Zealand's defense needs. The three-member committee
would hear submissions from the public to discover "what ordinary
New Zealanders feel about defense." Mr. Lange stated that, "What
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I want to know is how people in bars, in supermarkets, in church
halls and in plunket (childcare) groups perceive our defence
interests." C75:ml] The results of the committee are due
sometime in the spring of 1986, around the same time that the
committee that is studying the nuclear-free legisaltion is to
report its findings.
And what are the likely findings of these committees? An
editorial in the Wellington newpaper 'THE EVENING POST' in
September 1985, I believe points out what the results maybe:
National Research Bureau polls shows that 71 percent of the
electorate wants New Zealand to remain in ANZUS. THE NRB
respondents decided by a majority of two to one that they
supported the visits of nuclear-powered warships; however, by
the same majority they continue to oppose nuclear-armed ships
visiting our ports. Yet some of the 50 percent that do not
want nuclear arms in New Zealand also must be a part of the 71
percent of the voters who want to remain in ANZUS.
The obvious question to ask is how many people will take the
risk of occasionally hosting nuclear arms in our waters if the
alternative is a withdrawal from or an end to ANZUS? E65:m33
If Mr. Lange can show his Party that the majority of New
Zealanders want to remain in ANZUS, and are willing to accept
occasionally possibly nuclear-armed or nuclear powered vessels,
he maybe able to stand off the extreme leftwing of his Party and
remain in power. On the other hand, he may just be attempting to
show that there truly is broad public support for his Party's
position, in order to push the nuclear-free zone legislation
through and withstand the opposition pressure when the United
States moves to terminate its ANZUS ties to New Zealand.
New Zealand's current action, and its possible future moves,
represents a serious step away from its commitment to broader
Western security interests. ANZUS is an important part of the
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post-World War II alliance system which has helped to keep the
peace and underwrite regional stability. A political signal that
democratic Western societies were disengaging from mutual
support, no matter how tentative, would, in the view of the
United States, encourage our adversaries-reconfirming their sense
that opportunities for inducing isolationist tendencies in the
West were still available. [103:3-4]
Even if the United States takes the necessary steps to
minimize the effects of New Zealand's actions, there will still
be some repercussions. As a symbolic gesture, declaring New
Zealand permanently nuclear-free would have considerable
political significance. The political fallout would certainly be
felt in Australia, where the government would come under
increased pressure from its leftwing to emulate Australia's
smaller neighbor. Additionally, peace movements would also be
heartened and strengthened in other Western countries, including
the U.S. C63:26] Finally, the Soviet Union would have a
propaganda field day, no matter how many times Mr. Lange
expressed his anger at "Soviet impertience" to the Soviet
ambassador
.
The United States must start now to establish more direct
permanent ties and presence with the Island states, because if
the New Zealand NFZ legislation is passed, the United States must
be in a position to deal directly with the Island states in the
region and not hope to use New Zealand as a channel for U.S.
interests. Permanent termination of defense ties with New
Zealand will result in a severe disruption of normal relations
between the United States and the Labour Government. Emotions
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are likely to run high, and the United States cannot expect the
Labour Government to act in good faith when presenting the
position of the United States on various issues to the other
states in the region.
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VI. SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
During the early 1970s, the Labour Government in New Zealand,
using regional concern over nuclear testing in the region, sought
to implement its Party's commitment to establish a nuclear-free
zone (NFZ) in the Southwest Pacific. However, when the Labour
Government went out of office in 1975, the proposal went into
cold storage.
One of the platforms of the Australian Labor Party, when it
came into office in 1983, was a commitment to a wide range of
arms control objectives. Among these, but with no particular
emphasis, was a pledge to promote 'zones of peace and nuclear
free zones in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.' Building on the
opposition of the Island states to French nuclear testing,
Australia revived the lapsed New Zealand nuclear-free proposal at
the 1983 meeting of the South Pacific Forum. [14:813
Australian advocacy for a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
(SPNFZ) finally bore fruit with the decision by the South Pacific
Forum states on August 6, 1985 to adopt a treaty that wouid make
the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, along with Latin America
1
and Antarctica. Indonesia Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja
said the forming of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone "is a
-^The Antarctic Treaty outlaws nuclear weapons from the
southern continent by declaring it a zone of peace. The Treaty
of Tlateloco of 1967 prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin American,
although the nuclear power states do not recognize any
prohibition on transit of weapons through the region.
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Manifestation of the long-standing strong feeling of the
countries in the Pacific dating back to the first nuclear test
explosions in the 1940." More recent concerns, he said, had been
French tests and the dumping of nuclear wastes. [104:nlJ Indeed,
one of the targets, besides France of the treaty's provisions is
Japan. By establishing a NFZ in the Southwest Pacific, it is
hoped that any opportunity for Japan to dump radio-active
material in the area will pre-empted.
Besides the Treaty, there are three protocols. The first
invites France, the United States and the United Kingdom (members
of the SPC) to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their
Southwest Pacific territories. The other two protocols
respectively invite the five nuclear weapon states not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty and
not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone. [26:23
Prime Minister Lange told Parliament in a ministerial
statement, in September 1985, that the decision to adopt the
treaty was "an important event in the history of co-operation
among the countries of the South Pacific . . . an important event
in the history of co-operation among the countries of the South
Pacific." "It is an act to strengthen regional security and to
underline our mutual determination that nuclear weapons will not
be possessed by any of us or stationed on our territories. The
treaty will also provide a new means for providing pressure on
France to halt its testing programs at Mururoa." C82:m23
Building on this theme of stopping French testing,
Australian Defense Minister Beasley has pointed out that the
treaty was aimed mainly at trying to stop France from continuing
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nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia. Mr. Beasley stated
that, "We don't see American security interests as being piaced
in jeopardy by the treaty." He pointed out that the treaty did
not prohibit the passage of vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear
weapons through the area or prevent ships from docking at ports
of nations that allow their presence. [105:363
The cautious attitude of Australia and the majority of the
South Pacific Forum states reflects a dual concern with French
nuclear testing on the one hand and with U.S. security links on
the other; however, from the perspective of the United States,
it doesn't matter if the NFZ treaty is suppose to be directed at
France, if it in effect hinders American operations in the
Southwest Pacific. The U.S. concern is partly based on the
belief that the NFZ will curtail the freedom of movement of its
military ships and aircraft in the Southwest Pacific, especially
if the majority of the states which have signed the treaty try to
tighten restrictions as New Zealand and Vanuatu have.
As the current NFZ stands, it does not preclude countries
entering into treaties with others that are nuclear capable, and
it does not prevent nuclear-powered ships from coming through the
South Pacific. Therefore, the treaty does not really reduce the
number of nuclear weapons that traverse the region. C82:m33
However, if in the future a stronger version of a NFZ is passed,
such as the version of the treaty that Vanuatu and New Zealand
tried to get the SPF to pass initially, this would place strong
restrictions on 'anything nuclear' in the region.
Another American concern is that since the U.S. is the only
nuclear weapons state which currently deploys in the Southwest
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Pacific, the NFZ will in effect unilaterally restrict its
movements while not imposing similar constraints on its strategic
adversary--the Soviet Union. Since the U.S. maintains strategic
installations and other security links with its ANZUS allies, it
stands to be more disadvantaged by a nuclear-free zone than its
strategic adversary. [14:80]
While not opposed to NFZs in principle, the U.S. feels it
should only support those that were regionally comprehensive, do
not distrub 'necessary security arrangements', and are capable of
adequate verification. [14:813 Although the current SPNFZ is a
regionally comprehensive one and currently does not distrub
American security arrangements in the region, it is certainly not
capable of adequate verification. And even if the United States
were to sign the Treaty, it would still need to state that it
would only comply with certain provisions of the Treaty, since
the United States cannot renounce its right to have nuclear
weapons.
Additionally, it should be remembered that the primary reason
for the Treaty is to force the end to French nuclear testing in
the region. Even if the United States signs the Treaty as a
gesture of good faith, it means nothing if the French continue to
test. Another consideration is that the Labour Government in New
Zealand, the leftwing of the Australian Labor Party, and other
anti-nuclear forces in the Southwest Pacific and their allies
worldwide, could interpert an American decision to sign the
Treaty as a signal that they are following the proper course
towards world peace, instead of addressing the real underlying
nature of the competition between democracies and totalitarianism
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In the final analysis, the bottom line for the United States
regarding the SPNFZ Treaty is global rather than regional. Any
significant denial of U.S. Navy or Air Force access to and
transit through the area, accompanied by deterioration of the
ANZUS relationship, would: (1) set dangerous denuclearization
precedents for other oceanic areas where our strategic and other
interests may indeed be vital; and (2) contribute to giobal
perceptions of eroding U.S. power relationships and the ability
to project power. [33:723 And given the world situation and the
current issues the United States is addressing in the Southwest
Pacific, it does not appear to be in the national interest of the
United States to become a Party to the Treaty.
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VII. FISHING ISSUE
The small islands of the Pacific, including our own Trust
Territories, are making the transition to independence or self-
governing status. This promising development carries with it,
however, additional complications for such important matters as
fishing rights, law of the sea, and the exploitation of mineral
resources.
Cyrus Vance (1980) C30:4]
In examining the relations between the United States and the
Island states, the overriding bone of contention between the two
that comes to the forefront is the issue of fishing rights. The
fishing issue has been thorn in U.S. -Island relations for several
years. In August 1985, the director of the South Pacific Forum
Fisheries Agency (SPFFA), Philipp Muller, said that South Pacific
Island nations may resort to gunboats to stop U.S. tuna vessels
if a licensing agreement cannot be reached with the Reagan
Administration. Additionally, he stated that the refusal of Lhe
American Tuna Boat Association to recognize the Islands'
exclusive rights to migratory fish in their economic zones has
damaged U.S. relations in the Pacific. C106:5] And unless this
issue is solved in a matter that satisfies both parties,
relations will remained strained and the Soviet Union wili
continue to be presented a channel for gaining increasing levels
of influence in the Islands.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
The dominant internal question for most South Pacific
countries continues to be efforts to achieve more economic self-
sufficiency. Some, such as the Cook Islands, have sought to
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establish tax haven status by passing an Offshore Banking Act,
that have attracted a number of banks. However, the only reai
effective, long-term solution to chronic balance of payments
problems in the smaller Polynesian states is to capitalize on
whatever possibilities a narrow resource base provides. [20:112]
Economic development in the Southwest Pacific is proving more
difficult than political advancement. Few significant economic
resources exist; all economies are fragile, and most depend on
sizable amount of financial aid. As only about 1.8 per cent of
the area of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) is land, it is not
surprising that the marine resources of the 30 million square
kilometers of ocean in the area have attracted great interest
from the Island countries. Due to this interest, the Island
states of the region have long recognized the significance of a
comprehensive international regime which recognizes the rights,
obligations and interests of coastal states and which wili serve
to promote more efficient and equitable ocean management.
C1S:20] And with the declaration of 200-mile exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) around each Island state by the South Pacific Forum
in October 1976 (and sanctioned by the U.N. Law of the Sea
Convention) in a situation has resulted where more than a third
of the entire South Pacific Ocean falls under the jurisdiction of
one local state or another. [23:72]
The known offshore resources of the South Pacific are
dominated by highly migratory species, predominately tuna. Of
the total fishing catch from the 200-mile zones of the Island
states tuna accounts for Q& per cent of the catch, valued at
around U.S. $300 million. The greater part of the totai (about
114
Figure 7 Area Covered by 200 Mile EEZs
Source: C107:15]
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87 per cent) is taken by foreign vessels fishing indepedently of
the coastal states. ANd while the Pacific Island countries
receive only about U.S. S6 million from the total tuna catch,
tuna already represents the biggest industry in the Solomon
Islands, the second biggest in Fiji and is the sixth biggest in
Papua New Guinea. For countries such as Tuvalu and Kiribati the
value of tuna caught by distant-water tuna vessels exploiting
their 200-mile zones is greater than their entire GNP. The South
Pacific states therefore, agree that because the highly migratory
species are the major resource within their 200-mile zones tney
must be controlled by the coastal state. [18:25]
As indicated above, the Pacific Island states themselves do
not have well -developed commercial fishing fleets. There is
little expertise and capital available for such development.
What these countries do is 'rent' their water out to overseas
fishing fleets. States, such as Kiribati, which consist of large
numbers of scattered small islands have a rare advantage because
these islands create the basis for claim of a large 200-mile EEZ
.
This 'rent' has become a major source of income for several
Pacific states. [108:73
Although the United States and the South Pacific nations have
all consistently advocated the creation of a regional fisheries
organization in an effort for these states to effectively use
their marine resources, there are very important differences
between their approaches. The United States' position is that it
will recognize the jurisdiction over marine resources to the
extent that it is exercised through a regional organization. The
power of this regional organization would be derived from an
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international treaty that gave the organization the power to
regulate regional fishing. The South Pacific nations however,
believe that a regional organization's authority should be
derived from the delegation of national rights over each states
own EEZ and that the organization will act as agent for the
member nations by their consent. [107:168]
The U.S. does not recognize national assertions of
sovereignty over tuna, a view expressed in U.S. domestic
legislation, the U.S. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1
1976 (FCMA)
. The FCMA prohibits the importation of fish and
fish products into the U.S. from any country "not allowing
fishing vessels of the U.S. to engage in fishing for highly
migratory species in accordance with an international fishery
2
agreement." This provision of the FCMA has already provided the
basis for cutting off tuna imports from Canada, Peru, Costa Rica
and Mexico because of these states refusal to allow U.S. vessels
to catch tuna in their 200-mile zones. [18:25]
It is the position of the United States, that any U.S.
vessel fishing inside a nation's EEZ is not breaking any
international law because the U.S. refuses to recognize as valid
U.S. law, written largely under pressure from tuna fishing
interests, defines tuna as a migratory fish uncovered by such
exclusion zones. The law also directs the United States to
impose sanctions against nations that seize U.S. tuna boats in
those circumstances. In some cases, it indemnifies the boat
owners against loss of their craft. [109:2]
^Section 205 of the US Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 providies for a mandatory embargo on fish products
from any nation which seizes a United States flag fishing vessel
as a consequence of a claim of jurisdiction which we do not
recognize. [33:75]
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such law. The U.S. has also refused to recognize the authority
3
of the SPFFA (Japan has also ignored the agency where possible)
.
This is because the agency is the organization which registers
foreign fishing vessels that have permission to operate within
EEZs . Registered vessels are required to provide the agency with
a daily log of their catch. U.S. vessels send their logs via the
South Pacific Commission. [108:73
Because of their differences, several incidents have occurred
between U.S. vessels and several Pacific Island states, in
actions that have been an attempt by these states to show that
they serious about preventing what they see as poaching. In
March 1982, the U.S. registered supersemer, the Danica, was
seized and prosecuted by Papua New Guinea for illegally fishing
in Papua New Guinea's 200-mile economic zone. The matter was
reasonably and amicably settled with the Port Moresby Government
offering to 'sell' back the vessel for $250,000. [108:8]
3In August 1977 the SPF decided in Port Moresby to have the
SPEC convene a meeting with a view to setting up a regional
fisheries agency. At the signing of the "Port Moresby
Declaration" the Forum envisaged that the new agency would join
together the Island countries so that they would have coordinated
policies with which to face the distant-water fishing nations.
This notion became confused however, because the meeting was
attended by the U.S., the U.K. and France and certain problems
emerged, mainly due to the different interests being represented
by the coastal states on the one hand and the distant-water
fishing nations on the other. However, the South Pacific Forum
Fisheries Agency <FFA) was finally successfully negotiated and
the FFA was established in Honiara in 1979. The U.S. and other
non-Forum states continue to not be members due to their
continuing differences over fishing rights. [18:25]
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A more serious incident occurred in June 1984. The Solomon
Islands Government seized the U.S. Jeanette Diana, operating
within its EEZ. The Solomon Islands rejected a suggestion by the
South Pacific Forum that it bilaterally resolve the dispute with
the United States. The Solomon Islands Government instead
declared that the vessel was now its property and offered it for
sale for about $4 million. [110:013 However, there were no
buyers, mainly because the United States stated that it would
take any opportunity to seize the vessel back regardless of its
buyer. More importantly for U.S. -Islands relation, the United
States invoked the Magnusson Act banning Solomon Islands' produce
from the United States. Australia was drawn into the dispute as
the 'honest broker'. Fortunately for all concerned, the 1984
Solomon Islands' elections saw the return of the moderate Sir
Peter Kenilorea as Prime Minister, ousting the more radical Mr.
Solomon Mamaloni. In January 1985, the Jeanette Diana was sold
back to its owners for $842,000. [108:83
Sharing the Islanders hopes that the ocean will provide the
economic bounty the land has withheld, Australia has been
especially responsive to Island states defense requests related
4
to marine resources. In the Australian view, the economic
potential of the Islands offshore zones are seen both as
contributing to the stability of the region by reducing its
4On 1 June 1985, the Australian Government awarded a contract
to an Australian firm to build 10 patrol boats, to be supplied to
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga and Western
Samoa, under Australia's defense cooperation program, for
patrolling 200-mile economic zones. [111:9563
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economic vulnerability and as creating a source of instability
due to the relative incapacity of the Islands to enforce control
over their extended maritime zones. For Australia, the
connections between economic and defense in this matter are
intricate and extensive. [31:189]
New Zealand's also disagrees with the stance of the United
States on the issue. Deputy Prime Minister Palmer has stated
that his government is critical of the American attitude to
fishing zones in the Pacific, which he sees as the underlying
reason behind the recent Kiribati fishing agreement with the
Soviet Union and the consideration by Vanuatu of accepting a
similar offer from Moscow. Mr. Palmer stated that:
When you look at the fishing situation in the Pacific, it is
complicated one. And it has resulted, in our judgment, from
the failure of American policy to appreciate the implications
of their tuna boat activities, and I think the best thing that
has happened in the Pacific so far as the fishing issue is
concerned in the last few years is a belated recognition by the
United States that the tuna boat issue was affecting adversely,
very much, American interests in the Pacific, and they have
moved to try and change that policy so that the
extraterritorial reach of the legislation relating to tuna
boats is halted. [9:1]
The Pacific Islands view the American position as arrogant,
insofar as the U.S. denies coastal states the right to exercise
control over a resource that proportionately is of far greater
value to their economies than U.S. fisheries are to the American
economy. The Island countries also stress that the American
position is hypocritical in that the U.S. claims the right to
conserve marlin, a highly migratory species. £18:283
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B. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
The importance of the continuing dispute over the fishing
issue to United States interests in the area is that it has
opened a 'window of opportunity' for the Soviet Union in the
Southwest Pacific. Since the United States, up until the present
time, has not reached a agreement with the Pacific Islands over
the EEZs and the 'rent' of the waters therein, the Soviets have
been able to offer 'rent' themselves for the right to fish in
these waters.
Since the first Soviet offer to Southwest Pacific Island
states in 1976, Australia and New Zealand have consistently used
the South Pacific Forum meetings as a sounding board to warn
about the dangers of extending even non-security related
concessions to the Soviets. In 1976 a particular incident was
used to demonstrate the ostensible dangers inherent in inviting
the Soviet fishing fleet into the region. During 1976 Soviet
trawlers entered Australian waters for visual and electronic
surveillance of the ANZUS Kangaroo exercise. This strengthened
Australia's hand in putting its case to South Pacific countries
that the Soviet fishing fleet was not entirely benign. [112:3-43
However, since 1976, playing the so-called "Soviet card" has
become something of a South Pacific pastime: for example in 1982
the Prime Minister of the Solomons, Mr. Solomon Mamaloni, talked
about approaching the Soviet Union for aid, but his interest
happened to coincide with his conviction that Australia was being
obstinate in not providing the Solomons with a fast patrol boat
of the type used by the Australian Navy. In 1976, when the
Soviet card was first played, the Soviet Ambassador in New
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Zealand allegedly offered to give Tonga assistance in upgrading
its airfield at Fuaamotu, which would help the tourist industry,
and provide a dockyard at Vavau in exchange for a base for Soviet
fishing boats and air facilities for changing fishing crews. The
fears of a potential Soviet maritime presence in the region
persuaded the Australian and New Zealand governments to allocate
more economic aid to the region (Australia in fact quadrupled its
aid), to give it higher priority, and to initiate modest defense
cooperation programs. [23:72]
The Solomon Islands apparently tried to play the Soviet card
during the dispute with the United States over the Jeanette
Diana. At that time, the Solomon Islands hinted that it may
allow Soviet vessels to fish in its waters. The move came after
the Solomon Islands Government received written confirmation that
the United States had banned tuna exports from that nation, in
response to the impoundment of the American tuna boat. The
Solomon Islands Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade said that
it had been approached earlier in 1984 by the Soviet Union about
fishing in local waters and that in light of the Solomon Islands
policy of banning Soviet vessels from it3 ports, the government
was reluctant to consider Moscow's approaches. [113:Q1] However,
due to the ban by the United States on Solomon Islands fish
exports, the government needed to re-evaluate the Soviet request.
But, with a solution to the Jeanette Diana affair, the Solomon
Islands dropped its re-evaluation of the Soviet offer.
In not wishing to present the Soviets with an opportunxty to
establish a forward base in the South Pacific, the ANZUS nations
as a matter of policy have encouraged Island states to deny the
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Soviets any concessions. When necessary, the ANZUS nations have
offered aid or other incentives to counteract or pre-empt. a
Soviet initiative. Indeed, it has been suggested that their
demonstrated willingness to do so might tempt Island states to
'play the Soviet card" in order to reap the benefits of refusing
a Soviet offer. [12:475] However, the recent fishing agreement
between Kiribati and the Soviets would seem to indicate that we
have gone beyond bluffing.
C. THE CARD IS PLAYED
Even though the Soviets found their offers were constantly
turned down, they persisted in extending their offers. And their
persistence finally paid off, with the conclusion of a fishing
5
agreement with Kiribati in August 1985. The Soviet Union had
made their offer in 1984. It offered a return to Kiribati of
perhaps two to four times the normal fishing deal, but it
required an actual 'on land' presence by Soviet officials. It
was also well-timed. The Kiribati government was frustrated by
U.S. and Japanese vessels refusing to co-operate with the 3PF*FA
.
Kiribati also noted U.S. and Japanese reluctance to give figures
relating to their catches and hold-ups in U.S. payments. [108:83
Kiribati President Tabai signed the agreement with Moscow
allowing the Soviets to fish his country's 2-million-square-mile
resource zone, although no landing or base facilities rights were
5The agreement allowed 18 Soviet trawlers to fish in Kiribati
waters and in return the Soviet Union would provide the Island
nation with S2.4 million a year in license fees. No landing
rights or facilities were involved in the deal. [109:2]
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permitted in the agreement. Tabai said he was dealing with the
Soviets because the American Tuna Boat Association fished in his
country's waters without permission. [106:5]
Mr. Ieremia Tabai, strongly defended his country's fishing
treaty with the Soviet Union. "The Russians want to fish our
waters and we don't see anything wrong with it." "It is purely
6
economic." However, the has agreement split public opinion.
Opposition MPs urged the government to heed Australian and New
Zealand criticism against the agreement with the Soviet Union.
But Kiribati's foreign affairs secretary and roving ambassador,
Mr. Atanraoi Baiteke, claimed that the opposition was based on
misunderstanding and said that most Kiribati islanders favored
the deal. "They're afraid of a ghost. It is absurd to suggest
that Kiribati could turn communist because of a fishing
agreement," Mr. Baiteke said. C114:7]
Prior to the acceptance of the Soviet offer by Kiribati, the
Australian Government offered to provide an aid package that
would be equal to the $2.4 million fishing fee the Soviets haa
put on the table. The Australian offer was turned down however,
because the Kiribati Government wanted to move towards financial
self-sufficiency instead.. Whereas the Australian aid would
still have kept Kiribati dependent on a foreign government for
economic support, the Soviet deal would provide, in the Kiribati
mind, a return on the marine resources of the Kiribati EEZ.
c
Islanders from two northern atolls, Butaritari and Marakie,
staged demonstrations— an unusual step in a placid Micronesian
culture. "Tabai: Go to hell with the Russian's fishing rights!"
declared a banner at one meeting.
124
New Zealand also attempted to persuade the Kiribati
Government not to let the Soviets into their waters, but had to
try to explain that against the background of New Zealand already
having let the Soviets into one of its ports to conduct fishing
operations in the Southern Ocean. [115:533] The Kiribati
Government's attitude was that if New Zealand can control the
Soviets and profit from the relationship, then so can and should
Kiribati
.
The prospect of Soviet fishing officials setting up office in
tiny Kiribati is sufficient enough to set off alarm bells in
Washington, Canberra and Wellington. The anxiety in Canberra,
and throughout the Southwest Pacific, is that once the Soviets
are established on the Kiribati fishing grounds, the Soviets will
make a sufficiently attractive offer to secure base facilities
from which the operations of much U.S. naval activity could be
monitored. In the meantime, their fishing boats will, it is
presumed, be conducting hydrographic and oceanographic surveys of
interest to the Soviet Pacific fleet commanders. [115:5333
Furthermore, Soviet shore facilities in the past have been used
for espionage and the organization of elements prejudicial to the
stability of the host government. The refusal of the Kiribati
Government not to provide shore facilities, seems to indicate
that it is aware of this activities and does not want them in
their country. The primary concern for the United States is that
the Soviet fishing fleet is also heavily engaged in intelligence
gathering. And that Soviet access to the Kiribati EEZ would (and
does) provide the Soviet Union with closer access to the US test,
site at Kwajaiein Island. [71:961] Furthermore, there is a U.S.
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Air Force satellite tracking station on Canton Island in the
Phoenix group belonging to Kiribati. LlO&'.Ql
It is also important to remember that the Kiribati offer was
not an isolated move by the Soviet Union, for it had extended
fishing agreements to several other Pacific Islands states.
While the Kiribati Government agreed to a deal with the Soviets,
both Tonga Fiji rejected a Soviet request to fish and provide
bases in their economic zone. [106:5] However, the Solomon
Islands is still considering the matter.
In August 1985, Prime Minister Lange called on South Pacific
nations to be vigilant against Soviet expansionism which resulted
in Soviet bases being established in the Southwest Pacific. Mr.
Lange has repeated his opposition to a small Pacific country such
as Vanautu allowing the Soviet Union to develop its port
facilities. He said the development of port facilities in
Vanautu for Soviet fishing could bring a whole new dimension to
the Soviet presence in the region, and he described it as an
unwanted escalation. Mr. Lange described such an eventuality as
a result as the escalation of France's military presence in New
Caledonia, which he said is also unwanted. The New Zealand
leader has also said that his country will increase maritime
surveillance of the South Pacific and that it is making its Navy
more Pacific-oriented. C68:ml-23
Thus far, the coordinated policies of the ANZUS partners and
the countries of the South Pacific Forum have been successful in
denying the Soviet Union a major political foothold in the
region. They are anxious to avoid a situation arising in the
Southwest Pacific comparable to that in the Indian Ocean where
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Soviet offers of aid to the fishing industry and visits by
hydrographic vessels have developed into port calls by warships.
Although the USSR does not appear to have any compelling
strategic reasons to deploy military forces to the region, the
Southwest Pacific has many islands with good harbors. C23:723
D. REMARKS
The leaders of the Pacific Islands have a strong commitment
to regionalism and regional activities continue to grow.
Fisheries diplomacy is likely to be the major foreign relations
issue for many of the developing countries of the region in the
immediate future. It would be surprising, therefore, if there
were not further moves to strengthen regional fisheries
cooperation, particularly as the Island countries become more
involved in the management of their marine resources. [18:303
And it would greatly benefit U.S. policy in the region if we are
viewed as helping to develop these resources to the benefit of
the Island states versus a roadblock to progress and some level
of economic self-sufficiency.
However, the problem of continuing inequities in the region
cannot be met simply by rearranging the geography of
jurisdictions. At best, this could only be a temporary
corrective, in the same way that a one-time gift of resources
from the rich to the poor would only temporarily alter the
balance. It is obvious that the skew in the distribution of the
world's wealth is not due primarily to the fact that some nations
are better endowed with natural resources than others. If it
were, Japan and England would be desperately poor, while Latin
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Americana would count themselves among the most comfortable- The
point is that although direct control over natural resources is
certainly one cause of inequities, it is greatly overshadowed by
the role of social structures, and particularly the structure of
trade relationships. [107:155]
Less developed countries can invite developed countries to
provide capital and technology for exploitation of their
resources through joint ventures or other arrangements. It must
be realized of course, that the less developed countries are then
obligated to share the benefits. Furthermore, because of the
developed countries greater bargaining powers, joint ventures or
other contractual agreements are likely to be of greater benefit
to the developed nations. [107:154] However, this does not mean
that the less developed countries cannot also gain significant
benefits from joint ventures.
The Southwest Pacific is simply playing out some of the
familiar dynamics of world politics. Relationships typically
found between developed and less developed nations are being
reenacted within the region in the relationships between the more
and the less developed of these less developed nations. The
seemingly inexorable widening of the gap between the rich and
poor, the strong and the weak appears to be continuing here as
elsewhere. Nations which have more are able to strike harder
bargains, whether with fellow islanders or with outsiders, and
thus gain larger shares of the benefits. Politics are determined
by rather pinched visions of short-term material interests, and
cooperation is undertaken only incidentally when it. is seen as
serving that interest. [107:171]
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Pacific Islands leaders, as well as some Australians, New
Zeaianders, and Americans, feel that the United States must be
more empathetic towards the needs of their countries.
Additionally, they seem to feel that all that is needed to
correct the current situation is for the Administration to direct
Congress to provide more funding and legislation to accommodate
the needs of the Islands.
This attitude seems to indicate a lack of understanding of by
these individuals about how resources are allocated in the
American system. There seems to be little recognition of the
role of special interest groups and lobbying in the halls of
Congress in order to affect the budget allocation process.
This lack of understanding of the American political system
probably results from two factors. First, considering that most
of these Pacific Island states have small populations and
cultural systems that call for consensus and close personal
relations, political leaders probably project this image of
conducting business into the American political system. The
cultural perspectives of the islanders is compounded by the lack
of intensive contact with the American political process. Few
Pacific Islands states can afford to keep permanent
representatives in the United States. As it is, Australia pays
some 3500,000 a year to keep up one office in New York for the
use of the Pacific states for those occasions when they feel they
must make their voice heard in the UN General Assembly. [108:7]
Even larger countries, with more resources, have as of yet faiied




In the past, those in Washington who direct American policy
towards the South Pacific, have assumed too readily that the
Islands will understand the intricacies and legalisms of the
American political process and will accommodate. This is
unfortunate particularly in a region characterized by intimate
and pragmatic political systems. Australia itself has not always
understood the reasons for the American stand on the fisheries
issue. [31:1893
Given the domestic politics that go towards the formulation
of foreign policy and foreign aid amounts in the US and other
democratic countries with interests in the region, the Soviet
card may be critical for the Islands states in their competition
with the other special interests groups in the hails of Congress
and other legislative bodies in securing financial and other
forms of aid. The idea of a Soviet foothold in the South-west,
Pacific serves to motivate Defense and State Department officials
to lobby in Congress on behalf of Island states interests.
This is not to mean that concern over the Soviet Union should
be our only motivating factor in dealing with the Southwest
Pacific. Our basic concerns with democratic ideals, decent
government and institutions should also play a role in directing
our policies towards these states.
The United States and our allies, also need to make sure that
the Pacific Islands governments understand that Soviet 'license
fees' does not necessarily mean they have moved away from
dependence on aid given by friendly Western states and moved
towards self-sufficiency by using the marine resources from tneir
EEZs' to fund their economies.
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For example, in the Kiribati deal, the Soviet Union paid a
hefty fee to the Kiribati Government for fishing rights. It was
estimated by the Kiribati Government that the totai catch in 1985
by foreign vessels (Japanese, Taiwanese, Soviet, and American
ships) in its EEZ was worth $30 million. Although it is unKnown
the exact amount, lets say that each country accounted for 25
percent of the total catch. The Soviet share would tnen
represent $7.5 million and the fishing fee it paid would mean it
pay 32 percent of its total catch in fees alone. This represents
a pretty large premium on the part of the Soviet Union for the
right to fish in the Kiribati EEZ, if commercial reasons alone
account for the Soviet presence. However, if intelligence
gathering opportunities and future channels for political
influence are factored in, then the fishing fee paid by the
Soviets is not out-of-line with real or projected returns.
Assuming Soviet foreign policy goals, the fishing fee then does
not really represent a true economic return from its marine
resources for Kiribati.
Furthermore, if the Kiribati Government does not use the
money it is getting from the Soviet deal to build an economic
infrastructure that will allow it to harvest its own marine
resources, and instead simply uses the money to run government
and social program, then all the Kiribati Government has done is
shift its financial support base from a friendly Western country,
Australia, to a totalitarian state that could very well puil the
'financial rug' out from under the Kiribati economy at some
future date if certain conditions were not met.
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The experience of the United States with the fashing issue in
the South Pacific has been predominately an unhappy one. The
United States has treated the issue as an economic one, rather
than as a political problem, as Australia and New Zealand have
advised the United States to do. Islanders suspicions of
American motives in this matter have been intense in some
quarters and has led to acrimony and hostility from the time of
the agreement in 1978 at the Niue Forum to exclude the United
States from the FFA . £31:189]
The United States needs to concentrate on resolving the
fishing issue with the Pacific Island states, in conjunction with
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and other free-world
countries. As has been pointed out before, the objectives of the
United States in the Southwest Pacific are that it remains
stable and that it grows politically and economically. And
furthermore, that the region remain free of Soviet influence. In
line with these objectives, if the future economic basis for the
growth of these states is their marine resources and the need to
manage these resources effectively, the United States needs to
close the 'window of opportunity' that the current fishing
dispute is offering the Soviet Union. It would appear that in
the long-run that the security interests of the United States in
the region would be better served by reaching some form of
accommodation on the issue, even if it does not necessarily
please the American Tuna Boat Association, rather then let the
dispute continue.
Furthermore, even if the current fisheries issue is resolved,
the general issue itself will not disappear. As the statement by
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Cyrus Vance at the beginning of this chapter pointed out,
additional complications may arise with the Island states over
such issues as law of the sea, and the exploitation of mineral
resources. Advances in marine technology may permit sea-bed
mineral resources, such as manganese nodules, to be exploited by
industrially advanced countries. C23:73J And as a country that
is in the forefront of high technology, American advances in
marine technology will ensure that the U.S. will constantly have
to decide whether to assist the Islands by sharing these
developments in one way or another or to be seen to be part of
the resources security problem by denying them this knowledge.
[31:189] If the United States is to prevent the Soviet Union
from exploiting these other potential issues, American national
security planners must play a greater role in finding the proper
priority of American economic, political, and security interests
and objectives concerning these issues and how they effect
American influence in the region.
133
VIII. THREATS TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION
The central problem of American national security decision
makers is that their nation bears the major responsibility for
the defense of the Islands, Australasia and the Americas against
any external threat from Asia.
Though changing technology has removed some of the potential
importance of Pacific island bases, they would still prove to be
useful to aggressors against Australasia or the Americas, and the
basing of any aggressive forces in the area would greatly
complicate American defense planning. The scattered populations
of the Islands could not, by themselves, defend their territories
against conquest and use by powerful nations from outside. The
problem, then, is to keep open the necessary options to use the
Islands while denying the same freedom, if possible, to potential
foes. [37:236] A short historical note is in order here to help
illustrate the past (present and future) significance of the
Pacific Islands regarding the security of Asia and American
interests there.
After World War II the allies discovered that the actual
Japanese strategy was to isolate Australia, especially the
southeastern heartland, from any succor from the United States by
gaining control of the islands to the north, northeast, and east
of Australia, thus cutting the lines of communication between
North America and Australia versus the belief during the war that
the Japanese would launch an invasion from New Guinea, once it
was successfully occupied, down the Pacific coast of Queensland
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with the objective of occupying the heartland of Brisbane. The
Japanese believed that once the lines of communication were cut,
that Australia could be left to "wither on the vine." Such a
strategy clearly implied that the Japanese early on became
confident that the United States would come to Australia's aid if
its security was menaced by Japanese action. The Japanese
strategy was frustrated by the overextension of Japanese power
that the effort represented, and by the success in battle of the
Australian, New Zealand, and American forces. [116:84-53
The significance of the above is that given the current and
projected future level of economic activity that will criss-cross
the Pacific from North America to mainland Asia and the Southwest
Pacific, the importance of keeping a foe from gaining a foothold
in the Pacific from which the lines of communication could be cut
takes on an importance today that equals and perhaps exceeds that
of the past.
A major element of the region's strategic context is the
absence of a general security threat in the South Pacific. The
perception of a low level of strategic threat is held by the
Islands States as well as those outside the region. For example,
Rabbie Namaliu, the Papua New Guinea Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, outlined his assessment of the plausible risks to
Islands security in an address to the Fiftieth Anniversary
Conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs
in late August 1983. He listed and assessed these as: mtra-
regional conflict (slight); an unprovoked attack on an Island
country by an external power (also slight); destabilization of an
Island state for profit or ideology- -including Great Power
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rivalry (rather more likely); conflict over access to the
region's marine resources (also moderately possible); domestic
instability in New Caledonia (more likely yet) ; and domestic
internal threats to individual states (the greatest security
threat) . [31:1843
From the standpoint of the United States, the primary threat
to the region is that of the establishment of a totalitarian
regime in one of the Island states by exploitation of internal
divisions and economic disruption or stagnation by individuals
native to an island population and receiving support from an
outside source. The most dangerous source of this external
assistance would be the Soviet Union. Since World War II the
Soviet Union has been unable to make any headway into the region;
however, this is no reason for complacency.
For most of the Southwest Pacific's developing countries, the
main problem is that their resources are inadequate to maintain
the levels of income to which they aspire, or even those to which
they have become accustomed. [117:33] These countries, which
include Western Samoa and Tonga as well as Niue and the Cook
Islands, are already well on the way to permanent dependence on
aid. Others, such as Tokelaus, Tuvalu, and Kiribati are
basically the poorest countries of the Pacific. Their small
size, internal dispersal over wide areas of ocean, and tneir
remoteness, make it virtually impossible for them to operate
export-oriented manufacturing industries, and it is difficult to
see where they have any comparative advantage which can make up
their high transfer costs to world markets. [117:34]
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Threats to the region's basic domestic order can oe
categorized under two broad headings--changes which would resuit
in a state's ideological realignment and changes which would
result in corrupt or repressive regimes independent of ideology.
A regime which found itself embattled or a group which seized
control from its own gain will use any means to entrench itself
in power. [60:463 Either category of change would give an
opportunity to the Soviets, as well as to ourselves, depending
which is quickest on the ball, to take advantage of any internal
political development, whatever its ideological label.
While the basic West-leaning of the Southwest Pacific area
and the remoteness of any strategic threat are positive
advantages from the U.S. perspective, this contextual
consideration must also be regarded as a crucial liability. With
the exception of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, the other Islands
states are all microstates in terms of their populations. As
pointed out before, most of these microstates are land-limited
and resource poor. These and other consequences of small scale
make most of these regional states vulnerable to a sudden
takeover. Their economies are fragile and most are aid-
dependent. The cost of one of these countries as a client-state
would be negligible to a power such as the Soviet Union or the
United States. Yet it would be a financial burden the AN2US
allies are unlikely to be able to afford across the entire
region. In addition, the lines of authority are very short in
the Islands and the -dominance of a few key decision-makers often
go unchallenged by the majority of the population. Such
vulnerability reduces the time-frame for defensive reaction
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drastically and thus substantially undermines any complacency
based on the absence of a recognized strategic threat in the
region. £31:184-853
Based on the social, cultural and political record of the
region, the risks of a major domestic political upheavel are
slight. The strong Christian beliefs of the people in the region
help to serve as a deterrent to the rise of any sort of communist
movement in the region; however, this is not to say that the
region, particularly, the Island states, is immune to socialistic
doctrines, including Marxism-Leninism.
In each of these countries, though in varying degrees,
migration has become a significant feature of their adjustment,
and it has some benefits. However, it is also structurally
disruptive, in that it is the young male segment of the
population that often migrates. Additionally, it tends to take
an excessive proportion of the more skilled and literate workers.
Finally, if unchecked by non-economic barriers, migration may
become a flood, as it has from Niue and the Cook Islands, in which
case it can endanger the survival of the original society in its
home setting. £117:34] And who is to say, that some of those
who leave their country for better opportunities in the Western
world, return to their homes disillusioned with the Western
system and seek to lead their fellow citizens to a different way
of living.
Although there are many sources of tension within various
Island states that could disrupt internal security, only in one
instance—Vanuatu in 1980--has a problem escalated to a degree
beyond an Island government's capability to handle it. In that
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case, the situation was quickly brought under control after
Vanuatu secured support from Australia and Papua New Guinea to
put down the secessionist movement on the island of Espiriru
Santo. [12:4763
Vulnerability is clearly a two-edged sword- While the
relative weakness of the regional states is a source of concern
to those who fear that a regional state might pursue an ambitious
foreign policy and thereby upset the current stability of the
region, critics of the American defense interests in the South
Pacific worry lest the same factors of vulnerability allow
Washington to distort the region's basic security outlooks. Here
one finds fears over economic entrapment, misdirection of
development plans, loss of neutrality and the like. C3l:lS5]
Due to their very limited military capabilities all the
Island states share a sense of vulnerability as all are conscious
of their very limited capabilities to protect their sovereignty,
their outlying territories and offshore resource claims.
Economic security is a common, overriding and keenly feit
concern. It stems from small economies made more fragile by
being resource poor or, dependent on very few natural resources.
All the Island states are heavily dependent on external aid, and
the region as a whole receives the largest per capita aid in the
world. A sense of vulnerability and fragility has contributed to
a common concern to minimize great power rivalry in order to
reduce the threat of intervention in local affairs. C14:79]
As was mentioned before in the section dealing with the
French presence in the region, the current real potential source
of regional disorder lay in New Caledonia, where the movement for
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independence has divided the population and has received strong
support from the South Pacific Forum. Support for the
independence movement among the Island governments is grounded in
their strong preference for all territories to reach independence
as expeditiously as possible. [12:4773 On the other hand, the
opposition to an independent New Caledonia has resulted in
violence on the island. And as noted before, external states,
such as Libya, have already established ties to the more radical
elements of the independence movement. This opening of a channel
to a member of the 'terrorist network' does not help provide for
stability in the region.
Besides direct Soviet activities in the region, an additional
channel for Soviet penetration is through one of her client
states. For example, Cuba got a foot in South Pacific waters in
late July 1983 when it established full diplomatic links with
Vanuatu. £20:1123 The use of states in tune with Soviet
objectives in the world, provides it with possible channels of
influence without the external signs of Soviet attempts to gain
access to certain countries.
The U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983 to put an end to
Grenadian decisionmakers who were pursuing "adventurist" policies
with the aid of the Soviets, Cubans, and North Koreans, should
serve as a warning sign to all those concerned with the security
and political and economic development of the South Pacific.
Grenada is a prime example of how the United States can stop the
Soviets and other of their ilk, from using social and economic
unrest to exploit the situation to serve their strategic and
political aims. Grenada shows that if the Soviets were willing,
140
with the Cubans, to attempt to eatablish an island staging area
for military and political operations in the backyard of the U.S.
sphere of influence, then why not at some future time in the
Southwest Pacific as well. And in the Southwest Pacific, the
U.S. may not have the luxury of another medical school to serve
as a excuse for intervention. Grenada may prove to be the latest
example of a lasting but unintended American legacy coloring the
strategic complexion of defense relations with the Islands. The
Caribbean incident has demonstrated the fragility of the ciimate
of opinion which had previously discouraged intervention in
mircostates. although the circumstances of the South Pacific are
vastly different from those of the Caribbean particularly with
regard to proximity of sources of threat and the extent of Great
Power rivalry, the episode clearly has increased the perceived
vulnerability of small Island states. The President of Kiribati,
Ieremia Tabai, has openly expressed his concern that South
Pacific microstates such as his own could be endangered by such a
change in the climate of opinion. Reports that Great Britain and
New Zealand have developed contingency plans and special forces
to deal with Grenada-type situations in the South Pacific only
help to reinforce these concerns. [31:188]
The threats to the region are those elements of the
political, economic and social factors that are found throughout
the region that could present the Soviets and those other states
in the Soviet power orbit, with channels to extend their
influence into the region. The economic and social problems that
the Islands face may, in the future, place them into a position
into which they could be drawn into the power orbit of the Soviet
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Union. Although there la no direct threat, of outalde phyaical
invasion for any of the states of the Southwest Pacific, for
Australia and New Zealand, the only latent threat is a lack of
wili power to face the world as it really is, and by attempts r.o
divorce themselves from the power structure of the world and
their responsibilities to the Western alliance.
In trying to research threats to the region, I searched for a
power other then the 5oviet Union which seeks to extend its power
over the region and could find none, not even Japan, France or
any other potential economic "imperialist." American and other
Western states' economic power is not in the same league as
exploitation by the Soviet Union for political purposes. The
tendency by Third Worlders to see an equal danger to their
independence by both superpowers is totally off base.
Economically powerful Western states indeed are sometimes like
bulls in a China Shop, yet they are willing to help clean up and
make amends. The Soviets and those like them, are bulls who come





The research presented in this thesis has been to provide
some insight into the current interests and objectives of the
United States in the Southwest Pacific and to examine whether the
present policies of the United States are adequate to met the
changing situation in the region.
Although the U.S. agrees with the assessment of its ANZUS
allies that economic development is a key to domestic and
international stability in this region, Washington in the past
has not matched the levels of aid to the Island states of its two
allies and has generally relied on the two ANZAC states to carry
this burden. The U.S. does have a modest civil aid program in
the region currently of the order of £6 million a year to the
Forum Island states. [31:187] This aid is also distributed on a
regional basis, versus bilateral programs, although recently a
bilateral aid agreement has been concluded with Fiji.
In the past, the policy of the United States has been t.o let
Australia and New Zealand manage the region, since the interests
and objectives of these two allies were very much in tune with
those of the United States. However, there is no longer a real
confluence of policies.
Even though New Zealand had been a partner of the United
States since World War II in fact and in name since the signing
of the ANZUS pact in 1951, Mr. Lange and his Party view that a
new factor has entered that relationship, this being nuclear
weapons, and that the security of New Zealand requires the
143
exclusion from its territory of all nuclear weapons and that New
Zealand divorce itself from all things nuclear. [61:1009]
The question that an American policymaker must ask is: Since
nuclear weapons have been a part of the American arsenal since
1945, and indeed were used to bring the war against Japan to a
close, why is it that it took until 1984 for a New Zealand
government to see this as a new factor in the defense
relationship with the United States?
The answer to this question is to be found in both a reaction
to continued French nuciear testing in the region and a
combination of internal forces in New Zealand (peace groups,
labor unions, etc.), with some external support, that seek to
avoid the hard realities of world power politics and hope to
avoid being caught up in a nuclear conflict by renouncing all
things nuclear. And in an attempt to take some form of positive
action, the present Labour Government has moved to make New
Zealand a nuclear-free state. Unfortunately, the only nuciear
state it can really have any effect upon is its long time aiiy,
the United States.
In seeking policies to deal with the current dispute between
the United States and New Zealand, some voices from the past
prove useful. During the original negotiations of the ANZUS
Treaty in 1951, Mr. Spender, the Australian External Secretary,
stated that the idea of an indefinitely continuing obligation
appealed to him, but he wondered whether there should not oe a
minimum period before any party could terminate its obligations
under the treaty. The American representative. Ambassador
Dulles, said that his idea was that there should be no time limit
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on the main declaration but that any party could retire from the
Council at any time it wished. He pointed out that a treaty of
this sort which had no validity except from the flow of words was
actually void. Mr. Doidge, the New Zealand External Secretary,
agreed that the Pact would find its success in the sincerity of
purpose of the parties. [118:167]
It appears from the current dispute between the United States
and New Zealand that the 'sincerity of purpose' is now in
question. Furthermore, since the need for consensus is an
essential element of any agreement between nations, the current
dispute between the United States and New Zealand should not be
viewed as necessarily as bad development. If the foundations and
perceptions of what the real purpose of the ANZUS alliance is has
changed, even if it is due to a shift in one country. New
Zealand, then it is better to raise these differences now and
decide if a basis still exist for an alliance. This is not to
say that the United States should seek to develop a conventional
alliance with New Zealand, even if both agree that there is a
conventional role for New Zealand in the region. The United
States cannot allow itself to be decoupled from its global
deterrence posture which is based on nuclear weapons. If New
Zealand continues to insist that it wants nothing to do with a
defense structure that relies on nuclear weapons, then so be it.
A new consensus should be reached between the U.S. and New
Zealand; however, this new consensus should not be in the form o±~
a military alliance, since any military alliance with the United
States would automatically involve 'something nuclear'.
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The United States must continue a policy of stopping military
cooperation with New Zealand, for we cannot decouple nuclear form
conventional, as New Zealand wants to do. It may be in New
Zealand's interest to do so (as they see it); however, it is not
in the U.S. interest to do so.
This is true not only for our own strategic doctrine, out
also to prevent the spread of the so-called "nuclear aiiergy"
from New Zealand to other countries. For the spread of tne
mistaken belief that one can be safe conventionally by distancing
oneself from a nuclear power could lead to the breakup of the
Western alliance system, if other states saw that they could do
this without some cost.
There is no way that the United States as a single nation can
counteract the combined forces and resources of the Soviet empire
and still maintain itself as a democracy rather than as a
garrison state. It is, therefore, a serious, conceivably even
fatal error to conceive of the United States as the soie
adversary of the Soviet Union, to think pf the contemporary
contest as a "superpower" contest. L231&1 Yet if New Zeaiana
does not see it to be in its national interest to be a part of
the West's deterrence structure, then the U.S. and our other
allies, are better off finding out now and re-structure our
forces than having a half-hearted partner in defense of Western
values
.
The United States is not bullying New Zealand, we have our
own national interests. We can try to reach an accord; however,
only up to a point, after which we damage our own security.
After that point we can go no further. The United States is a
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large, powerful country that will create waves in tne
international system no matter which way she turns, and when she
does turn, it must be in the direction, that in the end, ensures
American security interests.
This is not to say that New Zealand shouid be let off scol-
free, if the alliance breaks up due to passage of the nuclear
free legislation; it must pay a price (by this I mean the Labour
Government and its supporters) . Lange constantly stresses that
N.Z.'s nuclear-free policy was democratically arrived at and that.
N.Z. should not be penalized for carrying out the will of the
people. This is fine. However, Mr. Lange and his supporters
must also realize that we live in a world where decisions have
consequences or opportunity costs. If New Zealand sees the
presence of U.S. ships in her ports as a threat to her security
or even more so an alliance with the United States, as paying too
high a price for the benefits gained, then she must also realize
that there are real cost for trading off that relationship with
the United States. By cutting defense ties with the United
States, New Zealand also changes the nature of that 'special
relationship' with the U.S. no matter how you look at it. Even
though the United States should not take direct economic actions
against New Zealand, those who are responsible for formulating
American foreign relations cannot help but be affected by a shift
in the defense partnership.
U.S. national security planners need to restructure
objectives and operational plans to take into account a neutral,
uncooperative New Zealand, since even if Mr. Lange's Party should
go down to defeat for some reason, it is apparent that there is
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no longer a consensus in the New Zealand body politic concerning
New Zealand's ties with the United States. The United States
cannot afford to have its alliance relationships jerked around
every coupie of years. Therefore, it is in the interest of the
United States to assume a larger role in those areas were before
we relied on the goodwill of New Zealand. This does not mean
that we should cut ourselves off from cooperation with New
Zealand. There is still a need to cooperate on political,
economic and social issues that concern the region.
If the ANZUS alliance is terminated due to New Zealand's
actions, the United States should institute a bilateral treaty
with Australia. Australia has already asked itself if it is in
its national interest and the Western world's collective strength
to maintain strong defense ties with the United States, and come
up with an overwhelming positive response, that cuts across party
lines. And Australia is entitled to a strong commitment by the
United States in response to its commitment to us.
Secondly, my research points out that the United States must
deal with Southwest Pacific micro-states. And that in past times
and perhaps future ones, these states do not have the population,
resource base and economic infrastructure that will allow them to
be self-sufficient and have an independent roie in the
international arena, but that have jurisdiction over land and
ocean areas that impact on the security interests of the Unitea
States
.
Clearly Island states that are impoverished or have
disaffected populations present obstacles to both efficient
administration and/or military security. Unfortunately, the
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execution of sound policy protective of both American and Islands
interests is hampered by confusion of policies by government,
agencies, the special interest lobbying of various groups in
Congress, and by a lack of understanding on all sides concerning
the needs of others involved in an issue. Furthermore, for
American planners, it is clear that strategic questions cannot be
disentangled from those of political status of the Islands and
the economic bases on which autonomous regimes there can stand.
On these matters, consultation with Island leaders must be an
integral part of Pacific security policy. [37:236]
As stated before, the United States needs to expend more time
and effort in reaching agreements with the Island states on what
is the best way for these states to reach some level of economic
development that will allow them some level of self-sufficiency.
Perhaps the best means is for the United States, along with other
interested Western states (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, etc.),
to help the Island states establish an infrastructure that will
enable them to play a greater role in harvesting their own
available resources.
As noted in the chapter dealing with the fishing issue, there
is potential for future disputes over other issues, such as
mineral resources located on the ocean floor. Additionally, it
has been pointed out that there is a lack of knowledge on ail
sides as to how the other side conducts its domestic politics. I
believe this has arisen because in the past the United States has
depended upon Australia and New Zealand as go betweens. For the
future then, in order to help the United States resolve issues
with the Island states, and perhaps head them off before they
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really develop, it is important for the United States to
establish a greater political presence in the region.
The United States is currently seeking to negotiate a
regional fisheries agreement that would resolve legal differences
over tuna fishing by American-owned tuna boats within the
Islands' exclusive economic zones. Negotiations are also in
progress on an environmental protection convention for the region
to protect its fragile ecological system from pollution. This
convention would address the issue of disposal of low-level
radioactive waste, a matter of great concern to the islanders.
[19:2] These are ali positive steps in seeking to establish a
firm, cooperative relationship with states in the region.
Thirdly, in dealing with threats to the region and also to
the interests of the United States, my research placed heavy
emphasis on the Soviet threat to the region, along with those
states which are in the Soviet power orbit. There are those who
say that the United States is too preoccupied with the Soviet
threat and that United States policy should not be constantly
aimed at countering Soviet moves worldwide. Furthermore, these
same individuals point out that the Soviet Union is not behind
all the turmoil in the world and that the United States muse
understand other causes under ly trouble spots on the globe.
I agree that the Soviet Union is not the cause of ail the
region's or world's problems. Certainly, in the Southwest
Pacific, France policy is doing much to foster policy problems
for the United States. However, the Soviet Union has shown it is
more than willing to take advantage of 'windows of opportunity'
that are presented to it.
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American national security planners and decisionmakers must.
be concerned with the Soviet threat as the primary one to U.S.
and Western political, economic and social systems. No one can
say that the United States should not be constantly concerned
over how the Soviet's might exploit any opportunity anywhere on
the globe to further the shift of world power towards a stronger
Soviet position versus the U.S. (the prime capitalist enemy)
specifically and the capitalist world in general.
As has been noted, the Soviet Union's political and strategic
interests are inimical to those of the states in the Southwest
Pacific and that there has been an apparent growth of concern in
regional attitudes about Soviet international policies and
behavior. [23:723 However, this 'we don't want you' attitude on
the part of the region is unlikely to deter Soviet attempts to
gain a foothold in the region, since for the Soviet Union,
success in the region extends Soviet power. On the other hand,
success in the Southwest Pacific for the United States simply
means that a nation manages to maintain its own independence. It
avoids incorporation. It may or may not make a contribution to
collective strength. £29:8]
The Soviet process of incremental incorporation and
consolidation of power provides a excuse for some in the Western
world into deluding themselves about what is really happening.
One of the favorite theoretical devices that some people use to
remain unconcerned about these processes is the theory that such
events are merely ongoing episodes in the ongoing process of
modernization; that they are merely "normal" examples of regional
turmoil, inevitable incidents on the road to modernization,
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without any significant international content or relevance.
[29:8] For the United States and its allies to adopt such an
attitude to the present or future difficulties in the Southwest
Pacific, would in the long term produce unnecessary riskss on
their national interests.
Although the Soviet Union obviously has the right to discuss
fishing agreements with the Island states, it should be American
policy to develop measures which give the Island states no reason
to consider turning to the USSR for such assistance, which could
give the Soviets undue political influence in Island countries
that have very fragile economies. Denial of Soviet economic
influence among the small Island states of the Southwest Pacific
is in the strategic interest of the United States.
The ability of the Soviet Union, and those other states in
the totalitarian orbit, to increase its political, economic and
military presence in the Southwest Pacific will largely depend on
the opportunities that the United States and other Western states
present to it. Any United States response, as well as other
concerned Western countries, must recognize the key role of the
West's superior economic assets in reducing the appeal of Soviet
blandishments. If American economic assets are combined with a
sensitivity to local regional issues (which are more concerned
with domestic economic problems than external threats) and there
is a sufficient display of regional military cooperation then
Soviet gains in the region will be held to a minimum [23:753
.
My research shows that there are currently shortcomings in
United States policy in the Southwest Pacific. First, the United
States can no longer rely on its AN2US partners, specifically New
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Zealand, to act as middlemen for American interests in the
region. The United States must take a more active role and a
greater presence in the Southwest Pacific. Secondly, the lack of
real involvement in Island affairs in the past has led to current
disputes between the Island states and the United States. These
disputes, especially over the use of EEZs,, provides the Soviet
Union with opportunities for increasing its ability to penetrate
the region and perhaps gain a real foothold in the Southwest
Pacific. The United States must start treating its disputes with
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Until the Minister in charge moves to introduce this Bill, this copy
is for the information of members only (S.O. 206)
NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT,
AND ARMS CONTROL BILL
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This Bill establishes in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone, promotes and encour-
ages an active and effecuve contribution by New Zealand to the essential process
of disarmament and international arms control, and implements in New Zealand
the following treaties:
(a) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985 (the text of
which is set out in the First Schedule to the Bill):
(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out
in the Second Schedule to the Bill):
(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968
(the text of which is set out in the Third Schedule to the Bill):
(d) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and
the Seafioor and in the Subsoil Thereof of 11 February 1971 (the text
of which is set out in the Fourth Schedule to the Bill):
(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction of 10 Apnl 1972 (the text of which is set out in the
Fifth Schedule to the Bill).
Clause 1 relates to the Short Tide of the Bill.
Clause 2 defines terms used in the Bill.
Clause J provides that the Act shall bind the Crown.
Clause 4 defines the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which is to comprise
—
(a) All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of
New Zealand; and
(b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and
(c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and




Prohibitions in Relation to Nuclear Explosive Devices and Biological Weapons
Clause 5: Subclause (I) provides that no person, who is a New Zealand citken
or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand
Nuclear Free Zone,
—
(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive
device: or
fb) Aid. assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have
control over any nuclear explosive device.
Subclause (2) provides that no person, who is a New Zealand cirizen or a person
ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown,
shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.
—
(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive
device; or
(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have
control over any nuclear explosive device.
• Clause 6 provides that no person shall emplani, emplace. transport on land or
inland waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device m
the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.
Clause 7 provides that no person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.
• Clause 3 provides that no person shall manufacture, stadon, acquire, or possess,
or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free
Zone.
f Clause 9: Subclause (1) provides that when the Prime Minister is considcrine
whether to grant aoproval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal
waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant
informadon and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including
informadon and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New
Zealand.
£ Subclause (2) provides that the Prime Minister mav only grant approval for the
entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime
Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive
device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.
Clause 10: Subclause (1) provides that when the Prime Minister is considering
whether to grant approval to the landing in New Zealand of foreign military
aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have regard to ail relevant informadon and
advice that mav be available to the Prime Minister including informadon and
advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.
Subclause (2) provides that the Prime Minister may only grant approval to the
landing in New Zealand bv any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is
satisfied that the foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive
device when it lands in New Zealand.
Subclause (J) provides that any such approval may relate to a category or class
of foreign military aircraft and may be given for such period as is specified in
the approval.
•# Clause 1 1 provides that entry into the internal waters of New Zealand bv anv





Clause 12 provides that nothing in the Bill shall apply to or be interpreted as
limiting the freedom of
—
(a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with
international law) through the territorial sea of New Zealand;, or
(b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance
with international law) through or over any strait used for international
navigation: or
(c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.
Clause 13 provides that nothing in the Bill shall be interpreted as limiting the
immunities of
—
(a) Anv foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes: or
(b) Any foreign military aircraft: or
(c) Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) of the clause applies.
Offences
Clause 14: Subclause (1) makes it an offence to contravene or fail to comply
with any provision of clauses 5 to 8.
Subclause (2) provides that every person who commits such an offence is liable
on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
Clause 15 provides that no information shall be laid against any person for
such an offence without the leave of the Attorney-General
Public Advisory CommUtee on Disarmament and Arms Control
Clause 16 establishes the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and
Arms Control.
Clause 17: Subclause (I) provides that the functions of the Committee shall be:
(a) To advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament
and arms control matters as it thinks fit:
(b) To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of the Act:
(c) To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament
and arms control matters and on the implementation of the Act.
Subclause (2) provides that the Committee shall have all such powers as are
reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its functions.
Clause 18 relates to the membership of the Committee. Its Chairman is to be
the Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control.
Clause 19 relates to the procedure of the Committee.
Clause 20 provides for the remuneration and travelling expenses of the
membership of the Committee.
Clause 21 provides that all expenditure incurred under or in the administration
of the Act is to be payable out of money appropriated by Parliament for the
purpose.
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Amendments to Other Acts
Clause 22: Subclause (1) inserts a new section 21a into the Marine Pollution Act
1974. The new section creates a number of offences in relation to the dumping
of radioactive waste.
Radioactive waste means material and substances of any kind, form, or
description having a specific radioactivity exceeding 1 00 kilbecquerels per' kilogram
and a total radioactivity exceeding 3 kilobecquerels.
Every person who is guilty of an offence under the new section
—
(a) Is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding SI 00,000; and
(b) Is also liable to pay such amount as the Court may assess in respect of the
expenses and costs that have been incurred or will be incurred in
removing or cleaning up or dispersing the waste to which the offence
relates.
Subclause (2) amends section 22b of the Marine Polludon Act 1974. The effect
of the amendment is that no permit under that section is to authorise the dumping
of radioacuve waste.
Clause 2J inserts a new secdon 1 0a into the Diplomadc Privileges and Immunities
Act 1968. The new section provides that the Governor-General may. from time
to time, bv Order in Council, confer upon anv persons who are appointed as
LnsDectors pursuant to anv international agreement on disarmament or arms
control all or anv of the pnvileees and immunities specified in the Third Schedule
to that Act.
Clause 24 amends the First Schedule to the Official Informaoon Act 1982. The
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control is to be an
organisation to which that Act applies.
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An Act to establish in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone,
to promote and encourage an active and effective
contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of
disarmament and international arms control, and to
implement in New Zealand the following treaties:
No. 00—1
166
2 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and
Arms Control
(a) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6
August 1985 (the text of which is set out in the
First Schedule to this Act):
(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 5
of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out
in the Second Schedule to this Act):
(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1 July 1968 (the text of which is
set out in the Third Schedule to this Act): 10
(d) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and the Seafloor and in the Subsoil Thereof
of 11 February 1971 (the text of which is set 15
out in the Fourth Schedule to this Act):
(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 20
1972 (the text of which is set out in the Fifth
Schedule to this Act):
BE n ENACTED by the General Assembly of New Zealand




l.*Short Title—This Act may be cited as the New Zealand
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1985.
2. Interpretation—In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,
—
"Biological weapon" means any microbial or biological 30
agent or toxin designed for use as a weapon in armed
conflict or for other hostile purposes; and includes
equipment designed to facilitate such use:
"Distress" includes force majeure, emergencies, or extreme
weather condidons: 35
"Foreign military aircraft" means any aircraft, as denned
in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971, which is for the
time being engaged in the service of or subject to the
authority or direction of the military authorities of anv
state other than New Zealand: 40
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"Foreign warship" means any ship, as defined in section 2
of the Defence Act 1971, which
—
(a) Belongs to the armed forces of a state other than
New Zealand; and
5 (b) Bears the external marks that distinguishes ships
of that state's nationality; and
(c) Is under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the Government of that state; and
(d) Is manned by a crew under regular armed forces
10 discipline:
"Internal waters of New Zealand" means the internal
waters of New Zealand as defined by section 4 of the
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977:
"Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or
15 other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear
energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could
be used, whether assembled, partly assembled, or
unassembled; but does not include the means of
transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if
20 separable from and not an indivisible part of it:
"Passage" means continuous and expeditious navigation
without stopping or anchoring except in as much as
these are incidental to ordinary navigation or are
rendered necessary by distress or for the purpose of
25 rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in
distress: " .
"Territorial sea of New Zealand" means the territorial sea
- of New Zealand as- defined by section 3 of the
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977.
30 3. Act to bind the Crown—This Act shall bind the Crown.
4. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone—There is hereby
established the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which shall
comprise:
(a) All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the
35 territorial limits of New Zealand; and
(b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and
(c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and
(d) The airspace above the areas specified in paragraphs (a)
to (c) of this section.
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Arms Control
Prohibitions in Relation to Nuclear Explosive Devices
and Biological Weapons
5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive
devices—(l)No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a
person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the 5
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,
—
(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over,
any nuclear explosive device; or
(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire,
possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive 10
device.
(2) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person
ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or




(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over,
any nuclear explosive device; or
(b) Aid, assist, or abet any person to manufacture, acquire,
possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive
device. 20
6. Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive
devices—No person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land
or inland waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear
explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.
7. Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices— 25
No person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New
Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.
8. Prohibition of biological weapons—No person shall
manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over
any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone. 30
9. Entry into internal waters of New Zealand—(1) When
the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval
to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of
New Zealand, the Prune Minister shall have regard to all
relevant information and advice that may be available to the 35
Prime Minister including information and advice concerning
the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.
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(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry
into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships
if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be
carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into
5 the internal waters of New Zealand.
10. Landing in New Zealand—(1) When the Prime Minister
is considering whether to grant approval to the landing in New
Zealand of foreign military aircraft, the Prime Minister shall
have regard to all relevant information and advice that may
10 be available to the Prime Minister including information and
advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New
Zealand.
(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the
landing in New Zealand by any foreign military aircraft if the
15 Prime Minister is satisfied that the foreign military aircraft will
not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when it lands in
New Zealand.
(3) Any such approval may relate to a category or class of
foreign military aircraft and may be given for such period as
20 is specified in the approval.
11. Visits by nuclear powered ships—Entry into the
internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion
is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.
Savings ~
25 12. Passage through territorial sea and straits—Nothing
in this Act shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the
freedom of
—
(a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in
accordance with international law) through the
30 territorial sea of New Zealand; or
(b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage
(in accordance with international law) through or over
any strait used for international navigation; or
(c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.
35 13. Immunities—Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted
as limiting the immunities of
—
(a) Any foreign warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes; or
(b) any foreign military aircraft; or
40 (c) Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this section applies.
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Offences
14. Offences and penalties—(1) Every person commits an
offence against this Act who contravenes or fails to comply
with any provision of sections 5 to 8 of this Act.
(2) Every person who commits an offence against this Act is 5
liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding 10 years.
15. Consent of Attorney-General to proceedings in




(a) An offence against this Act; or
(b) The offence of conspiring to commit an offence against
this Act; or




except with the consent of the Attorney-General:
Provided that a person alleged to have committed any
offence mentioned in this subsection may be arrested, or a
warrant for any such person's arrest may be issued and
executed, and anv such person may be remanded in custody 20
or on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attornev
General to the laying of an information for the offence has
not been obtained, but no further or other proceedings shall
be taken until that consent has been obtained.
(2) The AttorneyGeneral may, before deciding whether or 25
not to give consent under subsection ("V) of this section, make
such inquiries as the AttorneyGeneral thinks fit.
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control
16. Establishment of Public Advisory Committee on
Disarmament and Arms Control—There is hereby 30
established a committee to be called the Public Advisory
Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.
17. Functions and powers of Committee—(l)The
functions of the Committee shall be
—
(a) To advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects 35
of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks
fit:
(b) To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of
this Act:
(c) To publish from time to time public reports in relation 40
to disarmament and arms control matters and on the
implementation of this Act.
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(2) The Committee shall have all such powers as are
reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its
functions.
18. Membership of Commince—(l)The Committee shall
5 consist of 7 members, of whom
—
(a) One shall be the Minister for Disarmament and Arms
Control, who shall be the Chairman; and
(b) One shall be the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or another
officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nominated
10 from time to time by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
and
(c) One shall be the Secretary of Defence or another officer
of the Ministry of Defence nominated from time to
time by the Secretary of Defence; and
1 5 (d) Four shall be appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
(2) Each member of the Committee appointed under
subsection (1) (d) of this section holds office at the pleasure of
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
(3) The functions and powers of the Committee shall not be
20 affected by any vacancy in its membership.
19. Procedure of Commince—Subject to any directives
given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Committee may
regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.
20. Remuneration and travelling expenses—The
25 Committee is hereby declared to be a statutory Board within
the meaning of the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951.
(2) There shall be paid to the members of the Committee,
out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose,
remuneration by way of fees or allowances, and travelling
30 allowances and expenses, in accordance with the Fees and
Travelling Allowances Act 1951, and the provisions of that Act
shall apply accordingly.
21. Money to be appropriated by Parliament for
purposes or this Act—All fees, salaries, allowances, and other
35 expenditure payable or incurred under or in the administration
of this Act shall be payable out of money to be appropriated
by Parliament for the purpose.
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Arms Control
Amendments to Other Acts
22. Amendments to Marine Pollution Act 1974—(l)The
Marine Pollution Act 1974 is hereby amended by inserting,
after section 21 (as enacted by section 4 of the Marine Pollution
Amendment Act 1980), the following secdon: 5
"21 a. Offence to dump radioactive waste—
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the
persons mentioned in subsection (2) of this section commit an
offence if
—
"(a) Any radioactive waste is taken on board any ship or 1
aircraft in New Zealand or in New Zealand waters
for the purpose of dumping; or
"(b) Any radioactive waste is dumped into New Zealand
waters from any ship or aircraft to which this Part
of this Act applies; or 1
5
"(c) Any radioactive waste is dumped into the sea from any
offshore installation or fixed or floating platform or
other artificial structure to which this Part of this
Act applies; or
"(d) Any radioactive waste is dumped into the sea, other 20
than in New Zealand waters, from any New Zealand
ship or home-trade ship or New Zealand aircraft.
"(2) The persons who are guilty of an offence under
subsection (1) of this section are as follows:
"(a) In any case to which paragraph, (a), or paragraph (b), or 25
paragraph (d) of that subsection applies, the owner
and the master of the ship,"or (as the case may be)
the owner of the aircraft and the person in
possession of the aircraft:
"(b) In any case to which paragraph (cj of that subsection 30
applies, the owner of the offshore installation or
fixed or floating platform or other artificial structure
and the person having control of its operations.
"(3) For the purposes of this section, radioactive waste means
material and substances of any kind, form, or description 35
having a specific radioactivity exceeding 100 kilobecquerels per
kilogram and a total radioactivity exceeding 3 kilobecquerels.
"(4) Every person who is guilty of an offence under this
section
—
"(a) Is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 40
SI 00.000; and
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"(b) Is also liable to pay such amount as the Court may assess
in respect of the expenses and costs that have been
incurred or will be incurred in removing or cleaning
up or dispersing the waste to which the offence
5 relates.
"(5) Nothing in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of section 22 (1)
of this Act or in paragraph (a) of section 22 (2) of this Act
applies in respect of the dumping of radioactive waste."
(2) Section 22b of the Marine Pollution Act 1974 (as enacted
10 by section 4 of the Marine Pollution Amendment Act 1980) is
hereby amended by inserting, after subsection (6), the following
subsection:
"(6a) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, no permit shall
authorise the dumping of radioactive waste (as defined in section
15 21a (3) of this Act)."
23. Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities Act 1968—The Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities Act 1968 is hereby amended by inserting, after
section 10, the following section:
20 "10a. Privileges and immunities of international
inspectors pursuant to disarmament treaties—The
Governor-General may, from time to time, by Order in Council,
confer upon any persons who are appointed as inspectors
pursuant to any international agreement on disarmament or
25 arms control all or any of the privileges and immunities
specified in the Third Schedule to this Act."
24. Amendment to Official Information Act 1982—The
Official Information Act 1982 is hereby amended by inserting
in the First Schedule, after the item relating to the Phosphate
30 Commission of New Zealand, the following item:
"Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms
Control".
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Text of South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
Preamble
The Parties of this Treaty
United in their commitment to a world at peace;
Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the
risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all
people;
Convinced chat ail countries have an obligation to make everv effort to
achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which thev
hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;
Believing that regional arms concrol measures can contribute to global
efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the nauonal security
of each country in the region and the common security of all;
Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounrv
and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage
of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all
in peace:
Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the NonProliferauon of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and in contributing to world security;
Notinc, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognises the right
of any group of States to conclude regional treanes in order to assure the
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;
Noting that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of
nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil
thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific;
Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas,
contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere.
Ln Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific,
Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution bv
radioaenve wastes and other radioactive matter;
Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu
that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest
possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the
communique of that meeting;
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Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Usage of Terms
For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:
(a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex
1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;
(b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic
waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the
airspace above them;
(c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other
explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of
the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a
weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but
does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon
or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of ic
(d) "stationing" means emplanation, emplacement, transportation on land
or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.
Article 2
Application of the Treaty
(1) Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall
apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
(2) Noching in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights,
or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with
regard to freedom of the seas.
Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices
Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over
any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone:
(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition
of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or




(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production oT special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards
required by Article III. 1 o( the NPT, or
176
12 New Zealand Nuclear Tree Zone, Disarmament, and
Arms Control
FIRST SCHEDULE—continued
(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation
measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive
use;
(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-
proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA, safeguards
system.
Article 5
Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear
Explosive Devices
(1) Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any
nuclear explosive device.
(2) Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide
for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports
and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by
foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not
covered bv the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passaee
or transit passage of straits.
Prevention of Testing of Nuclear
Explosive Dlvices
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;
(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear
explosive device by any State.
Article 7
Prevention of Dumping
(1) Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea
anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone:
(b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive
matter by anvone in its territorial sea;
(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone
of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere
within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone:
id) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed
Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and
environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the
prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with
the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other
radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.
(2) Paragraph 1 (a) and 1 (b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention
and Protocol have entered into force.
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(l)The Parties hereby establish a control svstem for the purpose of
verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.
(2) The control system shall comprise:
(a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;
(b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);
(c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA
as provided for in Annex 2;
(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.
Article 9
Reports and Exchanges of Information
(1) Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau
for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant
event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty.
The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to ail Parties.
(2) The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters
arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information
by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.
(3) The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the
status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it,
incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and




; Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other
means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting
of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation




The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of
the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the
Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening
of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon
by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to
the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An
amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary
of acceptances from all Parties.
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(1) This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the' South
Pacific Forum.
(2) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary
of this Treaty and its Protocols.
(3) If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex
1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as required to enclose at least
the territory of that Party within the boundaries or the South Pacific Nuclear
Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraoh
shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.
Article IJ
WrTHDRAWAL
(l)This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violadon by any Party of a
provision of this Treaty essendal to the achievement of the objecuves of
the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the
right to withdraw from the Treaty.
(23 Withdrawal shall be effected by -giving nodce twelve months in advance
to the Director who shall circulate such nouce to all other Parues.
Article 14
Reservations
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
Article 15 -
Entry -into Force
(1) This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth
instrument of ratification.
(2) For a sienatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of
the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on
the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.
Article 16
Depositary Functions
The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified
copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific
Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty
and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its
Protocols.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their
Governments, have signed this Treaty.
Done at Rarotonga. this sixth dav of August. One thousand nine hundred
and eiehtv-five. in a single original in the English language.
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South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
A The area bounded by a line
—
(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the
maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;
(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its
intersection by the outer limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone of
Papua New Guinea;
(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that
outer limit to its intersection by the Equator
(4) thence east alone the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 163 degrees East:
(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersecnon by the parallel
of Latitude 3 degrees North;
(6) thence east alone that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 171 degrees Ease
(7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel
of Latitude 4 degrees North;
(8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 180 degrees Ease
(9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator.
(10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 165 degrees West;
(11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel
of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;
(12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 154 degrees West;
(13) thence south along that meridian to its'intersection by the Equator
(14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 115 degrees Wesc-
(15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel
of Latitude 60 degrees South;
( 1 6) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian
of Longitude 1 1 5 degrees East;
(17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection
by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;
(18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the
territorial sea of Auscralia to its intersection by the meridian of
Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;
(19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10
degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes Ease
(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia
and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between
those two countries;
(21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins
the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea,
on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and
(22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of
commencement.
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B The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian
islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north
of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shalTcease
to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the
depositary of written nodce from the Government of Australia stating
that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object
and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.
Annex 2
Iaea Safeguards
(1) The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party
be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and
concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable matenai
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Part, under
its jurisdiction or earned out under its control anywhere.
(2) The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be
equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in
connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in
document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each party shall take
all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for
it not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force
for that Parry of this Treaty.
(3) For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph
1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of
nuclear matenai from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive
devices.
(4) Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to
that Parry and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy
of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on
its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to
advise the Director prompdy of any subsequent findings of the Board
of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the
information of all Parties.
Annex 3
Consultative Committee
(1) There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be
convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Arucles 10
and 1 1 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be
constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Parry being enaded
to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers.
Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired
at any given meeting by the representative of the Parry which last
hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South
Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of
half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of
the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing
consensus, by a two-thirds majonty of those present and votine. The








ZONE OF APPLICATION OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF
NUCLEAR weapon! IN LATIN AMERICA
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(2) The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of sDecial
inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific




(DA Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that
another Parry is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall,
before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bnne the subject
matter of the complaint to the attenuon of the Partv complained of
and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with
an explanadon and to resolve the matter.
(2) If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party mav brine the
complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative
Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported
by an account of evidence of breach of oblieanons known to the
complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall
convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider
it.
(3) The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under
paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable
opportunity to provide it with an explanauon of the matter.
(4) if. after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives
of the Party complained of. the Consultative Committee decides that
there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special
inspection in the territory of that Partv or elsewhere, the Consuitauve
Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quicklv
as possible by a special inspection team -of three suitably qualified
special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in
consultanon with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided
that no nauonai of either Party shall serve on the special inspection
team. If so requested by the Party complained of. the special inspection
team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither
the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors,
nor the n^ht to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work
of the special inspection team.
(5) In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to
the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply
with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and
procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account
of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying
with its other international obligations and commitments and shall
not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA
pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2(1). The special
inspectors shall discharee their duties with due respect for the laws
of the Party complained of.
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(6) Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all
information and places within its territory which may be relevant to
enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to
them by the Consultative Committee.
(7) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate
the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges
and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions,
including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunitv
from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words
spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.
(8) The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to
the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out
relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting
evidence and documentauon as appropriate, and stating their
conclusions. The Consultauve Committee shall report fully to all
Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether
the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this
Treaty.
(9) If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained
of is in breach of its oblieauons under this Treaty, or that the above
provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request
of either the complainant or complained of Parry, the Parties shall
meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.
SECOND SCHEDULE
TEXT OF TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE. rN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER OF 5
AUGUST 1963
TREATY
banning nuclear weapon testa in
the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water
The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of
America hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties,"
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of
an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict
intemanonal control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations
which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incenove
to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear
weapons.
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all ume, determined to continue negotiauons to this end. and
desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by
radioacuve substances.
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Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE i
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit- to prevent,
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or anv other
nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere: bevond its limits, including outer space: or
underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris
to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this
connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice
to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of ail
nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the
conclusion of which, as the Parues have stated in the Preamble to this
Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Trearv undertakes furthermore to refrain
from causing, encouraging, or in anv wav participating in, the carrying
out of anv nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,
anywhere which would take place in anv of the environments described.
of have the effect referred to. in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article II
1. Any Parry may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of anv
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments
which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Trearv. Thereafter, if requested
to do so by one-third or more ot the parties, the Depositary Governments
shall convene a conference, to which they shall invue all the Parues. to
consider such amendment.
2. Anv amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majontv of
the votes of all the Parues to this Trearv-. including the votes of all of the
Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon
the deposit of instruments of ratificadon by a majority of all the Parties,
including the instruments of rauficadon of all of the Original Parries.
Article III
1. This Trearv shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which
does not sign this Trearv before its enrry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any rime.
2. This Trearv shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Original Parues— the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and the United States of America—which are hereby designated the
Deposuary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its rauficauon by all the
Original Parues and the deposit of their instruments o( rauficauon.
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4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force
on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall prompdy inform all signatory
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of
its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences
or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its nauonal sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties
to the Treaty three months in advance.
Article V
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic,
shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary
Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this
Treaty.
Done in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one
thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.
For the Government of For the Government of For the Government of
the United Kingdom the Union of Soviet the United States of
of Great Britain and Socialist Republics America
Northern Ireland
HOME A. TPOMblKO DEAN RUSK
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Text of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of
1 July 1968
TREATY
ON THE NON-PROUFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties
to the Treacy",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by
a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the
danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of
peoples.
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously
enhance the danger of nuclear war.
In conformicy with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly
calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider
dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
ExDressin? their support for research, development and other efforts to
further the applicauon. within the framework of the Internauonai Atomic
Lnersy Agencv safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively
the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments
and other techniques at certain strategic points.
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology, including any technological byproducts which may be derived
by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive
devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,
whether nuclear weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treatv
are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scienufic
information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operauon with other
States to the further development of the applications of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.
Declaring: their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in
the direction of nuclear disarmament.
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Recalling the determination expressed bv the Parties to the 1963 Treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under
water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiauons
to this end.
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the
strenztherung of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessauon of
the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles, and the eliminauon from nauonal arsenals of nuclear weapons
and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treatv on seneral and
complete disarmament under stnct and effective internauonai control.
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Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of anv
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace
and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments
of the world's human and economic resources.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirecdy; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Parry to the Trearv undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirecdy; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to
seek or receive any assistance m the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
„
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded
with the International Atomic Energy Agency m accordance with the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards
system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article
shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material
whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article
shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful
nuclear acuvities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction,
or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
desiened or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this Article.
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3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a
manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid
hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including
the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the
processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in
accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of
safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the
requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States
in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agencv.
Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 davs from the
original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their
instruments of ratification or accession after the 1 80-day period, negotiation
of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit.
Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after
the date of initiation of negouations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Trearv shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of thus Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the nght
to participate in. the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuciear
energy. Parties to the Trearv in a position to do so shall also co-operate
in contributing alone or together with other States or intemaaonal
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs
of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to
ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international
observauon and through appropriate international procedures, potential
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made
available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-
discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research
and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be
able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement
or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representauon of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject
shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Trearv so desiring may also obtain such
benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
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Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective intemauonai
control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons
in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty mav propose amendments to this Treaty.
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon,
if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treatv,
the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they
shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of
the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date
the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into
force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the
amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratificauon bv a
majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratificauon of all
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on
the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall
enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of
ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At
intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty
mav obtain, bv submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary
Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective
of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article DC
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Anv State which
does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at anv time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratificauon by signatory States.
Instruments of raufication and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
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3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the Slates,
the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and
forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their
instruments of rauficarion. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force
on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratificadon or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall prompdy inform all signatory and
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratificauon or of accession, the date of the entry into force
of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a
conference or other nodces.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursuant to Aracle 102 of the Charter of the United Nadons.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the ri^ht
to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related
to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. It shall give nooce of such withdrawal to ail other Parties
to the Treaty and to the United Nadons Security Council three months in
advance. Such nonce shall include a statement of the extraordinary events
it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference
shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.
This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French. Spanish and Chinese texts of
which are equally authendc, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.
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Text of Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof of 1 1 February
1971
TREATY




DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED
AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN
THE SUBSOIL THEREOF
The States Parties to this Treatv,
Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the
exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes.
Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed
and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces
international tensions and strengthens friendly relaaons among States,
Convinced that this Treaty consurutes a step towards the exclusion of
the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race.
Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
and determined to continue negouations to this end.
Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles
of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas.
Have agreed as follows:
Article I -
:1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace
on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons
or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures,
launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing,
testing or using such weapons.
2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this Article shall also apply to
the sea-bed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within
such sea-bed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to
the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters.
3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage
or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph ! of
this Article and not to pamdpate in any other way in such actions.
Article II
For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the sea-bed zone referred
to in Article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the
zone referred to in Pan II of the Convenuon on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958. and shall be
measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I. Section II, of that
Convenuon and in accordance with internauonal law.
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1. In order to promote the objectives of and ensure compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the
right to verify through observation the acdvides of other States Pardes to
the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof
beyond the zone referred to in Article I, provided that observadon does
not interfere with such acdvides.
2. If after such observadon reasonable doubts remain concerning the
fulfilment of the obligadons assumed under the Treaty, the State Partv
having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activines
giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts.
If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the
other States Parties, and the Pardes concerned shall cooperate on such
further procedures for venficadon as may be agreed, including appropriate
inspecuon of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that
reasonably mav be expected to be of a kind described in Article I. The
Parties in the region ol the activities, including any coastal State, and anv
other Parry so requesting, shall be ennded to participate in such consultanon
and co-operation. After completion of the further procedures for venficaaon.
an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that
initiated such procedures.
3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable
doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installanon
or other facility, the State Partv having such doubts shall noufv and make
appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of
any other State Partv. If it is ascertained through these mauines that a
particular State Party is responsible for the acnviues. that State Partv shall
consult and co-operate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of
this Arucle. If the identity of the State responsible for the acnviues cannot
be ascertained through these inauines, then further verification Drocedures.
including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Partv, which
shall invite the participation of the; Parties in the region of the acuvities,
including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to co-operate.
4. If consultation and co-operation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of
this Article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and
there remains a serious question concerning fulfilment of the obligations
assumed under this Treaty, a State Parry may, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the
Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.
5. Verification pursuant to this .Article may be undertaken by any State
Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of anv
other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within
the framework of the United Nauons and in accordance with its Charter.
6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with
activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard
for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of
the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration
and exploitauon of their continental shelves.
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Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing
the posiuon of any State Party with respect to existing international
conventions, including the 1958 Convendon on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party
may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or
claims asserted by any other State, related to waters of its coasts, including
inter alia, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the sea-bed and the
ocean floor, including continental shelves.
Article V
The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good
faith concerning further measures in the held of disarmament for the
prevenuon of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsod
thereof.
Article VI
Any State Party mav propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments
shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon
their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and.
thereafter, for each remaining State Parry on the date of acceptance by it.
Article VII
Five years after the entrv into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties
to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. Such review
shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review
conference shall determine, in accordance' with the views of a majority of
those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference
shall be convened.
Article VIII
Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject-matter of this Treaty have jeopardised the
suoreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to
all other States Parties to the Treatv and to the United Nauons Security
Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of
the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardised its supreme
interests.
Article IX
The provisions of this Treaty shall in no wav affect the obligations
assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments
establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.
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1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which
does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America,
which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treary shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments
of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments
designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments
of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratifiction or of accession, of the date
of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursuant to Article 1 02 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XI
This Trearv. the English. Russian. French. Spanish and Chinese texts of
which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
States signatory and acceding thereto.
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Text of Convention on the Prohibition of the Development.
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972
CONVENTION
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION
AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)
AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
The States Parties to this Convention,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards
general and complete disarmament, including the prorubidon and
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced
that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of
chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination,
through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
and conscious also of the contnbuuon which the said Protocol has already
made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war.
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objecuves of that
Protocol and calling upon all States to comply stricdy with them.
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly
condemned ail actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the
Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples
and the general improvement of the international atmosphere.
Desiring also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations,
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals
of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass
destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (bilogicai) agents.
Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the
achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition
of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and
determined to continue negotiations to that end.
Determined for the sake of ail mankind, to exclude completely the
possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as
weapons.
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of
mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk.
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Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in anv circumstances
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin
or method of production, of types and in quanddes that have no
justihcadon for prophylacdc, protecdve or other peaceful purposes:
(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
Article n
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert
to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months
after the entry into force of the Convendon, all agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convendon,
which are in its possession or under its jurisdicdon or control. In
implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precaudons
shall be observed to protect populadons and the environment.
Article III
Each State Party to this Convendon undertakes not to transfer to anv
recipient whatsoever, direcdy or indirecdy, and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any State, group of States or intemadonal
organisanons to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the
Convennon.
Article IV
Each State Party to this Convendon shall, in accordance with its
consnrudohal processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and
prevent the development, producdon, stockpiling, acquisidon or retenaon
of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified
in Article I of the Convendon. within the territory of such State, under its
jurisdicdon or under its control anywhere.
Article V
The States Parties to this Convendon undertake to consult one another
and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in reladon to
the objecdve of, or in the applicadon of the provisions of, the Convendon.
Consuitadon and cooperation pursuant to this Article may also be
undertaken through appropriate intemadonal procedures within the
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
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(l)Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State
Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the
Convendon may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming
its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.
(2) Each State Parry to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in
carrying out any invesdgarion which the Security Council may initiate, in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on
the basis of the comdaint received by the Council. The Security Council
shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the
investiganon.
Article VII
Each State Parry to this Convention undertakes to provide or support
assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Parry to
the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council derides that such
Parry has been exposed to danger as a result of violanon of the Convention.
Article VIII
Nothing in this Convennon shall be interpreted as in any wav limiting
or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other




Each State Parry to this Convennon affirms the recognised objective of
effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to
continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching earlv agreement
on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production
and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures
concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the
production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.
Article X
(1) The State Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials ana scientific and technological information for the use of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties
to the Convention in a posinon to do so shall also co-operate in contributing
individually or together with other States or intemauonal organisations to
the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field
of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful
purposes.
(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid
hampering the economic or technological development of States Parucs to
the Convennon or international co-operauon in the field of peaceful
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bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange
of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the
processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
Article XI
Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention.
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the
amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the State Parties to
the Convendon and thereafter for each remaining State Parry on the date
of acceptance by it.
Article XII
Five years after the entry into force of this Convendon. or earlier if it
is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convendon by submitting a
proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of
States Parries to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to
review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including
the provisions concerning negouations on chemical weapons, are being
realised. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and
technological developments relevant to the Convention.
Article XIII
'DThis Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
(2) Each State Parry to this Convention shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convenuon.
have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice
of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the
United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such nooce shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardised its supreme interests.
Article XIV
(DThis Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State
which does not sign the Convention before its enrrv into force in accordance
with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments
of ratification bv twenty-two Governments, including the Governments
designated as Depositaries of the Convention.
(4) For States whose instruments of ranficauon or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into
force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
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(5) The Depositary Governments shall orompdy inform all signatory and
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit o£ each
instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into
force of this Convendon. and of the receipt of other nodces.
(6) This Convendon shall be registered by the Depositary Governments
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United nadons.
Article XV
This Convention, the English, Russian, French. Spanish and Chinese texts
of which are equally authentic shall be deposited in the archives of the
Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.
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APPENDIX B
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND,




. Siened at San Francisco September 1. 1951: ratification adcised frv the
Senate of the United States of America March 20. 1952: ratified by the
President of the United States of America April 15, 1952; ratification of the
United States of America deposited with the Government cf Australia at
Canberra April 29. 1952: proclaimed /n- the President of the I nited States
of America \/av 9. 1952: entered into force April 2 (K 1952.
Bt the Presided or the United States or America
A PROCLAMATION
WiiEKEAfl the Security Treaty between Australia, Neu Zealand, and
the United States of America was sipned at San Francisco on Septem-
ber I, 1931 by their respective plenipotentiaries, the oripnai of which
Treatv is word for word as follows:
Source: U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements^. 1352, v. 3, Government Printing Office,







pari iv (it rraisunc* u>
MUM*.
The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nation? and their desire to live in peace with all
peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric
of peace in the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant
to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has
armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus. and
upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also
station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation
of peace and security in the Japan Area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside
a? well as within the Pacific Area.
Desinnc to declare pubhciy and formally their sense of unity, so
that no potential agirressor could be under the illusion that any of
them stand alone in tne Pacific Area, and
I>e?irinc further to coordinate their effort? for collective defense
for the preservation of peace and security pending the development
of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific
Area,
Therefore declare and agree as follows:
Anncle I
The Parties undertake, a? set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international dispute? in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article II
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty
the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual
and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
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Arttclk III
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any
of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security
of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.
Article IV
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area
on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
Article V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan
territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its
jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or air-
craft in the Pacific.
Article VI
This Treaty does not unVet and shall not be interpreted as aifecting
in any way the nchts and obligations of the Parties under the Charter
of the United Nations or tfte responsibility of the United Nations for
tne maintenance of international peace and security.
Article VII
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign
Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the im-
plementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so orsanized as
to be able to meet at any time.
Article VIII
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of re-
gional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United
Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and
security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to
maintain a consultative relationship with States. Regional Organiza-
tions. Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area
in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to

















entry This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification
shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia,
which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The
Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signa-
tories have been deposited.
Apticle X
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may
cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one
year after notice has been jriven to the Government of Australia,
which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit
of such notice.
Article XI
This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the
archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies
thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Government?
of each of the other signatories.
Ik witness whereof the undersipned Plenipotentiaries iiave signed
this Treaty.











I, Alfred Herbert Body, First Secretary of the Department of External Af-
fairs. Canberra. Australia, hebfbt cfbtift that the foregoing is a true copy of
the text of the original Security Treaty concluded between the Governments of
Australia. New Zealand and the United States of America on the first day of
September. One thousand, nine hundred and fifty-one.
tiivr.N under my hand and the seal of the Department of External Affairs this
fourth day of October, One thousand, nine hundred and nfty-one.
[seal] A. H. Bodt.
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Whereas the Senate of the United States of America by their resolu-
tion of March 20, 1952. two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Treaty;
Whereas the said Treaty was duly ratified by the President of the
United States of America on April 15, 1952, in pursuance of the
aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate;
Whereas it is provided in Article IX of the said Treaty that the
Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the instruments of ratification
of the signatories- have been deposited with the Government of
Australia;
Whereas instruments of ratification of the said Treaty were de-
posited with the Government of Australia on April 29. 1952 by Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the United States of America:
And whereas, pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Article IX Ealnr ""• ,vnt
of the said Treaty, the Treaty came into force on April 29. 1952;
Now. therefore, be it known that I, Harry S. Truman, President
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public
the said Security Treaty between Australia. New Zealand, and the
Unued States of America to the end that the same and every article and
clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, on and
after April 29, 1952. by the United States of America and by the
citizens of the United States of America and all other persons sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof.
Ix testxmont wHEREor. I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this ninth day of Mav in the vear
of our L#jrd one rhousand nine hundred riftv-two and of
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